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No. 119291
| Charles Sington, |
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Paul S. Rosen (248) 557-1155 |
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Plaintiff-Appellee
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Daryl C. Royal |
| vs (Appeal from Ct of Appeals) |
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| (Workers' Comp Appeal Comm) |
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| Chrysler Corporation, a/k/a, |
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Gerald M. Marcinkoski (248) 433-1414 |
| Daimlerchrysler Corporation, |
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Defendant-Appellant.
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Click to view briefs in Adobe format:
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief on Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellants' Brief on Appeal>>
Amicus Curiae Michigan Self-Insurers'
Association Brief on Appeal>>
Amicus Curiae Michigan Chamber of
Commerce and Detroit Regional Chamber
Brief on Appeal>>
Amicus Curiae Libner, VanLeuven,
Evans, Portenga & Slater, P.C., Brief>>
Amicus Curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Association Brief >>
Background
Charles Sington began working for Chrysler in 1971. He performed various
production jobs that included stacking and loading parts. In June 1994,
Sington slipped and fell, injuring his left shoulder. After surgery
on the shoulder, he returned to work on January 3, 1995 with a permanent
restriction of no work above the left shoulder. Ultimately, after another
surgery on his right shoulder in 1996, Sington returned to work with
a bilateral lifting limit of 20 pounds as well as a push/pull limit
of 20 pounds. Plaintiff performed his previous jobs but did them within
his limitations. He also served as a "floater," performing various duties
on an as-needed basis. On March 10, 1997, Sington suffered a stroke
which left him unable to use his right arm and fingers. Sington has
been off work as a result of the stroke. A worker's compensation magistrate
found that, both before and after his slip and fall in 1994, Sington
performed a regular plant job until his last day of work. As a result,
the magistrate concluded that plaintiff's wage loss was due to his stroke
and that he did not have a compensable disability. The Worker's Compensation
Appellate Commission affirmed the magistrate, but the Court of Appeals
reversed. The Court of Appeals stated that the magistrate and WCAC erred
by focusing on the duties Sington could still perform after his 1994
injury, rather than focusing on the tasks he was restricted from doing.
Chrysler appeals. The parties' arguments center on whether Sington should
be considered to have been disabled as of 1994, and whether he was "reasonably
employed" in jobs that accommodated his restrictions. If so, Sington
argues, he is entitled to worker's compensation benefits under §301(5)
of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Chrsyler argues that Sington
was not disabled and that he was working at a "regular plant job." Any
limitations on his job were caused by the nonwork-related injury for
which Sington underwent surgery in 1996, Chrsyler claims.
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