|
No. 141624, 141629
| Trenda Jones, Successor Personal Representative and Co-Personal Representative, Booker T. Jones, Co-Personal Representative, and Margaret A. Jones, Co-Personal Representative, of the Estate of Jamar Cortez Jones, |
|
Michael R. Dezsi |
Plaintiffs-Appellees, |
|
|
vs (Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
|
|
|
(Wayne - Ziolkowski, R.) |
|
|
| Detroit Medical Center and Sinai-Grace Hospital, |
|
Anita Comorski |
Defendants-Appellants, (in 141624) |
|
|
Defendants-Appellees, (in 141629) |
|
|
| and |
|
|
| |
|
|
| Danny F. Watson, M.D. and William M. Leuchter, P.C., |
|
Marc D. Saurbier |
Defendants-Appellees. (in 141624) |
|
|
Defendants-Appellants. (in 141629) |
|
|
| |
|
|
| _________________________________________ |
|
|
Click to view briefs in Adobe format:
Plaintiffs-Appeellees' Brief on Appeal>>
Defendants-Appellants'
[141624] Brief on Appeal>>
Defendants-Appellants' [141624] Reply Brief>>
Defendants-Appellants' [141629] Brief on Appeal>>
Michigan Association for Justice's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc.'s Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Michigan Health and Hospital Association's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Background
Jamar Jones was injured in a single-vehicle rollover accident and taken to the emergency room at Detroit Medical Center/Sinai-Grace Hospital. Dr. Danny F. Watson, a neurologist, saw Jones; according to Watson’s notes, Jones could not recall how the accident happened, and reported that family members had told him that, on several occasions, they saw him staring blankly and could not easily get his attention. The doctor diagnosed “[p]robable partial complex seizure disorder” and prescribed tegretol, an anticonvulsant. Watson also ordered an electroencephalogram (EEG), which was normal.
Jones began taking the medication as prescribed. A second EEG was normal, but Watson believed that he could not exclude a seizure disorder; he told Jones to continue taking the anticonvulsant. Several days later, Jones returned to the emergency room, where he reported having a fever, a sore throat, an inability to eat due to pain, and swollen lips and mouth. Doctors diagnosed Jones with Stevens-Johnson syndrome, a potentially fatal dermatological condition caused by a severe allergic reaction; less than two weeks later, Jones died of Stevens-Johnson syndrome, complicated by pneumonia. The parties’ medical experts agreed that the odds of a patient developing the syndrome, sometimes referred to as toxic epidermal necrolysis, are from one in a million to one in several hundred thousand, and that there is no way to determine in advance which patients are likely to suffer such a reaction.
The personal representatives of Jones’ estate sued Watson, his professional corporation, and the hospital; the plaintiffs claimed that Jones’ reaction to the tegretol caused his allergic reaction and death. Watson breached the standard of care by prescribing tegretol when he could not conclusively diagnose Jones as suffering from a seizure disorder, the plaintiffs asserted. The plaintiffs also alleged that Watson breached the standard of care by failing to advise Jones that he might have an allergic reaction to the medication.
The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to a ruling that the tegretol caused Jones’ death. The defendants filed a counter motion, arguing the case should be dismissed because the doctor could not have foreseen that Jones would suffer the extremely rare allergic reaction. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that Jones was an “eggshell plaintiff” – a plaintiff who was unusually susceptible to injury – and that Watson and the other defendants could be held liable for his unusual allergic reaction. The trial court therefore granted partial summary disposition in favor of the plaintiffs and denied the defendants’ motion. The court’s order noted that the only issue remaining for trial was whether Watson breached the standard of care.
The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. In a split published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, concluding that Stevens-Johnson syndrome was a foreseeable risk that was included in the literature accompanying the drug. Reasonable jurors could not dispute that the plaintiffs had shown the drug to be the proximate cause of Jones’ death, the Court of Appeals majority said. The dissenting judge noted that, where there is no intervening cause, the test for proximate cause is not whether the plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable. Rather, contended the dissenting judge, the proper test is whether the injury was the “natural and probable result of the negligent conduct.” Because reasonable jurors could disagree on this question, the dissenting judge would have reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary disposition. The defendants appeal.
Top of Page
|
