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No. 136114
| Keith Gayle Davis, |
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Jonathan A. Green |
Plaintiff-Appellee, |
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(Appeal from Ct of Appeals) |
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(Ingham - Giddings, J.) |
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| Forest River, Inc., |
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Donald H. Robertson |
Defendant-Appellant, |
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| and |
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| Kitsmiller RV, Inc., |
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| Defendant. |
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| __________________________________________ |
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Click to view briefs in Adobe format:
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief on Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief>>
Attorney General Michael A. Cox's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Chrysler LLC's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Consumer Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan and The Michigan Association for Justice's Amici Curiae Brief>>
Ford Motor Company's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
General Motors Corporation's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Michigan Manufacturers Association and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.'s Amici Curiae Brief>>
RVIA and NMMA's Amici Curiae Brief>>
Background
Keith Davis bought a recreational vehicle from a dealer. After the RV was plagued by repair problems, Davis sued both the dealer and Forest River, the RV’s manufacturer, under various theories of liability; Davis sought to revoke the RV’s purchase and compel the defendants to pay the purchase price to him. The dealer accepted a case evaluation and was dismissed from the case; Davis and Forest River proceeded to trial. The jury found in part that Forest River had breached its express warranty and its implied warranty of merchantability, and that Davis was entitled to revoke his acceptance of the RV. The trial court entered judgment for Davis in the amount of the purchase price of approximately $70,000; alternatively, the court ordered that, if an appellate court held that revocation of acceptance was not an available remedy under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty – Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, then Davis was entitled to his damages of approximately $44,000. The Court of Appeals, in a split, published decision, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, with a clarification. The majority held that “revocation of acceptance” is a Uniform Commercial Code remedy and not available to Davis because he and Forest River, the RV manufacturer, were not in “privity of contract.” In other words, because the purchase contract was between Davis and the dealer, Davis could not revoke the contract as against Forest River. But, the majority said, Davis had the common-law equitable remedy of “rescission” – the annulment or voiding of a contract. The majority noted that “Michigan law has, for half a century, unambiguously afforded the remedy of rescission to purchasers against remote, out-of-privity manufacturers on a theory of breach of implied warranty.” The dissenting judge disagreed, arguing that rescission cannot be available in the absence of privity. Forest River appeals.
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