An intoxicated person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway and "by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person" is guilty of the crime of OUIL (operating under the influence of liquor) causing death, MCL 257.625(4). Does this statute require proof that the defendant's intoxicated driving was a "substantial cause" of the victim's death, as this Court held in People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231 (1996)? Is the statute constitutional?

Background>>

   

An intoxicated person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway and "by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person" is guilty of the crime of OUIL (operating under the influence of liquor) causing death, MCL 257.625(4). Does this statute require proof that the defendant's intoxicated driving was a "substantial cause" of the victim's death, as this Court held in People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231 (1996)? Is the statute constitutional?

Background>>   
   

The plaintiff, a board-certified osteopathic surgeon, applied for privileges with the defendant hospital's surgery department. The department denied his application, based on its requirement that a staff physician must have completed a certain type of residency program; the department also requires a staff physician to have an allopathic board certification. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant discriminates against osteopathic surgeons in violation of MCL 333.21513(e), part of the Public Health Code. Does this statute give the plaintiff a private cause of action against the hospital?

Background>>
  

The plaintiff was hurt in an automobile accident while delivering food for the defendants. The defendants argue that the plaintiff is an "employee" within the meaning of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act ("WDCA"), MCL 418.161, and that he cannot bring a tort claim against his employer. The lower courts disagreed, holding that the plaintiff is an independent contractor and could therefore sue the defendants. Are the lower courts correct?

Background>>

The appellants challenge the Michigan Public Service Commission's (MPSC) Code of Conduct implementing the Customer Choice and Electricity Reliability Act (Act 141), which encourages competition in the electricity market. Was the Code of Conduct issued in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) rulemaking procedures?

Background>>

This second-degree murder case presents two sentencing issues. First, should Offense Variable (OV) 3 (physical injury to victim) be scored 25 points when the victim dies? Second, if OV 3 was improperly scored, does the II-B cell of the M2 grid allow for the imposition of a life sentence, or is a life sentence a departure from the sentencing guidelines?

Background>>

Do the sentencing guidelines apply to sentences imposed after a probation violation? If so, can a trial court find that the conduct giving rise to the probation violation constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines?

This case concerns the No-Fault Act and MCL 500.3145(1), the one-year-back rule, which imposes deadlines on a person who intends to file a claim for personal protection insurance benefits. Under Michigan 's no-fault law, if the insurance company has paid personal protection benefits, but later discontinues them, a lawsuit may be started within one year after the claimant's most recent allowable expense, work loss, or survivor's loss. In Lewis v DAIIE , 426 Mich 93 (1986), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the one-year period is tolled from the date the claimant makes a specific request for benefits to the date the insurer formally denies that claim. Should the Court overrule Lewis v DAIIE ? If it does, should the Court's decision be given prospective effect only?

People
v
Starks
126756
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The defendant allegedly offered to perform fellatio on a minor, and instructed the minor to pull down his pants. Is this evidence sufficient to bind over the defendant on the charge of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct ("CSC") involving penetration, MCL 750.520g(1)?

McClements
v
Ford
126276
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The plaintiff was employed by a company that operated the cafeterias at a Ford Motor Company plant. She alleges that a Ford supervisor sexually harassed her. Does she have a cause of action for negligent retention? Can she assert a sexual harassment claim against Ford even though Ford is not her employer?

A convicted felon sentenced to probation may not possess a firearm until a certain number of years after he "has successfully completed all conditions of probation.." Does this statute bar a felon who has violated probation for any reason from ever possessing a firearm, even if the felon was discharged from probation?

Defendant Maura Campbell discussed plaintiff Kenneth Mitan during an interview with a reporter; the interview was broadcast three days later. Mitan filed a defamation action within a year of the broadcast, but more than a year after the interview. Is this claim barred by the one-year statute of limitations?

Were the pipes that the plaintiff tripped over "open and obvious"? Should the open and obvious doctrine have any application in a claim under the common work area doctrine described in Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc , 471 Mich 45 (2004)? If so, how should the open and obvious doctrine be reconciled with Hardy v Monsanto-Chem Systems, Inc , 414 Mich 29 (1992), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the policy of promoting safety in the workplace would be enhanced by the application of principles of comparative negligence?

The claimant, who worked at a clothing retailer, was fired for violating a policy that requires employees who return store merchandise to produce a receipt establishing the purchase price. She argues that she was similarly situated to a store manager who refused to allow a customer to return merchandise without a receipt, but was not fired. Did the claimant establish a prima facie case of discrimination?

The plaintiff claims that the defendant hospital falsely imprisoned him when its emergency department staff physically restrained him in response to his request to leave and go to another hospital. The Court of Appeals held that if the plaintiff was competent, he had a right to refuse treatment, but that there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff was competent. Is there a factual issue as to whether the plaintiff was competent?

Township of
Casco
v
Secretary of
State
126120
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Under the Home Rule Cities Act (HRCA), can territory be detached from one city and transferred to more than one township in a single detachment election?

Fillmore
Township
v
Secretary
of State
126369
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Glass
v
Goeckel
126409
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This case will determine the extent of private title ownership at the beaches of the Great Lakes, and the public's right to use such beaches throughout the state of Michigan. Can the public use that part of the shore that lies below the natural high-water mark, or is that land reserved for the exclusive use of the landowner of the adjacent parcel? Is the land below the natural high-water mark owned by the landowner or the state?

Opinion
07/29/05>>
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Motion for Rehearing>>

Rory
v
Continental
Insurance
126747
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The plaintiffs' no-fault insurance policy states that a claim or suit for uninsured motorist benefits must be filed within one year of the accident. Is this provision reasonable and enforceable?

Mayberry
v
General
Orthopedics
126136
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MCL 600.2912b(6) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to give notice before filing suit, and MCL 600.5856(d) allows the two-year limitation period to be tolled during the notice period, but only if necessary to prevent the statute of limitations from expiring. Does a plaintiff who files a "notice of intent" (NOI) at an early time, so that it is not necessary to toll the statute of limitations during the notice period, receive the benefit of the tolling provision if a second NOI is filed during the last six months of the two-year limitation period?

Background>>
     

J & J Farmer
Leasing
v
Citizens
Insurance
125818
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People
v
Stewart
124055
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People
v
Perkins
126727
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Is the restoration of firearm rights, addressed in the felon-in-possession statute at MCL 750.224f(2)(b), an affirmative defense? Or is the absence of restoration an element of the prosecution's case? Is larceny from a person a "specified felony" for purposes of the felon-in-possession statute, MCL 750.224f(6)(i)?

Grosse
Pointe
Park
v
Michigan
Municipal
Liability &
Prop Ins
125630
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Is sewage a "pollutant" under the pollution exclusion clause in the relevant insurance policy? Can the defendant rely on the exclusion in this case, even if it has paid similar claims, or is it estopped from asserting the exclusion?

Opinion
07/19/05>>

People
v
Knight
124996
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Did the prosecutor violate the state and federal equal protection clauses by removing African-American jurors from the jury? Did jury selection violate Batson v Kentucky , 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), and Miller-El v Cockrell , 537 US 322; 123 S Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 (2003)?

Opinion
07/21/05>>

People
v
Rice
125101
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Did the prosecutor violate the state and federal equal protection clauses by removing African-American jurors from the jury? Did jury selection violate Batson v Kentucky , 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), and Miller-El v Cockrell , 537 US 322; 123 S Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 (2003)?

Opinion
07/21/05>>

County Road
Association
v
Governor
125665
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County road associations challenge the Governor's authority to reduce $12,750,000 of expenditures by the Comprehensive Transportation Fund ("CTF") as part of a budget reduction and balancing effort in 2001. Did the Governor's action violate the Michigan Constitution?

In a condemnation case, the jury is asked to determine the just compensation due to the property owner, based on the value of the highest and best use of the land at the time of the taking. Evidence that would tend to affect the property's market value as of the date of the taking is relevant, including the "reasonable possibility" of rezoning that would increase the land's value. May a jury consider evidence that the land actually was rezoned several years after the taking?

Background>>

The plaintiffs, six public school retirees, are participants in the Michigan Public School Employees' Retirement System (MPSERS). They filed suit to challenge increases in their health care plan deductibles and prescription copays. The Supreme Court will consider several constitutional challenges related to this lawsuit: (1) Do the MPSERS plan amendments violate Const 1963, art 9, § 24, which protects "accrued financial benefits"? (2) Does the Public School Employees Retirement Act create a contractual right to health care benefits that is subject to Const 1963, art 1, § 10, and US Const, art I, § 10, which prohibit enactment of state law that impairs existing contractual obligations? (3) If so, do the plan amendments substantially impair existing contractual obligations?

Background>>
 

Plaintiff Stephen W. Warda was a Flushing police officer who also did vehicle inspections for "salvage titles." He was charged with a criminal offense as a result of his inspection work. After his acquittal, Warda sought to recover his attorney fees from the city. The Flushing City Council denied his request, but both the circuit court and Court of Appeals have concluded that Warda is entitled to the payment of some of his attorney fees. Are the lower courts correct? Is the city council's decision subject to judicial review?

Plaintiff Arthur T. Jarrad held a no-fault policy with defendant Integon National Insurance Company. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Jarrad was also allowed to participate in the State of Michigan long-term disability (LTD) plan. After Jarrad had a disabling accident, he became eligible for both LTD and no-fault benefits. The LTD benefits were paid in full, but the defendant no-fault insurance company reduced Jarrad's no-fault benefit by the amount of the LTD benefits. Did the no-fault insurance company properly calculate the amount of Jarrad's no-fault benefit?

Statutory conversion consists of buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any property the defendant "knew" to be stolen, embezzled, or converted (MCL 600.2919a). In this case, the Court of Appeals interpreted the word "knew" to include a situation where the defendant's employees had information that would have led an honest person to make further inquiries, but did not do so. In other words, the appellate court held that constructive knowledge is sufficient to impose liability under the statute. Is the Court of Appeals interpretation correct?

The recreational trespass statute, MCL 324.73102, contains an exception for fishermen wading or floating a navigable stream. Frank Gatski was cited for recreational trespass when, while fishing, he disregarded a "no trespass" sign and stepped onto the grating of a dam owned and operated by Consumers Energy Company. Did the Court of Appeals properly interpret the statute? Does Consumers Energy have the right to limit a fisherman's access to parts of the dam "for the protection of life, health, and property"?

The city of Detroit identified a building for demolition, gave notice to the owner of record, and filed a notice lis pendens. The lis pendens expired and the building changed hands before it was demolished; a jury awarded the building's new owner damages for the demolition. Did the city of Detroit have a duty under MCL 125.540 or Detroit City Code 290-H, § 12-110-28, to notify the subsequent purchaser of the demolition order? Was the city required to renew its notice of lis pendens, MCL 600.2701, before going forward with the demolition? Is the city governmentally immune from liability for this trespass? Was interest on the judgment properly calculated?

This case concerns the quantity of evidence needed to support a defendant's conviction for distributing or promoting child pornography. The defendant left files depicting children in sexual situations on an employer-owned laptop computer. Must the prosecutor show that the defendant intended for someone to see or receive those files?

The trial court denied defendant his right to peremptorily remove prospective jurors. Was this a "structural error" that is not subject to the harmless error analysis? Is a new trial required?

MCL 418.921 limits an employer's liability for a work-related injury suffered by a vocationally disabled employee to 52 weeks; after that, the Second Injury Fund (SIF) is liable. MCL 418.925 requires an employer to notify the SIF within a certain timeframe if it is likely that the employee will be owed compensation after the one-year anniversary of the injury; the statute does not provide a sanction for noncompliance. When the SIF is dismissed because notice was not timely given under § 925, does the employer become responsible for the benefits that would otherwise be SIF's obligation?

Plaintiff Lula Elezovic sued her employer, Ford Motor Company, and her supervisor, Daniel Bennett, under the Michigan Civil Rights Act. She alleged that Ford and Bennett were liable for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation. Does the Civil Rights Act provide for individual liability against supervisors? Did the trial court commit evidentiary errors that warrant a new trial? Did the trial court err when it found that Ford did not have notice of the alleged sexual harassment?

The plaintiffs, a married couple, argue that defendants' misdiagnosis of fetal genetic defects, and delay in notifying the plaintiffs of the defects, delayed their ability to obtain an abortion. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the defendants breached their professional duties and that plaintiff Sharon Barnes suffered permanent physical, emotional, and financial injuries, and pain and suffering as a result. Does Michigan law recognize this type of lawsuit?

The plaintiffs claim to have been injured as a result of an object or dust thrown up by equipment operated by the road commission tractors as part of highway maintenance operations. Are these tractors "motor vehicles" and did these injuries arise as a result of their "operation" as motor vehicles?

Did the trial court err in refusing to determine whether the defendant's typewritten statement was voluntary, in light of the fact that the defendant denied knowing about the typewritten statement and said that he was coerced into making a different, handwritten statement? What evidence did the defendant present to show that the typewritten statement was coerced?

Did the trial court properly rule that the plaintiffs' expert was not qualified to testify against the defendant physician? Do the plaintiffs even need expert support for their medical malpractice claims?

The plaintiff, a woman of South Asian descent, sued her employer after she sought and was turned down for promotions. She claimed that her employer discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin. She also alleged that her employer retaliated against her for opposing sexual harassment and filing a grievance alleging national-origin discrimination. Did she present enough evidence to support her claims?

Background>>

 

The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v McCoy , 392 Mich 231 (1974), requires a trial judge to sua sponte - that is, without a request from the defendant - give a cautionary instruction to the jury concerning the unreliability of accomplice testimony where the issue of credibility is "closely drawn." The defendant in this case claims that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury that cautionary instruction. Should the Supreme Court reconsider People v McCoy ?

A physician treating an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by no-fault insurance may charge a "reasonable amount" for the services rendered. MCL 500.3157. No-fault insurers are required to pay "all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary . . .  services . . . for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." MCL 500.3107. In this case, the plaintiffs challenge the method used by more than a dozen no-fault insurance companies to determine whether a charge for medically necessary services is for a "reasonable amount."

The Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) provides for "scheduled benefits" for the permanent loss of either a specific body part or function. This case involves benefits for "specific losses," under § 361(2)(k) of the WDCA (leg), and benefits for "total and permanent disabilities," under § 361(3) (for either the loss of both legs, or "permanent and total loss of industrial use" of both legs). Is the plaintiff entitled to benefits for "specific loss" of his left leg, or for "total and permanent disability" benefits, or both?

Background>>

The Head Start Act, 42 USC § 9839(a), establishes administrative requirements for Head Start programs, including a requirement of "reasonable public access to information . . . and reasonable public access to books and records of the agency . . . ." Does this statute create an implied private cause of action, allowing a disappointed bidder to sue a local Head Start agency for disclosure of all submitted bids?

Background>>

At what point was the defendant's consensual encounter with a police officer transformed into an investigatory stop, which gives rise to Fourth Amendment protections and must be supported by reasonable suspicion?

The plaintiff claims to have suffered sex- and age-related harassment and discrimination during her employment with DaimlerChrysler. She filed a Civil Rights Act suit three years after her date of resignation, which was nearly five months after she went on medical leave for emotional distress. Was the plaintiff's suit timely filed?

Background>>

Historically, when the actions of two or more persons jointly caused an injury, each of them could be held liable for the full amount of damages. When one person paid the damages, that person could seek reimbursement, through an action for contribution, from the other person. In 1995, the Legislature enacted tort reform legislation that eliminated "joint and several liability" in many cases. Did the 1995 tort reform legislation also eliminate contribution among persons who cause injury (known as tortfeasors)?

Background>>

The lower courts acknowledged that a private investigator's surveillance for an insurance company that is investigating a possible insurance fraud is a "legitimate purpose" within the meaning of the stalking law. If the subject of the investigation becomes aware of the surveillance, can this type of activity become "harassment" under the terms of the statute so as to constitute stalking?

Background>>

The Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) purchased from the Soo Line Railroad a railroad right-of-way that crossed defendant's property. Was the initial grant of the easement to the Soo Line Railroad an unconditional right-of-way with no use restriction? Was the easement terminated by non-use?

The plaintiffs in this case claim that their health may be at risk from exposure to the toxic chemical dioxin, but they do not claim that they currently suffer from injury or disease. Does Michigan recognize a pre-injury cause of action for medical monitoring? Can the defendant in this case, Dow Chemical Company, be ordered to pay the cost of the plaintiffs' medical monitoring?

Under Michigan Court Rule 2.403, which establishes a case evaluation procedure, a party must be awarded costs under certain circumstances. Does that include attorney fees incurred on appeal?

Do successive prosecutions in different states violate Michigan 's constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy?

Should Judge James P. Noecker of the 45th Circuit Court be removed from the bench for judicial misconduct as recommended by the Judicial Tenure Commission? Should he be required to pay costs?

The defendant fondled the breasts and genital area of a 17-year-old woman who was visiting his apartment. Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, where the complainant failed to testify to the use of any force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact?

Background>>

City of
Monroe
v
Jones
125289
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Under a provision of Michigan 's motor vehicle code (MCL 257.675(6)), a disabled person is entitled to "courtesy [that] shall relieve the disabled person . . . from liability for a violation with respect to parking, other than in violation of this act [the Michigan vehicle code]." Does this statute relieve a disabled person from liability for parking in a way that violates the Michigan vehicle code, if the ticket cites a local ordinance that is comparable to a provision of the Michigan vehicle code, instead of citing the code itself? Can the City of Monroe enforce its local ordinance against the plaintiff, a disabled driver?

Background>>

The plaintiff receives weekly wage loss benefits from the defendant, her former employer. Should the plaintiff's profit from two adult foster care homes be set off against her benefits?

The defendant physician treated the plaintiff's varicose veins with a series of injections known as sclerotherapy. The plaintiff had an adverse reaction after the last injection, and alleges medical malpractice, claiming that the doctor did not obtain her informed consent to the procedure. Is the plaintiff's suit barred by the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions? Does plaintiff's informed-consent claim accrue from the date of the doctor's failure to obtain informed consent before the first injection, or does a separate claim accrue for the defendant's failure to obtain informed consent before each injection session?

Background>>