12.11Directed Verdict

A.Rule1

MCR 6.419(A)-(C) provide:

“(A) Before Submission to the Jury. After the prosecutor has rested the prosecution’s case-in-chief or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s evidence, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so.

(B) Reserving Decision. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.

(C) After Jury Verdict. After a jury verdict, the defendant may file an original or renewed motion for directed verdict of acquittal in the same manner as provided by MCR 6.431(A) for filing a motion for a new trial.”

A postjudgment motion for a directed verdict must be filed within the time for filing an application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.205(A)(2)(a) and MCR 7.205(A)(2)(b)(i)-(iii). See MCR 6.419(C); MCR 6.431(A)(3).2 

B.Test Applied by the Court

A directed verdict of acquittal is appropriate only if, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 6 (1997). It is impermissible for a trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses in deciding a motion for a directed verdict, no matter how inconsistent or vague that testimony may be. Id.

If the court has reserved decision on a motion for directed verdict, “it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.” MCR 6.419(B).

“The court must state orally on the record or in a written ruling made a part of the record its reasons for granting or denying a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and for conditionally granting or denying a motion for a new trial.” MCR 6.419(F).

C.Double Jeopardy Implications

When a trial court grants a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the prohibition against double jeopardy generally prevents further action against the defendant based on the same charges. People v Nix (Terressa), 453 Mich 619, 626-627 (1996). “However, the trial court’s characterization of its ruling is not dispositive, and what constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not controlled by the form of the action.” Mehall, 454 Mich at 5. Rather, a reviewing court must “determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” United States v Martin Linen Supply Co, 430 US 564, 571 (1977); see also Mehall, 454 Mich at 5. “Retrial is not permitted if the trial court evaluated the evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 6.

“[R]etrial is barred when a trial court grants an acquittal because the prosecution . . . failed to prove an ‘element’ of the offense that, in actuality, it did not have to prove.” Evans v Michigan, 568 US 313, 317 (2013). In Evans, 568 US at 315, “[w]hen the State of Michigan rested its case at [the defendant’s] arson trial, the [trial] court entered a directed verdict of acquittal, based upon its view that the State had not provided sufficient evidence of a particular element of the offense.” However, “the unproven ‘element’ was not actually a required element at all.” Id. The United States Supreme Court held that “a midtrial acquittal in these circumstances is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes[.]” Id. at 316. Accordingly, the defendant’s “trial ended in an acquittal when the trial court ruled the State had failed to produce sufficient evidence of his guilt.” Id. at 330. “The Double Jeopardy Clause thus bars retrial for his offense and should have barred the State’s appeal.” Id., reversing People v Evans, 491 Mich 1 (2012).3

See also MCR 6.419(B), permitting the court to “reserve decision on the motion[ for directed verdict] . . . and decide the motion[, on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved,] either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict.”4

D. Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have persuaded a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 122 (2001).

1    MCR 6.419(D) governs motions for acquittal in bench trials. See Section 12.3(E).

2    For motions filed after a jury verdict, the motion may be deemed presented for filing on the date it is deposited into the institution’s outgoing mail if the appellant is pro se, is incarcerated in prison or jail, and meets the other requirements of MCR 1.112. The motion is deemed timely if deposited on or before the filing deadline. MCR 1.112.

3    On April 5, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court, “[i]n conformity with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States[]” in Evans, 568 US 313, entered an order vacating its judgment and opinion in Evans, 491 Mich 1, and affirming the judgment of the Wayne County Circuit Court. People v Evans, 493 Mich 959, 959-960 (2013).

4    “Allowing the court to reserve judgment until after the jury returns a verdict mitigates double jeopardy concerns because ‘reversal would result in reinstatement of the jury verdict of guilt, not a new trial.’” Staff Comment to ADM 2010-34, quoting Evans, 568 US at 330 n 9.