People
v
Richardson
141752
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Issue: During an altercation with his neighbors, who were standing outside the defendant’s home, the defendant shot two people, seriously wounding them. The defendant was charged with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense, saying that he feared for his wife and himself when one of the neighbors started hitting his screen door with a baseball bat. The defendant also testified that he and his wife were fearful because the neighbors, who had been hostile to them before, had been drinking and taking drugs. A jury found the defendant guilty of assault and felony-firearm. The defendant challenged his convictions in the Court of Appeals, claiming in part that the evidence showed he acted in self-defense. But the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions. Did the defendant have a duty to retreat? Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions? Was the jury properly instructed on the elements of self-defense? Was the defendant denied his constitutional right to due process because the trial court was allegedly biased against him?

Background>>

***ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO ADJOURN ORAL ARGUMENT GRANTED***

Issue: Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, felony-murder, three counts of assault with intent to murder, and felony-firearm. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his attorney provided ineffective assistance during pretrial plea negotiations. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the trial court found that counsel gave inadequate advice to the defendant and that, absent this lapse, it was reasonably likely that the defendant would have accepted the plea deal that he was offered. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s assessment. May a defendant claim that counsel was ineffective during pretrial proceedings where he has received a fair trial? If so, what remedies are available to the defendant?

Background:
  

After her son was injured in an automobile accident, the plaintiff sued the defendant insurance company, seeking personal protection insurance benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act. She requested that the insurer cover the purchase of a handicap-accessible home, modifications to the home, and past rental costs. The trial court ruled that the insurance company was not liable for the family’s entire housing costs, but only for the increased costs caused by the son’s injuries. To what extent is the insurer liable under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for housing expenses, modifications, and accommodations associated with the plaintiff’s son’s care? Was Griffith v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich 521 (2005), correctly decided?

People
v
Fackelman
(Charles)
139856
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The defendant in this criminal case presented an insanity defense. A hospital psychiatrist examined the defendant and prepared a report, but did not testify at the trial, and his report was not admitted into evidence. Both experts who did testify at the defendant’s trial reviewed the psychiatrist report, and the prosecutor used it at trial to impeach an expert witness for the defense. The jury found the defendant guilty but mentally ill. The Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecutor properly impeached the defense expert with the report, but improperly elicited testimonial hearsay during the examination of his own expert, violating Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). However, that error was harmless, the Court of Appeals concluded. Was the content of the report testimonial in nature under Crawford? Did the introduction of the psychiatrist’s opinion regarding the defendant’s mental state constitute impermissible hearsay?  Was any error harmless?

Tus
v
Hurt
139769
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The plaintiffs purchased property that the seller had mortgaged. The bank that issued the mortgage had misplaced the file, and the mortgage was not paid off at the time of the sale. Five years later, the bank foreclosed upon the property. The plaintiffs filed a quiet title action, seeking to obtain clear title to the property. The trial court held that the bank’s delay prevented it from bringing a foreclosure action, but it awarded the bank a money judgment in the amount owed on the mortgage, and imposed a lien on the plaintiffs’ property. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that equity could not apply in a quiet title action and that the bank was entitled to judgment in its favor. Did the Court of Appeals reach the right result?

Great Wolf
Lodge
v
MPSC
139541
139542
139544
139545
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Cherryland Electric Cooperative provided service to a farm for many years and maintained a “service drop” at the property after the farm was no longer in operation. The plaintiff purchased the property to construct a water park and resort. Cherryland Electric claimed that it was entitled to continue providing electricity to the customer on the property, and it eventually did. A dispute about the rate Cherryland Electric charged led the plaintiff to file a complaint for a partial refund with the Michigan Public Service Commission. An administrative law judge ordered a refund with interest, and fined Cherryland Electric. The MPSC agreed that Cherryland Electric had the right to provide electricity to the premises and that the plaintiff was entitled to a refund, but did not order interest or a fine. The circuit court affirmed, except that it remanded for determination of the amount of interest and a fine. The Court of Appeals reversed as to Cherryland Electric’s right to provide electricity to the premises. Does Cherryland Electric have the right to service the premises? Is the MPSC required by statute (MCL 460.558) to impose a fine? Must the MPSC order interest on a refund?

Robelin
v
Spectrum
Health
139860
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The plaintiff’s baby suffered a stroke within 24 hours of birth. The plaintiff contends that the defendant hospital and doctor committed medical malpractice and that their malpractice caused her child’s stroke. The plaintiff intends to call a pediatric neurologist as an expert witness on causation, but the defendants sought to strike him from the plaintiff’s witness list, arguing that his theories were not accepted in the scientific community. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion, concluding that the neurologist’s opinions were sufficient to be presented to the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the lower court properly analyzed the doctor’s proffered testimony and did not abuse its discretion by concluding that he should be allowed to testify. Does the expert’s proposed testimony meet the criteria of MCL 600.2955 and MRE 702?

People
v
Aceval
(Alexander)
138577
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At the defendant’s first trial on drug charges, the prosecutor offered testimony from a confidential informant who was part of the defendant’s drug enterprise. The informant lied about certain matters relating to his role in order to conceal the fact that he was the informant. Police officers who were involved in the investigation also testified falsely in support of the informant’s version of events. The trial judge was aware of this, but allowed the trial to proceed. The trial ended in a mistrial, with a hung jury. Before the defendant could be retried, the perjury came to light. The prosecutor was removed from the case and the trial judge stepped down. The case was reassigned, and set for a second trial. When new evidence came to light suggesting that the defendant solicited perjury to aid his defense, the defendant pled guilty. Does the prosecution’s acquiescence in the presentation of perjured testimony in order to conceal the identity of a confidential informant amount to misconduct that deprived the defendant of due process?  If so, what is the remedy – a new trial, or dismissal of the charges?

Klooster
v
City of
Charlevoix
140423
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The petitioner owns taxable real property subject to the caps on valuation imposed by Proposal A (Const 1963, art 9, § 3) and the General Property Tax Act. He and his father owned the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The petitioner became the sole owner when his father died in 2005. The respondent city issued an assessment notice for tax year 2006 indicating that, because of a transfer of ownership, the property was not subject to the Proposal A cap. As a result, the taxable value of petitioner’s property increased. The petitioner appealed, claiming that his ownership of the property did not come about as a result of a “conveyance” within the meaning of MCL 211.27a(7)(h) of GPTA. The Tax Tribunal affirmed the assessment. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Tribunal, and held that the petitioner’s property is still subject to the cap because transfer of title by death of a joint tenant is not an uncapping transfer of ownership. Must a “conveyance,” under MCL 211.27a, be made by a written instrument? If so, does the deed creating the joint tenancy qualify as such an instrument?

People
v
Dowdy
(Randall)
140603
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The defendant, who had been convicted of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, was required to register as a sex offender with local law enforcement officials upon his release from prison. The defendant registered, and provided law enforcement with the address of the Lansing office of the Volunteers of America, where he had received meals and other services. When law enforcement officials learned that the defendant did not live at the address he provided, he was charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration Act. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the defendant was homeless and could not comply with SORA; the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in a published opinion. Did the trial court err in dismissing the charges pending against the defendant for his failure to comply with SORA?

Under collective bargaining agreements with the Michigan Education Association, various public school districts administer a payroll deduction plan for the MEA’s political action committee. The Secretary of State concluded that the school districts’ administration of the payroll deduction plan amounted to a “contribution” or expenditure” of public funds, in violation of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. Does section 57(1) of the act, MCL 169.257(1), prohibit a school district from expending government resources for such a payroll deduction plan if the costs of the plan are prepaid by the MEA? Does a school district have the authority to collect and deliver payroll deductions for such contributions? What is the effect, if any, of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US ___; 130 S Ct 876; 175 L Ed 2d 753 (2010), on this case?

Background:

Idalski
v
Schwedt
139960
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The plaintiff filed a first-party no-fault action against State Farm and then later amended the complaint to add a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. State Farm moved for dismissal of the uninsured motorist claim, arguing that the amended complaint was not filed within two years after the accident as required by the terms of the insurance policy. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Did the amended complaint relate back to the date plaintiff filed her original complaint? Is the two-year contractual limitations period valid under Rory v Continental Insurance Co., 473 Mich 457 (2005)? Should Rory be reconsidered?

Horvath
v
Johnson
139996
139997
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The plaintiff was injured when his leg was caught in the door of a bus operated by the defendant regional transportation authority. The plaintiff filed a claim for no-fault benefits with the defendant’s third-party claims administrator within 60 days of his injury. More than 60 days after the accident, the plaintiff sued the transportation authority and the bus driver. The trial court denied several dispositive motions filed by the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Did the plaintiff give notice of the tort claim within 60 days as required by MCL 124.419? Did operation of the bus fall within the motor vehicle exception to governmental liability, even though the bus was not moving at the time of the accident? Did the bus driver’s actions amount to gross negligence?

Calderon
v
Auto-Owners
138805
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Arthur Krumm sustained a closed head injury while riding as a passenger in a car that was involved in a single vehicle accident in North Carolina. Krumm did not have no-fault insurance. Was Krumm “domiciled in the same household” as his grandmother in Michigan for purposes of obtaining no-fault benefits from his grandmother’s no-fault insurer? The trial court granted the defendant insurance company’s motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Krumm was domiciled with his grandmother.

About four years after granting an insurance agent license to a man who had been convicted of a felony, the state Office of Financial and Insurance Services sought to revoke the license. OFIS stated that, under the clear terms of the Michigan Insurance Code at the time of the license application in 2004, the license should never have been granted to a person convicted of a felony. The circuit court and Court of Appeals both disagreed. Were the courts required to interpret the code as of the 2004 application? Does the code as it existed in 2004 clearly bar the state insurance commissioner from licensing someone convicted of a felony? Do equitable principles bar the state from revoking the license?

Background:

In re Certified
Question
(Waeschle
v
Oakland Co
Med
Examiner
140263
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The plaintiff and the defendants rejected the case evaluation, which assessed the case at $95,000. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $42,500. The trial court awarded evaluation sanctions, costs, and attorney fees to the defendants. Attorney fees were awarded at the rate of $175 per hour, even though the defendants paid their lawyers $110 per hour. The plaintiff’s request for costs pursuant to MCR 2.625 was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Did the appeals court err when it upheld the trial court’s award of a “reasonable attorney fee,” MCR 2.403(O)(6), that was higher than the rate that the defendants were actually billed? Was the plaintiff entitled to costs under MCR 2.625?

The petitioners sought to adopt three siblings who had been placed with them. Due to an error, the Department of Human Services placed the petitioners’ names on the central registry for child abuse and neglect; as a result, DHS removed the children from the petitioners’ home and placed with a foster care family. After DHS’ error was corrected, the petitioners sought to adopt the children, as did the foster family. The Superintendent of the Michigan Children’s Institute denied the petitioners’ request, but granted consent to adopt to the foster care family.  The petitioners appealed, contending that the decision was arbitration and capricious under MCL 710.45. The family court upheld the superintendent’s decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split unpublished decision. Did the family court abuse its discretion when it refused to allow petitioners to present witness testimony at a hearing pursuant to MCL 710.45? Was the MCI superintendent’s denial of consent to adopt based on inaccurate information and an incomplete investigation and, therefore, arbitrary and capricious?

Background:

Merit Energy Company and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality arranged for Merit to treat an underground contaminant plume by extracting and cleaning the contaminated water and material and discharging the treated water through a pipeline across Department of Natural Resources property and onto state land. The treated water would subsequently reach streams and lakes used by the plaintiffs. Could Merit be conveyed or granted the right to discharge water on land owned by the state? What test should be applied to determine whether Merit may discharge water, and the extent of the permissible discharge? Do the plaintiffs have a cause of action under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act against the DEQ? Were Michigan Citizens v Nestlé Waters, 479 Mich 280 (2007), and Preserve the Dunes v DEQ, 471 Mich 511 (2004), correctly decided?

Background:

A commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Services, the trial court and the Court of Appeals all agreed that MCL 500.3707 bars small employer health insurance carriers from including a provision in the contract that requires the employer to pay a set percentage of the premium for the insurance. They reached this conclusion because the employer’s failure to pay a set percentage of the premium was not a reason for nonrenewal of the insurance. Does the Small Employer Group Health Coverage Act bar carriers from requiring that the employer pay a set percentage of the premium charged?

Background:

A driver involved in a fatal auto accident told a witness that the police had nothing on him as long as she did not talk to them. The witness, who viewed these words as a threat, was not initially cooperative with the police. The driver was eventually convicted of involuntary manslaughter, witness intimidation, and reckless driving. With regard to calculating the minimum sentence for involuntary manslaughter, may points be assessed pursuant to MCL 777.49, Offense Variable 19 (interference with administration of justice), for conduct that occurs after the sentencing offense is completed?

The respondent-father’s rights to his children have been involuntarily terminated in a child protective proceeding under the Juvenile Code. The Court of Appeals held, in a published opinion, that the father can nonetheless be ordered to pay child support. Can a parent whose rights to his children have been involuntarily terminated pursuant to the Juvenile Code be ordered to pay child support?

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff claims that the hospital nurses were negligent in failing to report her deteriorating condition to her attending physician or others who were “higher up the chain of command.” The attending physician and the hospital’s chief of surgery state in affidavits that further information from the nurses would not have made a difference in the plaintiff’s treatment. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. Was summary disposition properly granted?

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that hospital nurses were negligent in failing to notify the surgeon of his condition. A jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, but the defendant hospital argued that the verdict should be vacated in light of the surgeon’s testimony that he would not have intervened sooner, even if the nurses had contacted him earlier. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and the Court of Appeals affirmed this aspect and other aspects of the lower court’s ruling, reversing only on a question involving the calculation of the judgment. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant’s motion for JNOV? Did the trial court allow improper evidence before the jury, or provide erroneous jury instructions?

Background:

Following a preliminary hearing, the family court judge authorized a petition and ordered the two-year-old minor child removed from her mother’s care and custody. After a bench trial, the judge held that the court had jurisdiction over the child pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (there is a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental well-being); and MCL 712A.2b(2) (the home is unfit). The court’s reasons for taking jurisdiction included findings that the mother had subjected the child to multiple medical examinations due to unsubstantiated allegations that the child’s father sexually abused her. The court also found that the mother sought to alienate the child from her father and that the mother’s home was unfit. In a split unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed. Did the trial court properly exercise jurisdiction over the child?

The incarcerated defendant’s trial was delayed multiple times. Most of the delays were attributable to the defendant, but two delays were ordered by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the 180-day rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the charge against the defendant did not need to be dismissed because most delays were attributable to the defendant, and the prosecution made good-faith efforts to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days and remained ready to go to trial thereafter. Is the 180-day rule, MCL 780.131 and 780.133, jurisdictional? Does it permit any delay in trial beyond 180 days? If some delay is permitted, should any delay be attributed to either the defendant or the prosecution? If so, should delays caused by the trial court, for example, due to docket management concerns, automatically be attributed to the prosecution? Are a prosecutor’s good-faith efforts to bring a defendant to trial within the initial 180-day period relevant? If the 180-day rule is jurisdictional and does not permit any delays in the commencement of trial, should that determination be applied retroactively?

Background:

The plaintiffs are front lot owners along Beach Drive, which runs along the north shore of Lake Charlevoix. In 1911, the subdivision plat dedicated Beach Drive to the public for public purposes. The plaintiffs’ lots do not touch the water; they touch the road, which runs along the shoreline. There is a small strip of land between the road and the water. The trial court interpreted the applicable plat act as giving the county a fee title in the roadway. And, because the road is adjacent to the water, the trial court held that the public also had the riparian rights to the land between the road and the lake. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Do the front lot owners, whose lots abut a road that runs adjacent to water, have the riparian rights in the disputed land?

Background:

People
v
McMullan
(Angelo)
139209
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The defendant admitted fatally shooting his friend in a drug dispute, but claimed that he did not intend to do so. The trial judge refused to give an involuntary manslaughter instruction to the jury, instructing only on the crimes of felony murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Was an involuntary manslaughter instruction warranted under a rational view of the evidence?