7.9Sheriff’s Good-Time/Disciplinary Credits

“Michigan law formerly awarded prisoners a ‘good-time’ allowance, but this scheme was subsequently replaced with a less generous scheme that allow[s] ‘disciplinary credits’ for only some categories of offenders. MCL 800.33(5).” People v Tyrpin, 268 Mich App 368, 371 (2005).

MCL 800.33 permits the reduction of a Department of Corrections prisoner’s sentence if their record shows that there are no violations of the rules and regulations; the statute refers to “good time” credits, “disciplinary credits,” and “special disciplinary credits”; these terms all generally refer to sentence reductions. See also People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408, 422 n 16, 423-425 (1987) (discussing credits under MCL 800.33). Similarly, MCL 51.282 entitles county jail prisoners without any violations of rules and regulations to specified sentence reductions. A detailed discussion of credits prisoners can earn is outside the scope of this benchbook; this section addresses selected issues related to prisoner credits that impact sentencing courts.

Probation.¹ “[A] sentencing court may not revoke good-time credit that a defendant already has earned while serving a jail sentence as a condition of probation.” People v Resler, 210 Mich App 24, 28 (1995) (holding the defendant was entitled to credit for both the time actually served in jail as a condition of probation and the good-time credit he earned while in jail against a subsequent prison term imposed as part of the sentence for violating that probation). But see People v Grazhidani, 277 Mich App 592, 595-601 (2008) (questioning and declining to extend Resler and concluding a defendant is not entitled to sentence credit for days not served because of early release under the jail overcrowding act, specifically MCL 801.57). “[A]lthough there is no constitutional right to good-time credit, once a good-time credit provision is adopted and a prisoner earns that credit, the deprivation of good-time credit constitutes a substantial sanction, and a prisoner may claim that a deprivation of good-time credit is a denial of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.” People v Cannon, 206 Mich App 653, 656 (1994). Accordingly, a trial court cannot deny a defendant the good-time credit opportunities provided in MCL 51.282(2). Cannon, 206 Mich App at 657. That is, in a defendant’s probation order, a court cannot impose a specific term of imprisonment and indicate the date on which the defendant is to be released. Id.

Invalid sentence. Good-time credit earned during a sentence that is later declared invalid does not transfer to the sentence imposed after the first sentence was declared invalid, where the defendant was not legally entitled to the good-time credit for the first sentence. Tyrpin, 268 Mich App at 371 (holding that “the trial court correctly determined that defendant should not benefit from a sentence credit that would not have been granted but for an error of law in defendant’s original sentencing”).

Ex Post Facto Clause. MCL 769.25a(6), which proscribes the inclusion of good time and disciplinary credits when resentencing juvenile offenders to sentences in which they are eligible for parole, cannot “be used to prevent [those offenders] from receiving disciplinary credits on their minimum and maximum sentences.” People v Wiley, 324 Mich App 130, 149-150, 168 (2018) (holding that MCL 769.25a(6) “violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and Michigan Constitutions, US Const art I, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10, because it precludes [juveniles (or former juvenile offenders) who are being resentenced] from having disciplinary credits applied to their term-of-years sentences, and thus, MCL 769.25a(6) is a retroactive provision that increases their potential sentences or punishments”). See also Hill v Snyder, 900 F3d 260, 269 (CA 6, 2018) (adopting the same reasoning as Wiley, 324 Mich App 130, and holding that MCL 769.25a(6) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution).²

Sentencing order may not prohibit good time credit in advance. The Court held that MCL 51.282(2)³ was violated where the trial court’s sentencing orders specified that the respondent was not entitled to credit on the basis of a local sheriff’s policy that categorically prohibited certain offenders from earning good-time credit, including offenders incarcerated for contempt of court. ARM v KJL, 342 Mich App 283, 301-303 (2022). MCL 51.282(2) does not give a sheriff discretion to determine whether a prisoner is eligible to earn credit in the first instance, and similarly, “a sentencing court is not permitted to circumvent or nullify the statutory scheme by taking away good-time credits in advance.” ARM, 342 Mich App at 302 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, “a local sheriff’s policy cannot trump the Legislature’s duly enacted statute,” and “a court may not deprive a prisoner of good-time credit to which the prisoner may be entitled under statute before that prisoner has even begun serving the term of imprisonment.” Id. at 302-303 (quotation marks and citation omitted).