7.5Mandatory Sentences

A.Sentencing Guidelines Do Not Apply to Mandatory Sentences

If a crime has a mandatory determinate penalty or a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment, the court is required to impose that penalty. MCL 769.34(5). The sentencing guidelines are inapplicable to mandatory sentences. Id.

B.Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole (LWOP)

Certain homicide and nonhomicide crimes are generally punishable under Michigan law by mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See MCL 791.234(6)(a)-(f).¹ However, an offender who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of an offense is not subject to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 489 (2012) (homicide offender under the age of 18 may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole unless a judge or jury first has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 82 (2010) (sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may not be imposed upon a defendant under the age of 18 for a nonhomicide offense).²

Further, the Court agreed that “no meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18,” and “to treat those two classes of defendants differently in [Michigan’s] sentencing scheme is disproportionate to the point of being cruel under [Michigan’s] Constitution.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 266 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Parks Court considered an 18-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder, and did not discuss the mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences for 18-year-old defendants convicted of other offenses. Id. at 268 (concluding that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution, . . . and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16”). Accordingly, “the Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.” Parks, 510 Mich at 244. The Court of Appeals concluded that the holding in Parks was substantive, not procedural, and applied its holding to order resentencing for a defendant who sought relief on collateral review. People v Poole, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (defendant was an 18-year-old in 2001 when he committed the acts that resulted in a conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole).

However, imposition of a life without the possibility of parole sentence following a first-degree premeditated murder conviction does not violate the Michigan Constitution where the defendant was 21 years old at the time he committed the crime. People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213, 219 (2023) (noting its holding is based on binding Michigan Supreme Court precedent and an examination of the factors set forth in Parks). Similarly, “defendant’s mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a first-degree murder committed at the age of 19 continues to not be cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16” following the decision in Parks because the Court in Parks “explicitly stated that its ‘opinion today does not affect Hall’s^[3] holding as to those older than 18,’” and Hall “upheld the constitutionality of a sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of felony murder, expressly rejecting the defendant’s argument that such a sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment[.]” People v Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023), quoting Parks, 510 Mich at 255 n 9. Similarly, a mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence for first-degree felony murder committed when the defendant was 22 years old does not violate the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution nor does it violate the Equal Protection Clause of either the federal or state constitutions. People v Abraham, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “In [Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465 (2012)], the United States Supreme Court concluded that mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional for defendants under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes.” Abraham, ___ Mich App at ___. “Instead, LWOP is available for juvenile offenders only if the trial court finds it is warranted after considering ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ as laid out in the Miller factors.” Id. at ___. In this case, defendant argued that “treating defendants aged 19 to 25 differently than 18-year-olds for sentencing purposes is arbitrary” and a violation of his equal protection rights. Id. at ___. Defendant also argued “that MCL 750.316, providing for mandatory LWOP for defendants 19 years old and older, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.” Abraham, ___ Mich App at ___. As to defendant’s equal protection challenge, “[w]hile defendant has shown that he is treated differently than 18-year-old defendants when it comes to mandatory LWOP, he has not shown that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. at ___. “The distinction [the Michigan] Supreme Court has drawn in imposing mandatory LWOP sentences for those over the age of 18 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in treating younger defendants potentially less harshly due to their developing brains.” Id. at ___. Additionally, “[a]s stated in [People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 265-266 (2022)], a defendant aged 18 or younger may still be sentenced to LWOP, but it is not mandatory under MCL 769.25, as it is for those over the age of 18.” Abraham, ___ Mich App at___. “Rather, a sentencing judge must consider the Miller factors before sentencing a defendant aged 18 or younger to LWOP.” Id. at ___. “This classification is rationally related to the state’s interest in individualized consideration of the mitigating factors of youth when a defendant is 18 and under.” Id. at ___. As to defendant’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of a sentence of mandatory LWOP, “[a] four-factor test is used to interpret Michigan’s Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause; courts are to consider (1) the severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the goal of rehabilitation.” Id. at ___. As to the first factor, “first-degree murder is the gravest of crimes” and is properly subject to “the harshest sentence available under state law.” Id. at ___. As to the second factor, the Michigan Supreme Court “has upheld mandatory LWOP sentences for arguably less egregious crimes.” Id. at ___. An analysis of the third factor “shows that about half of the states do impose mandatory LWOP.” Id. at ___. “There is clearly no consensus that mandatory LWOP for 22-year-olds is unconstitutional in other jurisdictions.” Id. at ___. Finally, “because the court specifically limited its ruling [in Parks] to defendants aged 18, [the Abraham Court could not] extend its reasoning to defendant, who was 22 years old at the time he committed these crimes.” Id. at ___. Therefore, “defendant’s sentence of mandatory LWOP is not cruel nor unusual punishment under the law and as applied to defendant because defendant was 22 years old at the time he committed these crimes.” Abraham, ___ Mich App at ___.

In order to comply with Miller, 567 US 460, MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a establish sentencing and resentencing procedures applicable to certain juvenile offenders and 18-year-old offenders who are convicted of certain offenses carrying mandatory life-without-parole sentences.⁴ Under circumstances in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a applies to an offender,⁵ the prosecuting attorney must file a motion if he or she intends to seek imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, MCL 769.25(3); MCL 769.25a(4)(b), and the sentencing court must conduct a hearing and consider the factors set out in Miller, 567 US 460,⁶ before imposing sentence, MCL 769.25(6); MCL 769.25a(4)(b). At a sentencing hearing held under MCL 769.25, “the prosecutor bears the burden to rebut a presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence,” and “[t]he standard for rebuttal is clear and convincing evidence.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 120 (2022). If the prosecution fails to file a timely motion for a life-without-parole sentence, or fails to rebut the presumption that a LWOP sentence is disproportionate, the court must impose a term-of-years sentence as specified in MCL 769.25(9) or MCL 769.25a(4)(c). See Taylor, 510 Mich at 138-139. Further, even when a term-of-years sentence is imposed, the court “must consider youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a”; “however, this consideration need not be articulated on the record.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 193 (2022).

“In practical terms, this means that courts should consider a defendant’s youth as part of the ‘four basic sentencing considerations’ first identified in People v Snow, 386 Mich 586 (1972), which courts must always bear in mind before imposing a sentence.” People v Copeland, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (citation omitted). See Boykin, 510 Mich at 188-189. The four considerations in Snow are: (1) reformation of the offender, (2) protection of society, (3) disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (4) deterrence of others from committing like offenses. Copeland, ___ Mich App at ___ (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]here are no magic words or phrases that a trial court must use to show that it adequately considered the mitigating qualities of youth within Snow’s sentencing criteria.” Copeland, ___ Mich App at ___. “Courts sentencing juvenile defendants to a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25a are required only to make a record demonstrating that the court considered the defendant’s youth and treated it as a mitigating factor.” Copeland, ___ Mich App at ___ The sentencing decision should reflect proportionality, “which looks to the circumstances of the offense and the background of the offender.” Id. at ___. “Since a defendant’s youth is part of a juvenile defendant’s background, courts must consider the characteristics of youth before sentencing a juvenile defendant in order for the resulting sentence to be proportionate.” Id.

“[T]he decision to sentence a juvenile to life without parole is to be made by a judge and . . . this decision is to be reviewed under the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard” because “[t]he trial court remains in the best position to determine whether each particular defendant is deserving of life without parole.” People v Skinner (Skinner II), 502 Mich 89, 97, 137 (2018) (holding that “MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth Amendment because neither the statute nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead, life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone”), rev’g People v Skinner (Skinner I), 312 Mich App 15 (2015) and aff’g in part and rev’g in part People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 (2016). “[A]ll Miller requires sentencing courts to do is to consider how children are different before imposing life without parole on a juvenile.” Skinner II, 502 Mich at 129-130 (explaining that trial courts are not required to “explicitly find that a defendant is ‘rare’ or ‘uncommon’ before it can impose life without parole”). See also Jones v Mississippi, 593 US ___, ___ (2021) (holding “[i]n a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient”).

“[O]nce [a defendant] places into evidence his own expert’s psychological report (that used information obtained from defendant), the Fifth Amendment (or its state counterpart) cannot then be used as a shield to prevent the prosecution from accessing similar information from defendant for their own expert’s use.” People v Black, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (citation omitted). In this case, defendant argued that “the trial court order compelling him to submit to a psychological evaluation by the prosecution’s expert, or striking [defendant’s psychological expert’s] report and testimony, violated his federal and state constitutional right against self-incrimination.” Id. at ___. “[B]ecause the prosecutor bears the burden of proof at a Miller^[7] hearing, and that burden is to rebut a presumption that the particular juvenile defendant is not deserving of life without parole, providing the prosecution the ability to have its expert meet with defendant for purposes of expert evaluation and testimony to rebut defendant’s evidence does not violate his right against self-incrimination.” Black, ___ Mich App at ___ (cleaned up). “Whether viewed as a waiver of his right by placing his current status at issue, or as a substantive conclusion that nothing in the amendment allows a defendant to submit evidence relevant to his current mental status while at the same time refusing the prosecution access to the same information and opportunity, the trial court order did not violate defendant’s rights under either constitutional provision.” Id. at ___ (citation omitted).

For additional discussion of sentencing juvenile and 18-year-old offenders to life without parole, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Juvenile Justice Benchbook, Chapter 19. For a table summarizing the application of MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a to juvenile offenders, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Quick Reference Guide.

C.No Judicial Discretion to Deviate From Mandatory Sentence

Where a statute mandates the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for an offense, the trial court may not sentence the defendant to an at-home electronic monitoring program “in lieu of the statutorily required . . . incarceration[.]” People v Pennebaker, 298 Mich App 1, 4-9 (2012) (holding that because MCL 257.625(7)(a)(ii)(B) “unequivocally [requires a] trial court [to] sentence a defendant to a minimum of 30 days in the county jail” for a second violation of MCL 257.625(7)(a), “the trial judge did not have discretion to sentence defendant to less than 30 days in jail”; furthermore, “[t]he placement of an electronic-monitoring device on defendant [was] not ‘imprisonment in the county jail’ as required by the statute,” and the statute did not authorize participation in a work-release program).