Highland-Howell Development
v
Marion Township
130698
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The petitioner developer did not appeal a $3 million special assessment for a sewer project that included a trunk line through its 200-acre parcel. It later appealed to the Tax Tribunal when the respondent township informally eliminated the trunk line, but the Tax Tribunal rejected the appeal as untimely. After the township formally ratified changes in the original project, including elimination of the trunk line, the petitioner timely appealed, but the Tax Tribunal ruled that its earlier decision barred the appeal under res judicata, a legal doctrine that provides that a matter already decided by a court or tribunal cannot be relitigated. The Court of Appeals affirmed based on the legal doctrine of collateral estoppel, which prevents a party to a lawsuit from raising a fact or issue which was already decided against that party in another lawsuit. How may a property owner seek relief from a special assessment for a planned improvement when there is a later change to the plan that materially affects the benefit to the owner’s property? Did the Tax Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider the last appeal?

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Order
06/29/07>>

In re Certified Questions (Miller v Ford)
131517
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A Texas jury awarded $9.5 million for the mesothelioma death of a woman who was allegedly exposed to asbestos by washing her stepfather’s work clothes; her stepfather worked for an independent contractor hired by Ford Motor Company to work at Ford’s River Rouge plant. The woman herself was never at the plant. The Texas Court of Appeals has asked the Michigan Supreme Court to determine whether, under Michigan law, Ford owed a duty to the woman to protect her from exposure to asbestos fibers.


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Matthews
v
Republic Western Ins
130912
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The plaintiff was injured while driving a rented truck in Georgia on a suspended license. The truck rental company’s insurer denied the plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits. The insurance company argued that the truck was not subject to the requirements of Michigan’s no-fault act, because it was owned by a nonresident and titled in Kentucky, and was not operated in Michigan for more than 30 days in the calendar year preceding the accident. The insurance company also argued that it did not owe the plaintiff no-fault benefits because he was engaged in wrongful conduct – driving on a suspended license – at the time of the accident. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected the insurance company’s arguments. Does the common law wrongful conduct rule bar the plaintiff from recovering no-fault benefits? What is the meaning of the phrase “operated in this state for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year” in the no-fault statute?

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Betten Auto Center
v
Dept of Treasury
132343
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Automobile dealerships sought a refund of use taxes that they paid on cars that were purchased for resale but received limited use as demonstrators before resale. Defendant Department of Treasury denied the plaintiffs’ request, and the plaintiffs appealed in the Court of Claims, which ordered the refund. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It also held, however, that pursuant to MCL 205.93(2), the plaintiffs were liable for a 2.5 percent use tax and a $30 monthly charge for certain vehicles. Did the Court of Appeals properly interpret the resale exemption?

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Brown
v
Mayor of Detroit
132016
132017
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Two former Detroit police officers have sued the Mayor of Detroit and the city of Detroit. The plaintiffs claim that they lost their jobs in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq. The mayor and city argue that the plaintiffs did not engage in protected activity within the WPA’s meaning. In order to fall within the WPA’s scope, must an employee of a public body report illegal activity to an outside or higher authority than his employer?

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Kirkaldy
v
Rim
129128
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In this medical malpractice case, the affidavit of merit filed with the plaintiffs’ complaint was signed by an expert who does not have the same board certification as the defendant physician, as required by MCL 600.2912d and 600.2169. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit without prejudice. The Court of Appeals ruled in a published opinion that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the defective affidavit of merit and that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Did the defective affidavit of merit toll the statute of limitations? Can a defect in an affidavit of merit filed with a medical malpractice complaint be cured without refiling the complaint?

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Mather Investors
v
Larson
131654
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A nursing home resident transferred a savings account and real estate to her nephew; she died owing the nursing home for her care. Although the nursing home sued both the resident and her nephew for fraudulent transfer, the resident died a week after the lawsuit was filed, and was never served with the complaint. The nursing home did not add her estate as a party, and the trial judge ultimately dismissed the case against the nephew, finding that the aunt’s estate was a necessary party. The court also denied the nursing home’s motion to then add the estate as a defendant, reasoning that the nephew would be prejudiced by the delay. In a fraudulent transfer case, if the debtor is dead, must the plaintiff sue the debtor’s estate to get relief from the debtor’s alleged fraud? Did the lower courts in this case correctly rule that the nephew would have been prejudiced by the nursing home’s delay in adding the estate to the lawsuit?

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Brown
v
Brown, et al
131358
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The plaintiff, a security guard, was assigned to work at the defendant’s plant. She sued the defendant after she was raped by one of its employees. The employee had no prior criminal record and no history of violent behavior. But the plaintiff alleged that the defendant should have known of the employee’s propensity for violent behavior, based on graphic sexual comments that the employee had made to her and that she had reported to a supervisor. Was the crude and aggressive nature of the employee’s comments sufficient to create a question of fact regarding whether the defendant knew or should have known of the employee’s violent propensity?

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Opinion
07/11/07>>

Bloomfield Estates
v
City of Birmingham
130990
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Over 75 years ago, the city of Birmingham acquired lots in the Bloomfield Estates subdivision for use as a park, despite a deed restriction limiting the property’s use to single-family residences. The subdivision did not object to the park’s existence until the city proposed establishing a dog park. Can the subdivision now enforce the deed restrictions? Is the dog park a significant deviation from the deed restrictions? What remedies are available if the deed restrictions are violated?

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The plaintiff slipped on ice outside the entrance to a restroom building at a freeway rest stop. Evidence established that melting snow from the building’s roof, caused by lack of proper insulation and inadequate drainage, created the icy patch. Was the lack of insulation and drainage a defective condition “of a public building” within the meaning of MCL 691.1406, so that governmental immunity does not apply? Did the Court of Appeals correctly characterize the alleged defective condition as a design defect? Does the public building exception permit a party to bring a design defect claim? Was the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the icy sidewalk was not a transitory condition contrary to Wade v Dept of Corrections, 439 Mich 158 (1992)?

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The defendant city and the plaintiff firefighters association are involved in Act 312 arbitration proceedings. Act 312 requires parties to maintain existing wages, hours and other conditions of employment pending the outcome of arbitration. But the parties’ collective bargaining agreement acknowledges that restructuring and layoffs are within the city’s managerial prerogative (and are therefore not mandatory subjects of bargaining). The city’s proposed budgetary plan called for restructuring and layoffs, but the trial court entered an injunction to prevent the plan from taking effect. The Court of Appeals affirmed. May the city implement the restructuring plan, or lay off firefighters, before reaching an agreement with the firefighters association about the impact of those actions?

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The defendant library does not allow non-residents to have full access to library services. The Michigan Constitution states that “The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment and support of public libraries which shall be available to all residents of the state …” Is the library’s policy unconstitutional?


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The defendant was arrested when he complied with the officers’ requests that he step outside his home. He argues that the incriminating evidence found in his apartment after his arrest should be suppressed because his arrest was unlawful. The trial court agreed and suppressed the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Does the police conduct in this case violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures?

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After receiving an anonymous tip, and finding a remnant of a burnt marijuana cigarette in the defendants’ trash, police obtained a search warrant; they found 172 grams of marijuana in the defendants’ home. Did the search violate either the Fourth Amendment or a state statute concerning search warrants based on anonymous tips? If there was a Fourth Amendment violation, did the police act in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on the warrant? If the search violated the statute, but not the Fourth Amendment, did the trial court elect a proper remedy by permitting the defense to argue to the jury that police misled the magistrate and violated the statute?

Background>

In sentencing criminal defendants, trial courts use statutory “offense variables,” which assign a number of points based on various factors in the crime; the number of points is used to determine the length of the sentence. In this case, relying on People v Morson, 471 Mich 248 (2004), the Court of Appeals held that all the defendants involved in a multiple offender criminal endeavor are required to receive the same scores for Offense Variable (OV) 1 (aggravated use of a weapon), OV 2 (lethal potential of the weapon), and OV 3 (physical injury to victim). The defendant’s companion used a box cutter to seriously injure a security guard, but the defendant was not himself convicted of the charges related to that crime. Is OV scoring offense-specific? Can the defendant be assessed offense variable points based on his codefendant’s conviction?

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Voters approved a millage under a ballot proposal to raise money for the repair and construction of county roads. The statute governing allocation of the millage proceeds requires that a portion of them be distributed to cities within the county, in the absence of a contrary agreement by the governing bodies. The plaintiff city has no county roads within its limits, but argued that it was entitled to its share of the millage proceeds. Did the Court of Appeals correctly rule in favor of the city? Was the ballot proposition illegal?

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The mother of an 11-year-old boy brought a medical malpractice claim on his behalf, claiming that a doctor’s 1999 misdiagnosis caused her son to suffer permanent mental impairment. But the trial court dismissed the case, finding that the suit was filed after the two-year statute of limitations expired. Does a statutory savings provision for insane persons apply to medical malpractice claims, allowing the lawsuit to go forward?

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Farmers Insurance is the assigned claims carrier that was paying benefits to a motorcyclist injured in an accident with a motor vehicle. Farm Bureau’s insured was a co-owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, but the vehicle was not listed in the Farm Bureau policy. Is Farm Bureau responsible for the motorcyclist’s no-fault benefits because it insured the motor vehicle’s owner?

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A state statute provides that a prisoner who is facing criminal charges must be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections notifies the county prosecutor of the prisoner’s location. The defendant was arrested in Georgia and incarcerated in Michigan in August 2002. He was tried in May 2003. The trial court found, after deducting pretrial delays that it concluded were attributable to the defendant, that the 180-day rule was met. Was there a violation of the 180-day rule? Is the time limit subject to waiver or extension for any reason, such as prosecutor good faith, mutual agreement of the parties, or time attributable to the defendant, including adjournment requests?

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The plaintiff sued her employer and a manager under the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the manager sexually harassed her and created a hostile work environment, and that her employer had notice of the hostile work environment and did not take action to address the problem. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the plaintiff’s claim against both her employer and the manager. Did the record submitted to the trial court create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer was on notice of the sexual harassment?

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A student wrestler was injured during wrestling maneuvers with a coach. The trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that there was a question of fact as to whether the coach was grossly negligent, which would remove the protections of governmental immunity. Was the student’s injury proximately caused by the coach’s alleged failure to give notice of the initial takedown? If so, was the coach grossly negligent?

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The plaintiff sued her former lawyer and his law firm for legal malpractice after her products liability case against an automobile manufacturer was dismissed. The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege a prima facie case of legal malpractice because she did not show that, but for the attorneys’ alleged negligence, she would have prevailed in her earlier lawsuit. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the plaintiff adequately stated a prima facie case of legal malpractice?

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In Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. In this case, the defendant pled guilty to larceny in a building. His guidelines range was calculated to be zero to 17 months, which is an “intermediate sanction” and does not include imposition of a prison term. The sentencing judge departed upward and imposed a sentence of two to four years in prison. The judge cited a number of factors for his decision, including the defendant’s lengthy criminal history and the fact that the defendant’s crime involved stealing from a charity. Does the defendant’s sentence violate Blakely?

Background>>

In Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. In this case, the defendant was placed on probation for attempted breaking and entering. He was later found guilty of violating his probation. The trial court acknowledged that the original sentencing guidelines called for a jail term of no longer than 11 months (an “intermediate sanction”), but the defendant was sentenced to 18 months to five years in prison, based on additional factual findings made by the sentencing judge.  Does the defendant’s sentence violate Blakely?

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People
v
McCuller
128161
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In Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. In this case, the sentencing guidelines would have called for a cap of 12 months in jail (an “intermediate sanction”). But the sentencing judge made additional factual findings that increased the defendant’s sentencing guidelines and permitting the imposition of a term of imprisonment. Does the defendant’s sentence violate Blakely?

While searching a car, a state police trooper discovered $180,975 in cash in the trunk; the car’s driver did not consent to the search. The prosecutor brought a forfeiture action in which the money itself was not introduced into evidence. Did the prosecutor prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was subject to forfeiture? How does the exclusionary rule – which has been applied to exclude evidence police obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures – apply in a forfeiture proceeding where the property subject to forfeiture was seized illegally?

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The city required certain employees, including police officers, to live within 20 “road miles” of city limits. Because the job applicant’s property was determined to be 23 “road miles” away from city limits, the city withdrew its conditional offer of employment to the applicant. Can the applicant sue the city for money damages? Is the city’s residency requirement consistent with MCL 15.602, which prohibits a local unit of government or school district from requiring any employee to live less than 20 miles from the nearest boundary of that unit or district?

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A woman unsuccessfully tried to stop her angry, drunken boyfriend from driving her car, which he drove regularly on other occasions with her consent. Several minutes later, her boyfriend struck another vehicle and injured the plaintiff, who then sued the car owner, her insurance company, and her boyfriend. MCL 257.401(1) states that “[t]he owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge.” In this case, was the car driven with the owner’s “express or implied consent or knowledge”? Are the vehicle owner and her insurance company liable for the injuries the owner’s boyfriend caused?

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Numerous investigative subpoenas were issued to third parties for phone records and the defendant’s banking and business records during the investigation of this home-invasion and safe-breaking case. The subpoenas failed to conform to statutory requirements for obtaining investigative subpoenas. Does the defendant have standing to raise the statutory violations? If so, should the evidence obtained through the subpoenas be excluded?

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Stipulation to dismiss the application entered. Oral argument adjourned.

The plaintiff sued his lawyer, and the lawyer’s law firm, for legal malpractice. To support his malpractice claim, the plaintiff produced an affidavit from an expert witness who testified that the defendant lawyer breached the standard of care. The trial court granted summary disposition to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff’s case. Was the defendant lawyer’s strategy reasonable as a matter of law? Or does the affidavit from the plaintiff's expert witness create a genuine issue of material fact, under the principles discussed in Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648 (1995), and other applicable law?

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The plaintiffs sought disclosure, under the Freedom of Information Act, of a report prepared by a police department. The trial court found that portions of the report, with the factual findings and summaries, were within the “frank communications” exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(m), and the “personnel records of law enforcement agencies” exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(s)(ix), but that purely factual portions were not exempt. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court’s analysis was inadequate. The appellate court offered guidance as to how the trial court should analyze the two exemptions on remand. Did the Court of Appeals properly construe the statute?

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In this auto no-fault case, the plaintiff sought to recover personal protection insurance benefits from the defendant insurer. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff, the sole owner of a subchapter S corporation, was self-employed and not entitled to benefits under Adams v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 154 Mich App 186 (1986). The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument and, relying on MCL 500.3148(1), ordered the defendant to pay attorney fees to the plaintiff on the ground that it “unreasonably” refused to pay benefits. Was the defendant properly ordered to pay attorney fees?

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Baker
v
Couchman
131607
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The plaintiff, a sheriff’s deputy, was employed as a school resource officer (SRO) under a written “partnership” agreement between the sheriff and the school district. Under the agreement, the school district paid a portion of the SRO’s salary and had the right to participate in the selection, supervision, and removal of the SRO. The sheriff ended the officer’s SRO assignment after the superintendent of schools concluded that the plaintiff was unsuitable for that assignment. The officer sued the superintendent for tortious interference with business relations. Is the superintendent immune from suit?

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An attorney sued the defendant school board, his former client, for allegedly violating the Open Meetings Act. Is he entitled to attorney fees?

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In this medical malpractice case, the court admitted the plaintiff’s experts’ affidavits of merit as substantive evidence and permitted their use at trial for impeachment; it also admitted into evidence a settling defendant’s deposition testimony. Were the plaintiffs denied a fair trial? Are affidavits of merit admissible at trial as substantive or impeachment evidence? Now that MCL 600.6304 and MCL 600.2957 require the finder of fact to determine and apportion the liability of non-parties, can a party make reference at trial to a defendant who has settled his liability with the plaintiff?

After his attorney left the police station, the defendant made statements that were used against him at trial. A federal judge ruled that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when his lawyer left him to be interrogated by the police; the judge ruled that those statements could not be used against the defendant in a second trial. Does the exclusionary rule – which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution – apply in this case, where the basis for exclusion is not police misconduct but the attorney’s abandonment of the defendant? Can the prosecutor introduce the testimony of witnesses whom the defendant identified during his interrogation?

A state statute requires that, before taxpayers can sue to remedy the misappropriation of public funds, they must first make a “demand” on the appropriate public official “to maintain such suit . . . .” In this case, before filing suit, the plaintiffs sent letters to local and state officials asking that they “investigate and halt the use of public funds” for health care benefits for Ann Arbor public school employees. Did the plaintiffs satisfy the pre-suit demand requirement? Does the state statute, MCL 129.61, purport to grant standing to individual taxpayers? Is standing in this case controlled by the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in National Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company, 471 Mich 608 (2004)?

This water use case concerns a conflict between riparian users (individual plaintiffs and persons represented by a conservation group) and a groundwater user (a spring-water bottling company). Do the plaintiffs have standing under the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in National Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company, 471 Mich 608 (2004), to bring all the claims set forth in their complaint?

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s experts’ causation testimony was speculative and unreliable. When a trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Michigan Rule of Evidence 702 and determines that the proponent of an expert has not put forth sufficient evidence that the expert’s testimony is “the product of reliable principles and methods,” is the trial court required to conduct a more searching inquiry before it may exclude the expert testimony? If a qualified medical expert testifies that ethical considerations preclude conducting a scientific study that would yield supporting data for the expert’s opinion, are the expert’s own knowledge and experience sufficient to establish a reliable basis for the expert’s opinion?

MCL 600.2912d requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to file an affidavit of merit that addresses the applicable standard of care and medical causation. The affidavit of merit must be signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under MCL 600.2169. Should the plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint against the defendant nurses be dismissed because her affidavits of merit were signed by nurses, who can testify as to the standard of care but may not be able to testify as to medical causation?

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Bates
v
Gilbert
129564
129565
129566
129567
129569
129570
129571
129572
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MCL 600.2912d requires a plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to file an affidavit of merit that addresses the applicable standard of care and medical causation. The affidavit of merit must be signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under MCL 600.2169. MCL 600.2912e imposes a similar requirement on the defendant, who must file an affidavit of meritorious defense. Should the plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint against an optometrist be dismissed because her affidavit of merit was signed by an ophthalmologist, who cannot testify about the standard of care of an optometrist? May one defendant satisfy its obligation to file an affidavit of meritorious defense by filing a reliance on the affidavit of merit filed by another defendant? May a defendant physician sign his own affidavit of meritorious defense?

The trial court barred the defendants from calling an independent standard of care expert witness, as a sanction for filing their affidavit of meritorious defense one day late. The court also ruled that the defendants could present standard of care testimony through the defendant physician or any other treating physician. Did the court abuse its discretion?

Hartman &
Eichhorn Bldg Co
v
Dailey
129733
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The Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which prohibits deceptive practices in trade or commerce, does not apply to “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority,” MCL 445.904(1)(a). Does the MCPA apply to residential builders or their corporate officers?



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Liss
v
Lewiston-Richards, Inc.
130064
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The Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which prohibits deceptive practices in trade or commerce, does not apply to “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority,” MCL 445.904(1)(a). Does the MCPA apply to residential builders or their corporate officers?

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People
v
Smith (Bobby)
130353
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Does Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), set forth the proper test to determine when “multiple punishments” are barred on double jeopardy grounds? Or should that issue be resolved through the analysis set forth in People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458 (1984)? Do defendant’s convictions of armed robbery and felony-murder based on a predicate felony of larceny violate double jeopardy protections under either the Blockburger or Robideau test?

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Trentadue (Estate of Eby)
v
Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler
128579
128623-5
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Margarette F. Eby was murdered in 1986, but her killer’s identity wasn’t discovered until 2002. Within six months of the killer’s arrest, the plaintiff, the personal representative of Eby’s estate, filed a civil suit for damages. The defendants argue that the lawsuit is untimely because it was filed after the statute of limitations expired. Did the plaintiff’s claims accrue in 1986, or was their accrual delayed under the common law discovery rule because the plaintiff could not have known of the claims until the killer was identified, well after the limitation period expired?

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People
v
Wright (Alphonzo)
130295
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Both defendants were charged with maintaining a drug vehicle under MCL 333.7405(1)(d), which states that a person “shall not knowingly keep or maintain” a vehicle for the purpose of selling a controlled substance. Does the statute require the vehicle to be used for such a purpose “continuously for an appreciable period” of time, as the Court of Appeals concluded in People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27 (1999)? Must there be more than a single use of the vehicle for that purpose?

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People
v
Thompson (Keith)
130825
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Both defendants were charged with maintaining a drug vehicle under MCL 333.7405(1)(d), which states that a person “shall not knowingly keep or maintain” a vehicle for the purpose of selling a controlled substance. Does the statute require the vehicle to be used for such a purpose “continuously for an appreciable period” of time, as the Court of Appeals concluded in People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27 (1999)? Must there be more than a single use of the vehicle for that purpose?

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Perry
v
Golling Chrysler Plymouth Jeep, Inc
129943
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The plaintiff was injured by a driver who had purchased a car that day from a dealership. Can the dealership be sued under the owner liability statute, or had it transferred title to the car buyer? MCL 257.933(9) provides that title transfers on the date of “execution of . . . the application for title.” Is an application for title executed upon completion and signing by the applicant, or upon being placed in the mail to the Secretary of State by the dealership? And does the release of the driver of the car also release the owner of the car of liability?

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International Home Foods
v
Department of Treasury
130542
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The Michigan Department of Treasury assessed the plaintiffs – both out-of-state companies which employed Michigan residents in sales positions – for unpaid Single Business Tax (SBT). The plaintiffs argued that they were not subject to the SBT for the years at issue under the standards set forth in tax bulletins issued by the department. The department argued that the SBT was properly assessed, based on the nexus standard announced in Magnetek Controls, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 221 Mich App 400 (1997). Can the Magnetek standard be applied retroactively to determine the plaintiffs’ liability for the SBT for tax years 1989 through 1996?

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Azzar
v
City of Grand Rapids
130310
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The city of Grand Rapids prosecuted a property owner for violations of the Grand Rapids Building Maintenance Code. After the owner was acquitted of the charges, he sued the city, asserting that it had no authority to promulgate or enforce the code. Is the city building code preempted by the Single State Construction Act, MCL 125.1501 et seq.?

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Czymbor's Timber, Inc
v
City of Saginaw
130672
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Two Saginaw city ordinances prohibit discharging weapons within city limits, which prevents the plaintiffs from hunting on their property. Are these ordinances preempted by the state hunting control act – which provides the Department of Natural Resources with the exclusive authority to regulate hunting – or by other state statutes that regulate hunting?

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Tri-County International Trucks
v
Hills' Pet Nutrition, Inc
130671
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The plaintiffs settled a personal injury lawsuit and filed this declaratory judgment action, alleging that the defendant is contractually obligated to indemnify them for the amount they paid in settlement. Does the defendant have a duty to indemnify plaintiff Tri-County International Trucks, Inc.?

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Lawson
v
Kreative Child Care Center, Inc
130872
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A child told his mother that his “butt hurt” and that “Uncle Fred[die] check out my butt.” The mother repeated this statement to her child’s treating physicians, who documented it in the medical record. Is the child’s statement admissible in this civil action under the hearsay exception for statements made for medical treatment?

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Miller
v
Chapman Contracting
130808
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The plaintiff’s attorney erroneously named the plaintiff, instead of his bankruptcy trustee, as the plaintiff in this lawsuit. After the statute of limitations expired, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, pointing out the plaintiff’s failure to name his bankruptcy trustee in the lawsuit. The plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff, but the trial court dismissed the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Should the trial court have granted the request to amend the complaint?


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Hosey
v
Berry
131213
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The plaintiff seeks non-economic damages for injuries that she claims to have received in an automobile accident. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of a body function, as defined in MCL 500.3135(1), and was not entitled to damages. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion by submitting reports containing unsworn opinions from doctors. Does Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 2.116(G)(6) permit a trial court, in deciding a motion for summary disposition, to consider unsworn statements or opinions of potential witnesses contained in documents that may be inadmissible at trial?

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Knue
v
Smith
130377
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Does the fee-shifting provision of the offer-of-judgment rule, Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 2.405(D), apply to equitable claims to quiet title? Was the offer of judgment in this case unconditional as required by MCR 2.405(A)(1), when it included a demand for a quitclaim deed?


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Lanzo Construction Company
v
Wayne Steel Erectors
130992
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The defendant agreed to indemnify the plaintiff for any liability for claims arising from a construction project. MCL 691.991 states that such an agreement cannot be enforced if it amounts to a promise to indemnify the promissee (here, the plaintiff) for injuries caused by the promissee’s sole negligence. The defendant’s employee sued the plaintiff, alleging that he tripped on debris at the construction site. Is the defendant obligated to indemnify the plaintiff for the employee’s claim, or was the plaintiff’s sole negligence the cause of the employee’s injury?

Background>>

 

Banks
v
Exxon Mobil Corporation
131036
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Did the owner of a gas station and its manager know, or should they have known, of the dangerous condition of a damaged gasoline pump, so that they should be held liable for the injuries suffered by a customer who attempted to use the pump? The trial court’s ruled that the jury would be instructed that it could infer that a missing surveillance videotape would be adverse to the gas station owner and its manager. Should this ruling play any role in determining whether summary disposition is warranted under Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 2.116(C)(10)?

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This medical malpractice case was dismissed by the trial court because the plaintiffs, who had their affidavit of merit prepared and notarized in another state, did not have the notary’s signature certified by a court clerk from the same county until after the statute of limitations ran out on their claims. A 1963 Michigan statute states that where an affidavit is notarized by a notary public of another state, “[t]he signature of such notary public … shall be certified by the clerk of any court of record in the county where such affidavit shall be taken….” But another statute, the Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgements Act (URAA), does not require special certification of an out-of-state notary’s signature. The Michigan Court of Appeals, while allowing the plaintiffs’ case to go forward, has ruled that in the future, “any affidavit of merit acknowledged by an out-of-state notary filed without the proper certification will not toll the period of limitations….” Is the 1963 statute controlling, or does the URAA apply?

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The plaintiff, a state government employee, sued the state of Michigan in the Court of Claims after her long-term disability payments were stopped. Does the Court of Claims have exclusive jurisdiction over her complaint as an original action? Was the decision to stop benefits an administrative decision that could only be reviewed by the circuit court?