MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

The following are summaries of cases that have been or will be argued before the Michigan Supreme Court's seven Justices during the term (October 2007 - July 31, 2008). This page also provides a status of the case, and links to the Court's opinion or order in each case this session. Further information may be obtained by calling the Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 517-373-0120. To help you select cases that may be of interest to you, the Court's staff has prepared the following synopses. These are simple summaries of complicated cases, and might not reflect the manner in which some or all of the Court's seven Justices view the cases. The lawyers may also disagree with regard to the facts, the issues, the procedural history, or the significance of their cases. For further details concerning these cases, you should contact the lawyers.

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Wednesday, June 11, 2008

Case Name & Docket Number

Calendar Number

At Issue

Status

In Re Beverley Nettles-Nickerson 133929 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat

Oral Argument

A judge is accused of a number of judicial ethics violations, including lying under oath in connection with her divorce case and releasing a criminal defendant from probation because of a social relationship with a court employee. She disputes the charges. Should she be removed from office?   Background:

Opinion 06/13/08>>

May Session Calendar>>
May Case Call>>

Wednesday, May 14, 2008

Case Name & Docket Number

Calendar Number

At Issue

Status

People v Lamorand 135247 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat

Oral Argument on Application

The defendant was arrested on drug charges, along with his mother and other family members. The prosecutor offered to let the defendant and his family members plead guilty in exchange for shorter jail sentences, on the condition that all of them would accept the plea bargains; if any of them refused, none of them would be able to plead. The defendant initially accepted, but later tried to withdraw his plea, arguing that he was coerced into pleading guilty because his family members would face longer jail sentences if he did not accept the bargain. Was the group plea bargain coercive? Should the defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea? Background:

Order 06/13/08>>

Wednesday, May 7, 2008

Case Name & Docket Number

Calendar Number

At Issue

Status

People v Bond (Andre) 135402 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The defendant was an adult hall monitor at a high school who made suggestive comments to female students and had physical contact with a couple of them. Was the evidence sufficient to show that the defendant used his position of authority to cause the victims’ submission to the sexual contact, as required for a conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(iii)? Background:	Order 05/16/08>>
Brackett v Focus Hope 135375 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff employee was disciplined for her refusal to attend a Martin Luther King, Jr. event that her employer considered to be mandatory. She suffered a major depression as a reaction to the discipline and remains totally disabled. Is the employee entitled to worker’s compensation benefits, or are benefits precluded by MCL 418.305, because her actions amounted to “intentional and wilful misconduct”? Background:	Opinion 07/30/08>>
Dept of Transportation v Initial Transport 134798 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	An accident involving the defendant motor carrier’s vehicle did at least $3.5 million in damage to a Michigan interstate highway. The Michigan Department of Transportation is suing to recover the full loss, even though Michigan’s no-fault act contains a $1 million cap on recoverable property damages. MDOT points to the Motor Carrier Safety Act, which incorporates federal regulations requiring up to $5 million in “financial responsibility” for motor carriers of hazardous materials. Does the Motor Carrier Safety Act provide a private cause of action or remedy for third parties? Does the Motor Carrier Safety Act carve out an exception to the no-fault act’s cap on recoverable property damages? Is MDOT entitled to penalty interest on delayed benefit payments not reasonably in dispute? Background:	Order 05/16/08>>
Fundunburks v Capital Area Transportation Authority 134408 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff claims that, as she was exiting a city bus, the defendant bus driver prematurely closed the doors, causing her to fall and injure both knees. Did the bus driver’s actions constitute gross negligence as defined in MCL 691.1407(7)(a), so as to be actionable under the exception to governmental immunity in MCL 691.1407(2)(c)? Did the circuit court err in denying partial summary disposition to the bus driver? Background:	Order 05/23/08>>
Miljevich Corp v North County Bank & Trust 134780 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff corporation borrowed about $1.4 million from the defendant bank. The loan note provided that the interest rate on the loan was “[o]ne and one-half percent (1½%) per annum above the ‘prime’ as published from time to time by the Bank as its ‘prime rate’. . . .” The bank never published its prime interest rate; it said that its prime rate was the same as the Wall Street Journal’s prime rate, but the bank’s rate was actually higher. After the corporation refinanced and paid its loan, it sued for the difference between what the bank charged for interest, and the interest that should have been charged pursuant to the Wall Street Journal’s prime rate plus 1.5 percent. Did the defendant indirectly publish its interest rate by telling the plaintiff that the Wall Street Journal prime rate was the applicable interest rate? If not, was the plaintiff damaged by the defendant’s failure to publish its interest rate? What interest rate applies to the loan? Background:	Order 05/16/08>>
People v Mercer (Charles) 135811 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The defendant is accused of killing his wife by giving her an overdose of propoxyphene. She died in 1968; the defendant was arrested in 2006. By then, many key witnesses had died and all of the medical samples taken at the time of the decedent’s death had been destroyed. The trial court found that the prejudice to the defendant from the delay in his arrest was too substantial to permit the case to go forward. The Court of Appeals reversed in a peremptory order, based on the legal standard that a defendant must show that the delay in arrest occurred because the prosecutor intended to achieve a tactical advantage. Did the Court of Appeals apply the proper standard? Should the charges against the defendant be dismissed due to the prearrest delay? Background:	Order 07/25/08>>
Zavradinos v JTRB, Inc. 135137 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant husband and sought to garnish two securities accounts to satisfy his judgment. The accounts are designated as being held by the defendant and his wife as “JTWROS” (joint tenants with right of survivorship). The husband and wife sought to defeat the garnishment, arguing that the accounts were held as tenants by the entireties, and were not available for garnishment on a judgment solely against the husband. Are the accounts subject to garnishment? Does MCL 557.151 mean that there is a statutory presumption that property held jointly by a husband and wife is held by them as tenants by the entirety unless the title or conveyance expressly provides otherwise? If so, how can the presumption of a tenancy by the entirety be overcome? Background:	Order 07/18/08>>

April Session Calendar>>
April Case Call Calendar>>

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Case Name & Docket Number

Calendar Number

At Issue

Status

People v Sargent (Dennis) 133474 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	1	In sentencing criminal defendants, trial courts use statutory “offense variables,” which assign a number of points based on various factors in the crime; the number of points is used to determine the length of the sentence. Offense Variable 9 (number of victims), MCL 777.39, requires 10 points to be assessed if there were two to nine victims. At the time, the instructions provided that “each person who was placed in danger of injury or loss of life” was counted as a victim. MCL 777.39(2)(a). Does the number of “victims,” for purposes of scoring OV 9, include persons who testify as to uncharged, similar acts committed by the defendant? Should the analysis of OV 6 scoring under the former judicial sentencing guidelines, set forth in People v Chesebro, 206 Mich App 468 (1994), be applied to OV 9 scoring? Background:	Opinion 06/18/08>>
People v Taylor (Geracer) 134206 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	3	The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator; the victim’s statements were made after the victim was told he might die. Are these statements testimonial within the meaning of Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004)? Are they dying declarations? Does the Sixth Amendment incorporate an exception for testimonial dying declarations? Background:	Order 07/11/08>>
People v Horton (Rudolph) 135021 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	4	03/26/08 - see attached Order holding case in Abeyance. To view Order, click here>>
Credit Acceptance Corp v 46th District Court 133292 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Arguments on Application	A judgment creditor filed verified statements with a district court, asking the court to issue writs of garnishment. But the court refused, instructing the creditor to provide more information to support each verified statement. The creditor argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the verified statements satisfied the requirements of MCR 3.101(D) and that the district court lacked the authority to require further documentation. Did the district court exceed its powers? Background:	Order 05/30/08>>
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Miller v Allstate Insurance 134393 134406 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	2	Allstate Insurance denied the plaintiff’s claim for physical therapy services, arguing that the services were “unlawful” because the service provider is incorporated under the Business Corporations Act rather than the Professional Services Corporation Act. Must the plaintiff incorporate under the PSCA? Was the physical therapy lawfully rendered under the no-fault act? Background:	Opinion 07/02/08>>
In re Miltenberger Estate 133847 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	5	In Michigan, a widow may, upon the death of her husband, elect to exercise her right to dower, which is set forth in art 10, § 1 of the 1963 Michigan constitution as well as MCL 700.2202(2) and MCL 558.1. Dower provides a widow with the right to use one-third of the land that her husband possessed at the time of his death. No such rights are provided for a widower following his wife’s death. Does a widow’s right to dower violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions as set forth in Const 1963, art 1, § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? Background:	Order 07/31/08>>
People v Smith (Gary) 134682 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Arguments on Application	The defendant sexually abused a 10-year-old girl who was in his care and lived at his house. The sentencing guidelines provided that the defendant’s minimum sentence should fall in the range of 108 months to 15 years. But the trial court exceeded the guidelines, sentencing the defendant to 30 to 50 years in prison. Was the upward departure from the sentencing guidelines proportionate to the offense, as required by People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264, 273 (2003)? Did the trial court fulfill its obligation under Babcock to “articulate on the record a substantial and compelling reason for its particular departure, and explain why this reason justifies that departure”? Background:	Opinion 07/31/08>>

March Session Calendar>>
March Case Call Calendar>>

Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Case Name & Docket Number	Calendar Number	At Issue	Status
Daimlerchrysler v State Tax Commission 133394 133396 133400 133401 133402 133403 133404 133405 133406 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	2	These consolidated cases involve three taxpayers’ applications for state tax exemption certificates under Part 59, MCL 324.5901 et seq., of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. Ford Motor Company, DaimlerChrysler Corporation and Detroit Diesel Corporation installed “test cell” facilities to sample exhaust emissions from vehicles during the design and manufacturing process in order to comply with federal emissions standards. Detroit Diesel also built a new plant to manufacture engines that meet recently implemented federal emission standards for diesel engines. Do these facilities qualify for tax exemption as pollution abatement facilities? Background:	Opinion 07/30/08>>
State News v MSU 133682 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	3	The defendant university denied the plaintiff newspaper’s Freedom of Information Act request for a police incident report that detailed an assault in a university dormitory room. Did the university meet its burden of demonstrating that the requested report was exempt from disclosure under both the FOIA privacy exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(a), and the law enforcement purposes exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(b)? Did the Court of Appeals err in instructing the trial court regarding the “personal nature” of public records covered by the FOIA privacy exemption or the law enforcement purposes exemption, including whether the “personal nature” of such records may be affected if some or all of the information becomes public? Background:	Opinion 07/16/08>>
White v Taylor Distributing 134751 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	6	The plaintiffs sued the defendant driver for driving negligently and causing an accident. The driver testified at his deposition that the accident resulted from the sudden onset of a medical condition that caused him to faint. The defendants moved to dismiss the case under the sudden emergency doctrine, relying on the driver’s deposition testimony and arguing that he did not act negligently. The plaintiffs presented no countervailing evidence, but argued against summary disposition. Should the defendant’s motion be denied on the ground that judgment is not appropriate under MCR 2.116(G)(4)? Background:	Opinion 07/23/08>>
Manuel v Gill 131103 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Arguments on Application	The Court of Appeals held that the Tri-County Metro Narcotics Squad is similar to a state agency and must be sued in the Court of Claims. In light of the statement in the Court of Appeals judgment that a breach of contract action against TCM was possibly viable in the Court of Claims, is TCM an aggrieved party entitled to appeal, despite the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition on all grounds? Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that TCM is equivalent to a state agency? Background:	Opinion 07/16/08>>
People v Blackston (Junior) 134473 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Arguments on Application	The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. His motion for a new trial was granted, and a second trial also resulted in a conviction for first-degree murder. In between the two trials, two important witnesses provided written statements recanting the testimony they gave in the first trial. In the second trial, their testimony from the first trial was admitted because both witnesses were “unavailable.” But the trial court ruled that their written statements were inadmissible to impeach their testimony from the first trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred, that the error was not harmless, and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Did the trial court properly exclude the two witnesses’ inconsistent statements? Did the Court of Appeals apply the correct standard of review? Is the defendant entitled to a new trial? Background:	Opinion 06/25/08>>
Oram v Oram 134670 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff’s attorney failed to appear on a scheduled trial date, claiming to be medically incapacitated. When the trial was rescheduled, he appeared in court, but again claimed that he was not fit to proceed; the trial court then dismissed the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. Did the Court of Appeals properly affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit? Was the dismissal order a “verdict” for purposes of ordering case evaluation sanctions? Background:	Order 4/11/08>>
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Sidun v Wayne Treasurer 131905 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	1	The plaintiff and her mother owned a rental house in Hamtramck, but each lived in separate houses elsewhere. All tax communications were sent to the mother’s address.  After the mother moved, several property tax notices were returned to sender, and the defendant county treasurer eventually foreclosed on and sold the Hamtramck house. No notice was sent to the plaintiff’s address, which was shown on a quit claim deed that the defendant discovered during a title search it conducted as part of the foreclosure process. Did the defendant’s efforts to provide notice satisfy due process, in light of Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220; 126 S Ct 1708; 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006)? Background:	Opinion 07/02/08>>
Michigan Federation of Teachers v U-M 133819 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	4	The Michigan Federation of Teachers and School Related Personnel, AFT, AFL-CIO, sought information under the Freedom of Information Act from the University of Michigan, including university employees’ home telephone numbers and addresses. The university provided all of the requested information except for the home telephone numbers and addresses of those employees who refused to allow the information to be included in the university’s faculty and staff directory. Is this information exempt under FOIA’s privacy exemption? Background:	Opinion 07/16/08>>
SBC v MPSC 134493 134500 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	7	At issue are the Michigan Public Service Commission’s regulatory efforts regarding the service fees SBC Michigan charges when it receives a customer call about service interruptions. What legal framework should appellate courts apply to determine the degree of deference due an administrative agency in its interpretation of a statute within its purview? Did the Court of Appeals err in deferring to the Michigan Public Service Commission’s interpretation of MCL 484.2502(1)(a)? Did the Commission abuse its discretion in applying this statutory provision to a carrier’s diagnostic mistakes? Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the Commission lacks the jurisdiction to prohibit the imposition of a fee for a carrier’s inspection of its own services when that inspection eliminates the carrier as the cause of a service disruption? Background:	Opinion 07/23/08>>
People v Osantowski (Andrew) 134244 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	In sentencing criminal defendants, trial courts use statutory “offense variables,” which assign a number of points based on various factors in the crime; the number of points is used to determine the length of the sentence. Offense Variable 20 (Terrorism), MCL 777.49a, requires 100 points to be assessed if the “offender committed an act of terrorism by using or threatening to use . . . [an] incendiary device, or explosive device.” Under MCL 777.49a, must the threat itself constitute an “act of terrorism,” as defined by MCL 750.543b, in order for 100 points to be assessed under OV 20? Background:	Opinion 5/7/08>>
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Herman v County of Berrien 134097 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	5	A group of land owners sued to prevent the county from constructing shooting ranges for use in training police officers. Is the county entitled to summary disposition? Does the County Commissioners Act, MCL 46.11, preempt the Township Zoning Act when the two conflict? Does the County Commissioners Act preempt township ordinances that would regulate the use and operation of ancillary physical improvements to the site of a county building? Background:	Opinion 06/18/08>>
Willer v Titan Ins 133596 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	While she was scraping snow off her car windshield, the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice in her driveway, allegedly suffering injuries. Her no-fault insurer denied her claim for benefits, based on the parked-vehicle exclusion in MCL 500.3106(1). The trial court denied the insurer’s motion for summary disposition, ruling that the plaintiff was engaged in “maintenance” of her vehicle as a motor vehicle within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(1). Is the plaintiff entitled to no-fault benefits? Background:	Order 4/25/08>>
Dimmitt & Owens Financial v Deloitte & Touche 134087 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	In this accounting malpractice and breach of contract case, the parties disagree on where the “original injury” occurred for purposes of determining where venue is proper pursuant to MCL 600.1629(1). Assuming that the defendants breached their contract with the plaintiffs to review the plaintiffs’ financial statements, what “original injury” did the plaintiffs suffer as a result of that breach, under MCL 600.1629(1), and where did the plaintiffs suffer that injury? Is the record below is sufficiently developed to make such a determination? Background:	Opinion 07/09/08>>
January Session Calendar>> January Case Call Calendar>>
Tuesday, January 8, 2008
Case Name & Docket Number	Calendar Number	At Issue	Status
Estate Buckner v City of Lansing 133772 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	1	Three Lansing girls, finding the sidewalk covered with piled up snow and ice, chose to walk in the street instead, where two of them were struck by a car. Does the girls’ decision to walk in the street prevent the plaintiffs from establishing proximate causation in their case against the city of Lansing? Does the statutory duty to “maintain the highway in reasonable repair,” MCL 691.1402(1), impose obligations relating only to structural-type defects, or does it include a duty not to place temporary obstacles on a highway that render it impassable? Is the city entitled to governmental immunity because the injuries occurred in the street, and not on the sidewalk that the city allegedly failed to maintain? Background:	Order 4/25/08>>
Cooper v Auto Club Insurance Association 132792 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	2	The plaintiffs sued, seeking to recover no-fault personal protection insurance benefits from the defendant insurance company. In their lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced their mother to accept an unreasonably low compensation rate for the in-home attendant care services that she provided to them. Is the plaintiffs’ common law cause of action for fraud subject to the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1)? Background:	Opinion 06/25/08>>
Braverman v Garden City Hospital 134445-6 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	3	In this medical malpractice case, the initial personal representative mailed a pre-suit notice of intent to file a lawsuit under MCL 600.2912b, but resigned without filing a complaint. The plaintiff, the successor personal representative, filed the medical malpractice complaint. Was the complaint timely filed? Was the successor personal representative entitled to rely on the notice filed by his predecessor under provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL 700.3701? Background:	Order 4/9/08>>
Stone v Williamson 133986 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	4	MCL 600.2912a(2) provides in part that “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.” In Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70 (2002), the Court of Appeals held that § 2912a(2) requires a plaintiff seeking to establish a claim of lost opportunity to show that the initial opportunity was diminished by more than 50 percent. Was Fulton correctly decided? If not, how should a lost opportunity be calculated? In this case, where the plaintiffs allege that the defendant radiologist failed to identify signs of an aneurysm on arteriogram films, forcing the plaintiff to undergo risky emergency surgery after the aneurysm ruptured, does the plaintiff have to establish a lost opportunity to achieve a better result within the meaning of § 2912a(2)? If so, did the plaintiff suffer such a lost opportunity? Background:	Opinion 7/24/08>>
Rodriguez v A.S.E. Industries, Inc. 133686 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	5	In a products liability case, the jury’s award of noneconomic damages is capped unless the jury finds that the defendant was grossly negligent, or the trial court finds that the defendant knew of the defect in the product, that the injury was likely to occur, and that the defendant  willfully disregarded that knowledge. MCL 600.2946a(3); MCL 600.2949a. In this products liability case, the jury found that the defendant manufacturer was liable to the plaintiff for her injuries, but was not grossly negligent. In such a situation, when the jury makes factual findings that require application of the damages cap, may the trial court make independent factual findings concerning the defendant’s culpability and refuse to apply the damages cap? Background:	Order 03/19/08>>
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
Allison v AEW Capital Management 133771 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	6	The plaintiff fell on snow and ice in the parking lot at his apartment complex. He sued his landlord and the apartment management company. The trial court granted summary disposition to the defendants, concluding that the danger posed by the snow and ice was open and obvious, and not covered by MCL 554.139(1), which imposes a duty on lessors to keep their premises in reasonable repair and common areas fit for their intended use. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting an earlier panel’s analysis of the applicability of MCL 554.139(1) in Teufel v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 429 n 1 (2005). Was the Court of Appeals bound by the Teufel court’s analysis? Does MCL 554.139(1) cover snow and ice accumulations? Background:	Opinion 06/25/08>>
Gee v Arthur B. Myr Industries, Inc. 133762 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff sustained a severe work-related injury in 1992 and was paid worker’s compensation benefits. In a 2001 proceeding, a magistrate found that the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. At the close of proofs in this proceeding, the plaintiff requested attendant care benefits, based on assistance provided by his family. The magistrate did not address this claim, but the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission denied it because plaintiff failed to present proof on a required element of the claim. The plaintiff then filed a new application for hearing, requesting payment for 56 hours of attendant care per week. The plaintiff’s counsel filed applications on behalf of plaintiff’s wife and mother, claiming reimbursement for the attendant care services they provide to the plaintiff. Are these claims barred by res judicata? Background:	Order 4/9/08>>
Pappas v Bortz Health Care Facilities 128864 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	This medical malpractice case involves the interplay among the wrongful death act, MCL 600.5852; the medical malpractice discovery rule, MCL 600.5838a(2); and the insanity saving provision of MCL 600.5851(1). Assuming that the six-month discovery provision in MCL 600.5838a(2) applies in this case because the plaintiff’s decedent was insane from the time the claim accrued until her death, is the claim barred where the plaintiff did not bring this action within one year after the insanity disability was removed through death pursuant to MCL 600.5851(1)? Does the wrongful death saving statute, MCL 600.5852, apply in this case? Background:	Order 08/01/08>>
Boodt v Borgess Medical Center 132688 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	MCL 600.2912b requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to mail a pre-suit notice to each potential defendant. Among other things, the notice must state (1) the factual basis for the lawsuit, (2) how the applicable standard of care was allegedly breached, (3) what the defendant should have done to comply with the standard of care, and (4) how the alleged breach of the standard of care proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. Does the plaintiff’s notice of intent to the defendant physician comply with § 2912b’s requirements? Background:	Opinion 07/02/08>>
Manzella v Morado 133620 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiffs sued their insurance company, claiming that it was obligated to pay them uninsured motorist benefits in connection with an automobile accident. The plaintiffs also sued the uninsured vehicle’s owner and driver and got a default judgment against them. Is the insurance company contractually obligated to pay the default judgment? Background:	Order 03/21/08>>
Burris v Allstate Insurance Co. 132949 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	A jury awarded the plaintiff attendant care expenses for services provided by his father, his brother, and his friend. The plaintiff was not billed for these services, and his caretakers could not provide records of the time they spent caring for him. The trial court vacated the attendant care award, finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he “incurred” the expense of these services within the meaning of the no-fault statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the jury verdict.  Did plaintiff “incur” attendant care expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a)? Background:	Order 03/07/08>>
People v Carter (Steven) 134687 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	Because the defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent him. The defendant’s probation order stated that he was to repay the county $730 for his counsel’s attorney fees. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court “to consider these assessments in light of defendant’s current and future financial circumstances,” citing People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 254-255 (2004). Did the Court of Appeals err? Are the constitutional underpinnings of Dunbar sound? Background:	Order 02/08/08>>
Minter v City of Grand Rapids 133988 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	Under Michigan’s no-fault act, a person will only be responsible for noneconomic damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident “if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1). Did the plaintiff, who suffered a closed head injury as a result of an automobile accident and was scarred, suffer a serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement? Background:	Order 4/25/08>>

December Session Calendar>>
December Case Call Calendar>>

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Case Name & Docket Number	Calendar Number	At Issue	Status
People v Cannon (Trumon) 131994 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	1	In sentencing criminal defendants, trial courts use statutory “offense variables,” which assign a number of points based on various factors in the crime; the number of points determines the length of the sentence. In this case, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery for his part in a restaurant robbery. There was evidence that the defendant and two companions planned the robbery, waited for the restaurant’s customers to leave, selected the defendant to be the lookout, and parked a getaway vehicle nearby. The trial court assessed 15 points for predatory conduct under Offense Variable (OV) 10 (Exploitation of a Vulnerable Victim), MCL 777.40(3)(a). What are the parameters of predatory conduct under OV 10? Does predatory conduct include this type of pre-offense planning? Background:	Opinion 06/04/08
Ross v Auto Club Group 130917 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	2	In this auto no-fault case, the plaintiff sought to recover personal protection insurance benefits from the defendant insurer. The insurer claimed that the plaintiff, the sole owner of a subchapter S corporation, was self-employed and therefore not entitled to benefits under Adams v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 154 Mich App 186 (1986). The trial court rejected the insurer’s argument and, relying on MCL 500.3148(1), ordered the insurer to pay attorney fees to the plaintiff on the ground that the insurer “unreasonably” refused to pay benefits. Was the defendant properly ordered to pay attorney fees? Background:	Opinion 5/7/08>>
Mich Dept of Transportation v Tomkins 132983 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	3	The Michigan Department of Transportation acquired part of the defendants’ property for a highway project. Do the property owners have a constitutional right to be compensated for the reduction in value of their remaining property, due to the increased noise, dust, fumes, and vibration from the newly constructed highway? Background:	Opinion 06/11/08>>
Smith v Khouri 132823 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	4	In this dental malpractice case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, which entitled the plaintiff to also recover case evaluation sanctions. As part of the case evaluation sanctions award, the trial court granted the plaintiff nearly $68,000 in attorney fees, based on a $450 per hour rate for lead counsel and a $275 per hour rate for associate counsel. The defendants challenged the award as unreasonable, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. Did the trial court determine a reasonably hourly rate for the plaintiff’s counsel? Was the trial court’s award of attorney fees excessive? Background:	Opinion 07/02/08>>
In Re Egbert R. Smith Trust (Phillips v Homer) 133462 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	5	The petitioners leased farm land owned by the Smith testamentary trust. The lease provided them with a right of first refusal to purchase the property. The respondent, the trust’s personal representative, gave the petitioners notice that she intended to accept an offer from a third party to purchase the property. Although the respondent soon after notified the petitioners that she had changed her mind and would not sell the property, the petitioners gave notice of their intent to exercise their right of first refusal. Was an enforceable contract of sale created between the parties? Background:	Opinion 3/19/08>>
Wednesday, December 5, 2007
Jones v Olson 132385 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff was injured in a car accident and suffered a fractured vertebra in his neck; he was disabled from almost all his normal activities for several months. Seven months after the accident, he returned to work and resumed his normal activities. He sued the defendants for noneconomic damages under Michigan’s no-fault statute, MCL 500.3135 et seq. But the trial court determined as a matter of law that the plaintiff had not suffered a serious impairment of body function because his injuries ultimately did not affect his ability to lead a normal life; accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover noneconomic damages, the trial court held. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a permanent impact on a person’s life is not required to establish a serious impairment. Did the Court of Appeals err? Background:	Order 4/25/08>>
James v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co 130460 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	Accounts differed as to which of two men was driving a jet-ski that crashed into a bridge. In the first lawsuit arising from the accident, the trial court ruled that Richard James was the driver. That lawsuit then settled, and the parties agreed in the settlement agreement that the question of the driver’s identity would be litigated in a separate declaratory judgment action concerning the insurer’s liability for insurance coverage. Despite this, the trial court ruled in the declaratory judgment action that collateral estoppel precluded the insurer from challenging the first lawsuit’s determination of the driver’s identity. Did the insurer waive its right to rely on the provision in the settlement agreement allowing further litigation of the driver’s identity? Does collateral estoppel apply? Background:	Order 01/11/08>>
Ramanathan v Wayne State Univ Bd of Governors 133170 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff, an Asian Indian professor, sued Wayne State University and the Dean of the School of Social Work, alleging violations of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. Did the plaintiff present sufficient evidence to sustain his claims? Background:	Order 03/07/08>>
Beavers v Barton Malow Company 133294 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	The plaintiff filed a claim of appeal, but his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals because he did not file his brief on time. The plaintiff then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal, pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 7.205(F)(3). The delayed application was filed 11 months after the first appeal was dismissed, but 14 months after the trial court order that the plaintiff sought to appeal. Did the Court of Appeals properly hold that the delayed application was not timely filed within 12 months of the entry of the order to be appealed as required by MCR 7.205(F)(3)? Or was the 12-month period tolled while the plaintiff’s first appeal was pending? Background:	Order 02/01/08>>
Community Resource Consultants v Progressive Mich Ins Co 133416 Click on docket number(s) to view Briefs in Acrobat	Oral Argument on Application	Under the Michigan’s no-fault act’s one-year back rule, a claimant “may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.” MCL 500.3145(1). In this case, the plaintiff company sued to recover payment for services the plaintiff provided to a seriously injured man who was insured by the defendant. The defendant no-fault insurer argued that, under the one-year back rule, the plaintiff could not recover for any services that were rendered more than one year before the plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed. The plaintiff disagreed, arguing that its accounting and billing practices created a dispute of fact as to when “the loss” at issue occurred. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the plaintiff’s favor. Did the lower courts decide this issue correctly? Background:	Order 03/07/08>>