Instructions
M Civ JI 15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause
M Civ JI 15.02 Definition of Proximately Contributed [Instruction Deleted]
M Civ JI 15.03 More Than One Proximate Cause
M Civ JI 15.04 Causation by Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 15.05 Intervening Negligence or Conduct of Person Not a Party
M Civ JI 15.06 Intervening Outside Force (Other Than Person)
M Civ JI 15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause
When I use the words “proximate cause” I mean first, that the negligent conduct must have been a cause of plaintiff’s injury, and second, that the plaintiff’s injury must have been of a type that is a natural and probable result of the negligent conduct.
Note on Use
This definition should accompany instructions which use the term “proximate cause.”
When a defendant presents evidence that the conduct of a person other than the plaintiff or force was a proximate cause, M Civ JI 15.03 and the appropriate instruction from M Civ JI 15.04, 15.05 and 15.06 should be given in addition to this instruction.
Comment
Proximate cause, at the minimum, means a cause in fact relationship. Glinski v Szylling, 358 Mich 182; 99 NW2d 637 (1959). In addition, the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the occurrence which produced the injury must have some practical limitation, variously expressed in terms such as “natural,” “probable,” “direct,” or “reasonably anticipated.” See Van Keulen & Winchester Lumber Co v Manistee & N R Co, 222 Mich 682; 193 NW 289 (1923); Woodyard v Barnett, 335 Mich 352; 56 NW2d 214 (1953); and Fisk v Powell, 349 Mich 604; 84 NW2d 736 (1957), all approved in Sutter v Biggs, 377 Mich 80; 139 NW2d 684 (1966). The exact damages need not have been foreseen so long as the results are a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. It is sufficient that the ordinary prudent person ought to have foreseen or anticipated that damage might possibly occur. Luck v Gregory, 257 Mich 562; 241 NW 862 (1932); Clumfoot v St Clair Tunnel Co, 221 Mich 113; 190 NW 759 (1922). Proximate cause “normally involves examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held legally responsible for such consequences.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 163 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 15.01 is a revision of SJI 15.01.
Amended September 1980, October 1988, June 2010. TOP
History
Deleted September 1988. TOP
There may be more than one proximate cause. To be a proximate cause, the claimed negligence need not be the only cause nor the last cause. A cause may be proximate although it and another cause act at the same time or in combination to produce the occurrence.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given as an introduction to M Civ JI 15.04, 15.05, or 15.06. The instruction may also be given where the only possible additional proximate cause is the conduct of the plaintiff.
The use note to the predecessor version of this instruction included the admonition that it was not to be used if the only possible additional proximate cause was the conduct of the plaintiff. The reason for that admonition was that there was a separate instruction on the plaintiff’s conduct as a “proximate contributing cause,” M Civ JI 15.02 Definition of Proximately Contributed. Several cases repeated this admonition. E.g., Stephens v Spiwak, 61 Mich App 647; 233 NW2d 124 (1975). In 1988, the Committee deleted M Civ JI 15.02 and made the instruction that defines proximate cause, M Civ JI 15.01, party-neutral by eliminating the reference to the defendant’s negligent conduct. These changes make the Stephens case obsolete and make the current version of M Civ JI 15.03 applicable even if the only other possible additional proximate cause is the plaintiff’s conduct.
This instruction should not be given in a case against a government employee under the employee exception to the governmental immunity act. Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (overruling Dedes v Asch, 446 Mich 99; 521 NW2d 488 (1994)). See the Comment below.
Comment
There may be more than one proximate cause contributing to an injury; the defendant’s negligence need not be the sole cause. Brisboy v Fibreboard Corp, 429 Mich 540; 418 NW2d 650 (1988); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594; 101 NW2d 365 (1960); Gleason v Hanafin, 308 Mich 31; 13 NW2d 196 (1944). It is prejudicially erroneous for instructions on proximate cause to refer to “the proximate cause” instead of “a proximate cause” in cases in which it is an issue whether there was more than one proximate cause. Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585, 600–607; 256 NW2d 400, 408–411 (1977).
Governmental employees are not individually liable under the motor vehicle exception (MCL 691.1405) to the governmental immunity act unless their conduct constitutes the proximate cause, that is, the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Robinson (construing the employee provision of the act, MCL 691.1407(2)).
History
Amended December 1988. TOP
You may decide that the conduct of [neither / none], one or [both / more] of the defendants was a proximate cause. If you decide that [one / one or more] of the defendants was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that the conduct of [the / any] other [defendant / defendants] also may have been a cause of the occurrence. Each defendant is entitled to separate consideration as to whether [his / or / her] conduct was a proximate cause of the occurrence.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 15.03 and should be given when there is an issue whether the conduct of each defendant was a proximate cause. The bracketed alternatives should be selected according to whether there are two or more than two defendants.
Comment
See Banzhof v Roche, 228 Mich 36; 199 NW 607 (1924); Camp v Wilson, 258 Mich 38; 241 NW 844 (1932). TOP
This instruction was deleted by the Committee June 1, 2003. The instruction was deleted because the effect of nonparty fault is addressed in MCivJI 15.03 More Than One Proximate Cause and 42.05 Allocation of Fault of Parties and Identified Nonparties.
History
MCivJI 15.05 is a revision of SJI2d 15.05.
Amended September 1980.
Deleted June 1, 2003. TOP
If you decide that [the defendant / one or more of the defendants] [was / were] negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that [description of force] also was a cause of this occurrence.
*(However, if you decide that the only proximate cause of the occurrence was [description of force], then your verdict should be for the [defendant / defendants].)
Note on Use
M Civ JI 15.03 is the proper preface to this instruction.
*The paragraph in parentheses should be given only if there is evidence that the outside force may have been the sole proximate cause.
In the blanks, insert a description of the force, as for example flood, fire or wind.
Comment
As to the possibility of more than one proximate cause and the liability of a single defendant when more than one such cause existed, see authorities in Comments to M Civ JI 15.03 and 15.04. Defendant is relieved from liability if the outside force was the sole proximate cause of the injury. See Tobin v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 192 Mich 549; 159 NW 389 (1916). However, defendant is not relieved from liability where the outside force aggravates the damage resulting from defendant’s negligent conduct. Lillibridge v McCann, 117 Mich 84; 75 NW 288 (1898). TOP