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Spectrum Health Hospitals v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
142874
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1 |
Issue: Available soon.
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Pending Oral Agrument
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Progressive Marathon Insurance Company v DeYoung
143330
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2 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
People v Cole (David)
143046
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3 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
Titan Insurance Company v Hyten
142774
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4 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
Michigan Properties v Meridian Township
143085-7
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5 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
Toll Northville v Township of Northville
143281
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6 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
People v Vaughn (Joseph)
142627
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7 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
In re Estate of Mortimore
143307
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8 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
In re Estate of Price
143123
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9 |
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Pending Oral Agrument |
Admire v Auto-Owners Ins
142842
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Atkins v SMART
140401
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Cedroni Associates v Tomblinson, Harburn Associates
142339
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Davis v Emergency Manager for Detroit Public Schools
144084
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Johnson v Hurley Medical Group
141793
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McCahan v Brennan
142765
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January 2012 Calendar>>
January 2012 Call>> |
Wednesday, January 11, 2012 |
Patterson v Nichols & Sutton
142438-9
142441
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4 |
Issue: A five-year-old boy called 911 twice, telling both operators that his mother had passed out. The first operator told the boy that she would send police, but did not, recording the call as a prank; the second operator scolded the boy for “playing on the phone,” but did send a police officer. The boy’s mother, who had suffered a heart attack, died; she might have survived had medical help been sent after the first call. The plaintiffs sued the 911 operators, alleging wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The operators moved to dismiss these claims, but the trial court denied their motions for summary disposition and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Did the operators have a duty to the boy’s mother? If so, can their conduct be viewed as the proximate cause of her death? Can the operators’ conduct be viewed as “so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results”? Can the plaintiffs maintain their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
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Order
1/25/12
142441
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People v Grissom (James)
140147
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Issue: The defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on his alleged sexual assault of a woman in her van in the parking lot of a Meijer store. After the defendant’s direct appeal was exhausted, he sought relief from judgment based on police reports that included several false allegations of victimization, including fabricated allegations of rape, made by the complainant. On remand, a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief from judgment, with one judge dissenting. Whether, and under what circumstances, can newly-discovered impeachment evidence be grounds for a new trial, see generally People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 363 (1977)? If impeachment evidence can be grounds for a new trial, would the defendant have had a “reasonably likely chance of acquittal,” MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(i)?
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People v Reese (Verdell)
142913
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Issue: The defendant was charged with second-degree murder, and, alternatively, with voluntary manslaughter under a theory of imperfect self-defense. Following a bench trial, he was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution had not provided sufficient evidence that he was the initial aggressor; moreover, because the trial court found that he had a valid self-defense claim, he should not have been found guilty of the homicide, the defendant maintained. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s manslaughter conviction and remanded for a new trial on that count, concluding that the factual record and the court’s findings were inconsistent with the manslaughter verdict. Can the doctrine of imperfect self-defense mitigate second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter and, if so, was the doctrine appropriately applied in this case?
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In re MORRIS
142759
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Issue: The circuit court terminated both parents’ parental rights to their daughter. The parents appealed and, in the Court of Appeals, the Department of Human Services admitted that it failed to give notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1912(a), despite knowing that the child at issue might have Indian heritage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, but the Michigan Supreme Court remanded to case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of the department’s confession of error. On remand, the Court of Appeals readopted its original opinion and “conditionally affirmed” the circuit court’s termination decision, but remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings regarding both parents with regard to the requirements of the ICWA. Is the Court of Appeals “conditional affirmance” remedy an appropriate resolution of an ICWA violation?
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In re J.L. GORDON
143673
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Issue: A woman challenges the circuit court’s termination of parental rights to her son, asserting in part that the Department of Human Services and the circuit court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq., and failed to create a complete record of their attempts at compliance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, rejecting the mother’s ICWA challenges; the appellate court held that there was ample evidence that the tribe had actual notice of the proceedings. Moreover, the circuit court was relieved from any further ICWA notification efforts by the mother’s own statement on the record regarding her ineligibility for tribal membership, the Court of Appeals stated. Were the notice requirements of § 1912(a) of the ICWA invoked when the mother stated at the preliminary hearing that her parents were tribal members but she was not? Were the Department of Human Services and the circuit court obligated to make a complete record of their compliance with the ICWA’s notice requirements? Can a parent waive a minor child’s status as an “Indian Child” under the ICWA, 25 USC 1903(4), or waive compliance with the federal law’s requirements? If so, did the mother’s statement on the record that her family had been notified directly by the tribe that they were not entitled to money or benefits constitute a waiver?
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People v Rao (Malini)
142537
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Issue: The defendant was convicted of second-degree child abuse, based in part on findings made at a hospital that the child had multiple rib fractures of various ages. Ten months later, the defendant moved for a new trial, supporting her motion with current x-rays that she claimed showed that the rib injuries were still present. The defendant argued that this evidence supported her claim that the injuries were the result of a metabolic disorder, not child abuse. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the significance of the newly-discovered evidence. Do the x-rays constitute newly-discovered evidence? If so, would the evidence have made a different result probable on retrial, given the other evidence implicating the defendant as the cause of other injuries the child suffered?
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Pending |
Thursday, January 12, 2012 |
Attorney General v BC/BS & Ofc of Fin & Ins Regulation
142670-1
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Issue: The Attorney General challenges the legality of the State Accident Fund’s purchase of three foreign worker’s compensation carriers. Does MCL 550.1207(1)(o) bar not only Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, but also its wholly-owned subsidiary, the Accident Fund, from purchasing foreign insurance companies?
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Pending |
People v Kolanek (Alexander)
142695
142712
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5 |
Issue: Six days after he was arrested and charged with marijuana possession, the defendant applied for a medical marijuana registry identification card; the Department of Community Health had begun accepting such applications only two days before his arrest. The defendant did not go to his doctor for certification for the medical use of marijuana until after his arrest, but he had spoken with his doctor before the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MCL 333.26421 et seq.) passed in 2008, and the doctor was supportive of his medical use of marijuana. The defendant sought to dismiss the drug charges under § 8 of the MMMA, which provides an affirmative defense for patients who, although they do not have a registry identification card, meet certain criteria for the medical use of marijuana. The Court of Appeals declined to dismiss the drug possession charges, holding that, to assert the § 8 affirmative defense, a person must obtain the physician certification required by § 8(a) after the passage of the MMMA and before being arrested. The Court of Appeals also held that the defendant may nevertheless raise the defense before a jury. Can a defendant assert a § 8 affirmative defense without first obtaining a valid “registry identification card”? To have a valid § 8 defense, must a defendant obtain the required physician statement after the MMMA’s enactment date, but before the arrest date? May a defendant assert the § 8 defense at trial after a court has denied his motion to dismiss under § 8?
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People v King (Larry)
142850
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Issue: The defendant possessed a valid registry identification card under § 4 of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MCL 333.26424), but was arrested and charged with two counts of manufacturing marijuana because his marijuana plants were kept in an outdoor locked chain-link dog kennel and in an unlocked living room closet, neither of which complied, according to the prosecutor, with the requirement in § 4(a) of the act that marijuana plants be kept in an “enclosed, locked facility.” The trial court dismissed the charges, but in a split published decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the charges. The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant did not satisfy the requirement that his plants be kept in an “enclosed, locked facility.” Was the defendant immune from prosecution for manufacturing marijuana under § 4 of the MMMA where he had a valid registry identification card and possessed an amount of marijuana under the limit allowed by the MMMA? Was the presumption under § 4(d) rebutted by evidence that the defendant did not keep his 12 marijuana plants in an “enclosed, locked facility” under § 4(a), as defined in § 3(c), MCL 333.26423(c)? If so, may the defendant independently assert an affirmative defense under § 8(a), MCL 333.26428(a)?
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Pending |
DeFrain v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
142956
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Issue: A pedestrian who was struck by a hit-and-run driver filed a claim for uninsured motorist benefits 86 days after the accident. The insurer denied the claim for failure to comply with the policy’s 30-day notice provision regarding hit-and-run motor vehicle claims. The claimant sued, and the insurance company moved to dismiss based on the 30-day notice provision, but the trial court denied the insurer’s motion. The trial court found that the insurance policy was ambiguous as to who was required to provide notice and when; moreover, the insurer did not show that it was prejudiced by the delay, the circuit court said. The Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court on the lack of prejudice issue, but did not address the ambiguity issue. Is this case controlled by Jackson v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 942 (2005)? Is the 30-day notice provision enforceable without a showing of prejudice to the insurer?
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Pending |
December 2011 Calendar>>
December 2011 Call>> |
Tuesday, December 6, 2011 |
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People v Cooley (Michael)
142228
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Issue: During a traffic stop, the defendant, one of several passengers in the car, got out of the car, but then complied with the police officer’s command to get back inside. The officer noticed a cigarette pack on the ground that contained a rock of crack cocaine. The defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine; he denied that the cigarette pack was his and asked for the pack to be tested for fingerprints. After a trial, the defendant was convicted as charged. At sentencing, the trial court scored Offense Variable 19 (MCL 777.49 – interference with administration of justice) at 10 points. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the score was appropriate based on the defendant’s attempts to deflect blame from himself. Can OV 19 be scored under these circumstances?
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People v Bryant (Ramon)
141741
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Issue: A computer error in Kent County resulted in a disproportionately low number of juror questionnaires being sent to residents of the zip codes that contained the county’s highest concentrations of racial minorities. The defendant, who was convicted of several crimes following a jury trial, objected that African-Americans were underrepresented in the jury pool. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community had been violated. In evaluating whether a distinctive group has been sufficiently underrepresented so as to violate the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, may a court examine only the composition of the defendant’s particular jury venire, or must a court examine the composition of broader pools or arrays of prospective jurors? Must a defendant’s claim of underrepresentation be supported by hard data, or are statistical estimates permissible? If so, under what circumstances? Was any underrepresentation of African-Americans in the defendant’s venire, or in Kent County jury pools, the result of systematic exclusion of African-Americans?
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Pending |
People v Richards (Maurice)
142234
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Issue: The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of carjacking and felony-firearm. At trial, the jurors were instructed that they could engage in pre-deliberation discussions amongst themselves as part of a pilot project to study proposed jury reforms. Those proposed rules included allowing judges to inform jurors that they may discuss evidence among themselves during trial recesses. Was the defendant’s right to a fair trial and impartial jury prejudiced by allowing the jurors to discuss the evidence before final deliberations?
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Pending |
Joseph v ACIA
142615
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Issue: This no-fault auto insurance case involves the interplay between MCL 500.3145(1), the no-fault act’s one-year-back provision, and MCL 600.5851(1), which tolls the applicable limitations period for minors and insane persons. The plaintiff, who suffers from a severe head injury, sued the defendant insurance company to obtain no-fault benefits. The insurance company argued that the plaintiff was barred by the one-year-back rule from recovering no-fault benefits dating back to more than one year before the lawsuit was filed. The trial court ruled that the one-year back rule was tolled by MCL 600.5851(1), which tolls claims brought by minors and insane persons, and that there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff was “insane” for purposes of MCL 600.5851(1). Does the tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) apply to toll the “one-year back rule” in MCL 500.3145(1)? Was Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289 (2010), correctly decided?
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Pending |
Velez v Tuma
138952
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Issue: At issue in this case is how a medical malpractice judgment is calculated when the jury awards non-economic damages in excess of those allowed by statute (MCL 600.1483), and there is a setoff for an earlier settlement with another defendant. When is the setoff applied – to the unadjusted jury verdict, before the cap on non-economic damages is applied, or to the final judgment, after the cap is applied? Here, the trial court applied the setoff to the unadjusted verdict and then applied the cap. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, holding that the setoff should be applied to the unadjusted verdict.
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Pending |
Wednesday, December 7, 2011 |
Prins v Michigan State Police
142841
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Issue: In a letter dated July 22, 2008, the plaintiff made a Freedom of Information Act request for any video or recording of a traffic stop in which she had been involved. The defendant denied the request in a letter that was dated July 26, 2008, but postmarked July 29, 2008. After learning that a videotape did exist, the plaintiff filed a FOIA lawsuit on January 26, 2009. Was the action commenced “within 180 days after a public body’s final determination to deny a request,” as required by MCL 15.240(1)? The circuit court calculated the 180-day period from the date on the letter, and said no, dismissing the case. In a published decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute begins to run on the date the public body sends out or officially circulates its denial of a request to produce a public record.
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Hoffner v Lanctoe
142267
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Issue: The plaintiff slipped and fell while walking across an ice patch near the entrance to her fitness club. She sued the landlords and the fitness club. The trial court denied summary disposition to the defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the fitness club and its owners were entitled to summary disposition because they did not control the sidewalk. But, the appeals court held, the landlords were subject to liability because the hazard posed by the ice patch could be deemed “unavoidable.” Are the plaintiff’s claims against the landlord barred by the “open and obvious danger” doctrine?
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Pending |
People v Laidler (Marteez)
142442-3
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Issue: The defendant was convicted of first-degree home invasion and was sentenced to four to 20 years in prison. The trial court assessed 100 points under Offense Variable 3 (MCL 777.33 – degree of physical injury to a victim), based on the fact that the defendant’s accomplice was killed by the homeowner during the home invasion. In a split published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly scored OV 3, and it remanded the case for resentencing. Was the defendant’s accomplice a “victim” within the meaning of MCL 777.33(1)? Did his death “result from the commission of a crime” within the meaning of MCL 777.33(2)(b)?
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Pending |
Whitmore v Charlevoix Rd Comm
142106
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Issue: The plaintiffs sued the county road commission for injuries they suffered when their motorcycle hit a pothole in a county road. The trial court denied the defendant road commission’s motion for summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Did the plaintiffs demonstrate that the defendant road commission “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of the defect” that rendered the roadway not “reasonably safe and convenient for public travel,” MCL 691.1402(1); 691.1403, see Wilson v Alpena Co Rd Comm, 474 Mich 161 (2006)?
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Nason v MSERS
142246
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Issue: The petitioner, a prison guard, fractured his heel while on vacation and applied for non-duty disability retirement under MCL 38.24. The State Employees’ Retirement System denied his application, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Is a SERS member eligible for non-duty disability retirement under MCL 38.24, if he is totally incapacitated from performing the state job from which he seeks to retire, but is not totally incapacitated from performing other work within his education, experience, or training?
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November 2011 Calendar>>
November 2011 Call>> |
Tuesday, November 8, 2011 |
Jones v Detroit Medical Center
141624
141629
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1 |
Issue: Jamar Jones died from a rare allergic reaction to an anticonvulsant drug his doctor prescribed. The personal representatives of Jones’ estate sued the doctor and other health care providers for medical malpractice. The trial court ruled that the anticonvulsant was the proximate cause of Jones’ death; the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split published opinion. In determining whether the drug was the proximate cause of Jones’ death, should the court consider whether it was probable that the drug would cause a fatal allergic reaction? Where the defendant’s negligence has not been established, should the court grant partial summary disposition to the plaintiffs on the proximate causation issue?
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Engenius, Inc v Ford Motor Company
141977
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Issue: EnGenius, Inc. and EnGenius-EU, Ltd. sued Ford Motor Company for breach of contract. Ford’s motion to compel binding arbitration was granted, and the arbitration panel, by a vote of 2-1, rendered an award in the plaintiffs’ favor, finding that Ford had breached two contracts with the plaintiffs. But the arbitrators first determined that one of the contracts did not include an arbitration clause. Was it proper for the arbitration panel to retain jurisdiction over that contract and render an award for its breach?
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People v Williams (Glenn)
141161
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Issue: The defendant entered a retail store intending to rob it, suggested to a clerk that he had a weapon, but fled without taking anything. The defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery, but after sentencing, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant argued that he could not be guilty of armed robbery because he did not take anything from the store. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant’s attempt to commit a larceny was sufficient to support the armed robbery conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a split published opinion. Is a completed larceny necessary to sustain an armed robbery conviction?
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Pending |
People v Watkins (Lincoln)
142031
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Issue: The defendant was charged with having a sexual relationship with a 12-year-old girl; at trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had an earlier sexual relationship with another minor. MCL 768.27a states that, “in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of committing a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” The defendant challenges his convictions for criminal sexual conduct, arguing, among other matters, that the evidence admitted under MCL 769.27a deprived him of his constitutional rights. Does MCL 768.27a conflict with MRE 404(b) and, if so, does the statute prevail over the court rule, see McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15 (1999), and Const 1963, art 6, § 1 and § 5? Does MCL 768.27a violate a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial? Does MCL 768.27a interfere with the judicial power to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial, a power exclusively vested in Michigan courts under Article 6, section 1 of the Michigan state constitution?
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People v Pullen (Richard)
142751
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Issue: The defendant has been charged with criminal sexual conduct and aggravated indecent exposure for acts allegedly committed against his 12-year-old granddaughter. The prosecution sought to introduce a 1989 police report that the defendant had also committed criminal sexual conduct against his then-16-year-old daughter. Under MCL 768.27a, “in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of committing a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” But the trial court, acting on the defendant’s motion, excluded the evidence under Michigan Rule of Evidence 403; the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Does MCL 768.27a violate a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial? Is the evidence described in MCL 768.27a admissible only if it is not otherwise excluded under MRE 403? Does MCL 768.27a interfere with the judicial power to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial, a power exclusively vested in Michigan courts under Article 6, section 1 of the Michigan Constitution?
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Pending |
Wednesday, November 9, 2011 |
DEQ v Worth Twp
141810
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Issue: Privately owned septic tanks are discharging effluent into Lake Huron along a five-mile strip of shoreline located in Worth Township. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and its director sued the township after the township declined to install a public sanitary sewer system. The trial court ruled in the department’s favor, ordering the township to take corrective action; the court also ordered the township to pay a fine and the department’s attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed in a split published opinion. Does the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.101, et seq., empower a circuit court to order a township to install a municipal sanitary sewer system when a widespread failure of private septic systems results in contamination of lake waters?
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Pending |
Johnson v Pastoriza
142127
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Issue: The plaintiff gave premature birth to a non-viable fetus. On behalf of her child and herself, she sued her doctor for wrongful death of a fetus under MCL 600.2922a, and also sought damages for her own emotional distress. The defendants argued that they could not be held liable for their failure to act and that they were protected by the statutory exclusion for the performance of medical procedures at MCL 600.2922a(2)(b). They also argued that the plaintiff could not recover for her own emotional distress in this wrongful-death lawsuit. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion. Did the courts err in ruling that the plaintiff could proceed under the wrongful death act against a medical professional for the death of her non-viable fetus?
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Pending |
People v Franklin (Joseph)
142323
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Issue: The defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree home invasion in exchange for the prosecution’s agreement to dismiss other charges. At the plea hearing, the trial judge was agreeable to sentencing the defendant under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, MCL 762.11, if the defendant qualified for such status. But at the sentencing hearing, the judge declined to impose a HYTA sentence; the judge vacated the plea agreement, reinstated the original charges, and set the case for trial. The defendant was convicted as charged. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions, holding that the judge acted improperly by unilaterally vacating the plea agreement. Was the trial judge required to give the defendant the opportunity to affirm his guilty plea when she declined to impose the sentence proposed at the plea hearing? Should the question of the defendant’s right to affirm his guilty plea be evaluated under MCR 6.310(B)(2)(a) or MCR 6.310(B)(2)(b)? Even if the defendant had the right to affirm his guilty plea, did he waive that right by failing to object when the trial court vacated his plea and scheduled a trial?
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People v Kowalski (Jerome)
141932
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Issue: The defendant seeks to present expert testimony regarding interrogation techniques that tend to generate false confessions, and regarding aspects of his psychological makeup that, he argues, make him vulnerable to falsely confessing. The trial court excluded the testimony of his two proffered expert witnesses, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Is the defendant’s proffered expert testimony regarding the existence of false confessions, and the interrogation techniques and psychological factors that tend to generate false confessions, admissible under MRE 702? Is the probative value of the proffered expert testimony substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? Did the trial court’s order excluding the defendant’s proffered expert testimony deny the defendant his constitutional right to present a defense?
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Townships of Haring & Selma v City of Cadillac
142117-8
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8 |
Issue: In the mid-1970s, the city of Cadillac and Wexford County executed two contracts to allow nearby townships to use the city’s wastewater treatment system. Both contracts were set to expire in 2017 unless renewed by the parties’ agreement. In 2006, the city notified the townships that it did not intend to renew the contracts, absent the townships’ annexation into the city. Three of the townships sued, claiming that the city had a legal obligation to allow them to continue using the wastewater treatment system at least through 2052 and possibly beyond. The trial court granted summary disposition to the city, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Are the townships entitled to relief based on the holding of Washtenaw Co Health Dep’t v T&M Chevrolet, Inc, 406 Mich 518 (1979), which states that “[w]hen ... an available sewer line crosses municipal boundaries, the municipality operating the sewer system may not condition connection on annexation of the properties involved when connection means abatement of a public health hazard”? Are plaintiffs’ claims ripe for adjudication now, when the contracts have not yet expired?
Background>>
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Thursday, November 10, 2011 |
People v Buie (James)
142698
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number(s) to
view Briefs
in Acrobat
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11 |
Issue: Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, as well as felony-firearm. Two of the prosecution’s medical experts testified from remote locations by video-conferencing; before trial, the defendant’s attorney agreed that they could do so. Did the trial court violate the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause or MCR 6.006(C)(2) by allowing the witnesses to testify via two-way interactive video technology? Did defense counsel waive the issue?
Background>>
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Pending |
McCue v O-N Minerals
142287
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number(s) to
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in Acrobat
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12 |
Issue: The plaintiff’s wife fell as they were cycling along a section of highway that passes through property owned by the defendant mining company. Steel rails had been embedded in the concrete; the concrete was degraded around the rails, producing the ruts which caused her fall. The plaintiff sued the mining company, alleging negligence and public nuisance. Did the defendant mining company owe a duty to the plaintiff because the defendant used the state highway in a way that caused the defect at issue or increased the hazard posed by the defect? Did the plaintiff state a claim for public nuisance?
Background>>
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Residential Funding v Saurman
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Bank of New York Trust Company v Messner
143178-9
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number(s) to
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in Acrobat
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Oral
Argument
on
Application |
Issue: These consolidated cases each involve a foreclosure initiated by the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS foreclosed on the property by advertisement, but the defendants claimed that the foreclosures were invalid. They argued that MERS was not qualified under the foreclosure by advertisement statute (MCL 600.3204(1)(d)) to foreclose without judicial proceedings. The district courts rejected the defendants’ claims, as did the circuit courts. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that MERS owned no interest in the indebtedness as required by MCL 600.3204(1)(d), and that, as a result, its foreclosures by advertisement were void from the beginning. Is MERS, as the mortgagee and nominee of the note holder, an “owner … of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage” within the meaning of MCL 600.3204(1)(d), such that MERS was permitted to foreclose by advertisement?
Background>>
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October 2011 Calendar>>
October 2011 Call>>
October 27, 2011 Calendar>> |
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PLEASE NOTE
People v Evans (Lamar)
will be heard at the Old Courtroom
Capitol Building
9:30 a.m. |
Case Name
& Docket
Number |
Calendar
Number |
At Issue |
Status |
People v Evans (Lamar)
141381
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number(s) to
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in Acrobat
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1 |
Issue: The defendant in this case argues that double jeopardy prevents him from being retried for arson. He was charged under a statute that applies to arson of “any building or other real property” other than a dwelling; the building he was accused of burning was a vacant house. After the prosecution presented its evidence, the trial judge dismissed the case on defense counsel’s motion. The trial judge said that the prosecutor had failed to prove that the building was not a dwelling; therefore, defendant could not be convicted under the “any building” statute. On appeal, the parties agreed that the trial court had erred, but the defendant argued that any attempt to retry him on the arson charge would violate the double jeopardy clause, citing People v Nix, 453 Mich 619 (1996). In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings, including a new trial. Is retrial barred under the double jeopardy clause where the trial court made an error of law and did not determine any actual element of the charged offense?
Background>> |
Pending |
PLEASE NOTE
Cases 5, 6, and
Findley v DaimlerChrysler (Oral Argument on Application)
will be heard at the
Michigan Hall of Justice
Check-in prior to noon |
People v Moreno (Angel)
141837
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number(s) to
view Briefs
in Acrobat |
5 |
Issue: Police officers looking for a subject of outstanding warrants smelled marijuana while speaking to the defendant’s girlfriend at the door to his house. The officers decided to enter and secure the home. When told this, the defendant ordered the police off his porch and attempted to slam the door. An officer sought to prevent the door from closing and a struggle ensued. Police removed the defendant from the house and arrested him. He was charged with two counts of resisting and obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d. The circuit court ruled that the police entry was unlawful, but refused to quash the charges against the defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Is it a violation of MCL 750.81d for a person to resist a police officer who unlawfully and forcibly enters the person’s home? If so, is MCL 750.81d unconstitutional? Can a defendant prosecuted under the statute claim self-defense?
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