2.16Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The concepts of res judicata (also known as claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion) are designed to prevent the relitigation of claims that have already been litigated or that should have been litigated in a prior case. See, generally, Mable Cleary Trust v Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust, 262 Mich App 485 (2004), overruled on other grounds by Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 556 n 4 (2012). Although the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel are often conflated, Topps-Toeller, Inc v Lansing, 47 Mich App 720, 726 (1973), distinguished the two doctrines:
•Res judicata “bars the reinstitution of the same cause of action by the same parties in a subsequent suit.” Topps-Toeller, Inc, 47 Mich App at 727.
•Collateral estoppel “bars the relitigation of issues previously decided when such issues are raised in a subsequent suit by the same parties based upon a different cause of action.” Topps-Toeller, Inc, 47 Mich App at 727.
The above “two principles fulfill the judicial policy of providing the parties with a final decision upon litigated questions.” Topps-Toeller, Inc, 47 Mich App at 727.
“There are three prerequisites to the application of the res judicata doctrine:
(1) there must have been a prior decision on the merits;
(2) the issues must have been resolved in the first action, either because they were actually litigated or because they might have been presented in the first action; and
(3) both actions must be between the same parties or their privies. . . . Michigan courts apply the res judicata doctrine broadly so as to bar claims that were actually litigated as well as claims arising out of the same transaction which a plaintiff could have brought, but did not.” VanDeventer v Mich Nat’l Bank, 172 Mich App 456, 464 (1988) (internal citations omitted).
“‘The transactional test provides that the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.’” Adair v Michigan (Adair III), 317 Mich App 355, 366 (2016), quoting Adair v Michigan (Adair II), 470 Mich 105, 124 (2004) (additional citation and quotation omitted). The same transaction test for res judicata is “‘whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit[.]’” Marketplace of Rochester Hills Parcel B, LLC v Comerica Bank, 498 Mich 934 (2015), quoting Adair II, 470 Mich at 125 (additional citation and quotation omitted).
“To be accorded the conclusive effect of res judicata, the judgment must ordinarily be a firm and stable one, the last word of the rendering court.” In re Bibi Guardianship, 315 Mich App 323, 333 (2016) (explaining that orders granting temporary relief and interlocutory orders generally do not carry preclusive effect under res judicata) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
A party may not unilaterally elect to present only a portion of its case at trial and, at the same time, reserve its right to litigate the remaining portion at a separate proceeding in the future. “Unlike collateral estoppel, which bars relitigation of only those issues actually decided, res judicata bars relitigation of claims . . . actually litigated and those claims arising out of the same transaction that could have been litigated, but were not.” Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich App 55, 92 (1995).
2.Burden of Proof
The burden of proving the application of res judicata is on the party asserting it. Baraga Co v State Tax Comm, 466 Mich 264, 269 (2002).
3.Timing
The defense of res judicata must be raised in the party’s first responsive pleading, unless the defense is stated in a motion filed under MCR 2.116 before the party’s first responsive pleading. MCR 2.116(D)(2). However, “MCR 2.116(D)(2) does not foreclose a party from adding a defense in an amended responsive pleading.” Leite v Dow Chem Co, 439 Mich 920 (1992).
4.Res Judicata Asserted by Plaintiff
A plaintiff may assert res judicata as a ground for judgment against a defendant. Marketplace of Rochester Hills Parcel B, LLC v Comerica Bank, 309 Mich App 579, 588-589 (2015), vacated in part on other grounds 498 Mich 934 (2015).1 Although “[p]arties typically use the doctrine of res judicata as a shield rather than as a sword, . . . nothing precludes a plaintiff from asserting res judicata as a ground for judgment if the plaintiff has asserted a ripe claim.” Id. (holding that the trial court erred by “determining that res judicata is a defense that . . . only [a defendant may] assert in a successive action against it by [a plaintiff]”) (citations omitted).
5.Federal Case as Basis for Res Judicata
The Michigan Supreme Court requires the application of federal law to res judicata claims when determining whether the prior federal suit bars the state action under the doctrine. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 380-381 (1999). The federal law on determining whether the doctrine of res judicata applies can be found at Becherer v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc, 193 F3d 415, 422 (CA 6, 1999). The elements include the three prerequisites that Michigan analyzes in addition to “an identity of the causes of action.” Id. at 422.
a.Consent Judgment
The doctrine of res judicata applies to consent judgments. In re Bibi Guardianship, 315 Mich App 323, 333 (2016). However, the consent judgment must be “a final decision for purposes of res judicata.” Id. Accordingly, res judicata did not bar a guardianship petition where a prior foreign consent judgment “was clearly not intended to be the last word of the [foreign] court with regard to the wards,” but rather was merely “an agreement between the parties regarding a temporary placement . . . [pending] ‘further Order of the Court.’” Id. at 334. Furthermore, where “[m]ore than a year passed between the entry of the consent judgment and the probate court’s decision, during which there were intervening changes of both fact and law,” and “the proper venue for a guardianship or custody [action] changed from [the foreign jurisdiction] to Michigan,” the probate court erred in applying res judicata, which resulted in an “abdicat[ion of] its statutory authority to decide the issue on the merits[.]” Id. at 334, 335 (citations omitted).
b.Involuntary Dismissal
Because an involuntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits under MCR 2.504(B)(3), res judicata barred a successor personal representative of a decedent’s estate from filing a complaint after the initial personal representative’s complaint was dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired. Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478 Mich 412, 414 (2007). See also Adair v Michigan (Adair III), 317 Mich App 355, 365 (2016) (holding that “[a]n involuntary dismissal pursuant to MCR 2.504 operates as an adjudication on the merits,” and “in the absence of any language in the order of dismissal limiting the scope of the merits decided,” the first prerequisite to applying res judicata – that the prior action be decided on the merits – is satisfied by an involuntary dismissal).
Note: MCR 2.504(B)(3) states that “[u]nless the court otherwise specifies in its order for dismissal, a dismissal under this subrule or a dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to join a party under MCR 2.205, operates as an adjudication on the merits.”
c.Workers’ Compensation
“The doctrine of res judicata applies to workers’ compensation awards[.]” Banks v LAB Lansing Body Assembly, 271 Mich App 227, 229-230 (2006). “However, a claimant may later raise a different claim or modify an existing award if the employee’s physical condition worsens.” Id. at 230.
d.The Headlee Amendment
The doctrine of res judicata applies to matters involving the enforcement of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25-34. Adair v Michigan (Adair III), 317 Mich App 355, 364 n 3 (2016) (“the ratifiers of the Headlee Amendment ‘would have thought, as with all litigation, there would be the traditional rules that would preclude relitigation of similar issues by similar parties’ and that an application of the doctrine was essential to making the amendment ‘workable,’ and to preventing the Amendment from becoming a ‘Frankensteinian monster’”), quoting Adair v Michigan (Adair II), 470 Mich 105, 120-121, 126-127 (2004).
e.Landlord-Tenant Summary Proceedings
“The remedy provided by summary proceedings is in addition to, and not exclusive of, other remedies, either legal, equitable or statutory.” MCL 600.5750. Accordingly, the application of res judicata in the context of a judgment of possession is limited to claims that were actually litigated. Sewell v Clean Cut Mgt, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 576-577 (2001). “Interpreting this provision, our Supreme Court has concluded that, ‘the Legislature took these cases outside the realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in order that attorneys would not be obliged to fasten all other pending claims to the swiftly moving summary proceedings.’” King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594, 602 (2019), quoting Sewell, 463 Mich at 574 (concluding that “because plaintiff was not required to bring her negligence claim in the summary-eviction proceedings and the district court did not otherwise resolve the claim, res judicata [did] not bar plaintiff from bringing a negligence claim in the circuit court”).
f.Personal Protection Order
Res judicata did not bar a petitioner’s second request for a PPO where the petitioner accused the respondent of some of the same stalking behaviors she identified in her first request for a PPO. See PF v JF, 336 Mich App 118, 120-121 (2021). In PF, the petitioner sought the first PPO based on five incidents, and the trial court denied the request. Id. at 120. After the court denied the request, a sixth incident occurred, and it “drove petitioner to again seek the assistance of a [different] court in an effort to obtain a PPO against respondent. And the sixth incident could not be viewed in isolation or a vacuum; rather, the pattern of conduct between and involving the parties, including the first five incidents, had to be examined in its entirety. The earlier incidents could give explanation or context to the sixth incident by providing insight on intent, continuity of purpose, the reasonableness of beliefs, and states of mind or feelings relative to terror, fright, intimidation, threats, harassment, and molestation.” Id. at 129-130 (the Court recognized that the incidents raised in the first request overlapped with all but one incident raised in the second request, but noted that if “res judicata precluded consideration of the first five incidents in relation to whether a PPO should be issued predicated on stalking activity,” the Court “would effectively be subverting the intent of the Legislature in enacting MCL 600.2950” and “the common-law doctrine of res judicata cannot be employed to undermine our Legislature’s intent”). “A circuit court needs to have the ability to examine and consider the totality of the circumstances when ruling on a PPO petition. The past history of the parties is a necessary consideration when evaluating whether a PPO should be issued.” PF, 336 Mich App at 130-131.
g.Assignments
Because “both res judicata and collateral estoppel apply only when the parties in the subsequent action were parties or privies of parties to the original action,” “a judgment entered after [an] assignment does not bind the assignee [when] the assignee is not in privity with the assignor with respect to that judgment.” Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2022). In Mecosta, the insured “was injured in a car crash and received medical treatment from plaintiffs[.]” Id. at ___. “As compensation for this treatment,” the insured assigned plaintiffs “his right to seek no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from the insurer responsible for making those payments.” Id. at ___. “After the assignment,” the insured “filed suit seeking PIP benefits for separate services he received arising from the crash.” Id. at ___. “In that lawsuit, to which [the Mecosta plaintiffs] were not party, the trial court held that [the insured] had not properly insured the vehicle and was therefore not entitled to any benefits.” Id. at ___.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that “the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel [were] inapplicable” “because plaintiffs were neither parties to the earlier suit nor privies with respect to the subsequently entered judgment[.]” Mecosta Co Med Ctr, ___ Mich at ___. The Mecosta Court noted that “the mere succession of rights to the same property or interest does not, by itself, give rise to privity with regard to subsequent actions by and against the assignor.” Id. at ___. The Court observed that “the assignee succeeds to those rights subject to any earlier adjudication involving the assignor that defined those rights.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, the Court opined that “[w]hen the litigation involving the assignor occurs after the assignment, the rights could not yet have been affected by the litigation at the time they were transferred to the assignee.” Id. at ___.
“The fact that the prior judgment involved rescission does not alter the analysis under Mecosta.” C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023). Accordingly, “[t]he fact that the court in [the injured party’s] case granted the equitable remedy of rescission does not affect [assignee] C-Spine’s rights, because C-Spine was not involved in that case. It had no opportunity to argue against rescission in that litigation. A contrary position would allow an assignor to cut off an assignee’s rights without the latter having any notice or opportunity to be heard.” Id. at ___. “Rescission does not change this.” Id. at ___.
In order for collateral estoppel to apply, there are three general requirements:
“(1) ‘[A] question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment’;
(2) ‘the same parties must have had a full [and fair] opportunity to litigate the issue’; and
(3) ‘there must be mutuality of estoppel.’” Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684 (2004), quoting Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 373 n 3 (1988) (alteration in original).
“In the subsequent action, the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action. The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.” King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594, 600 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“One of the critical factors in applying collateral estoppel involves the determination of whether the respective litigants were parties or privy to a party to an action in which a valid judgment has been rendered.” Synergy Spine & Orthopedic Surgery Ctr, LLC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (cleaned up) (“[C]ollateral estoppel appl[ies] only when the parties in the subsequent action were parties or privies of parties to the original action.”). “[A]n assignee is in privity with the assignor only up to the time of the assignment and not thereafter.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude a plaintiff’s claim where the “plaintiff was neither a party in [the insured’s] case nor in privity with [the insured] with respect to the judgment that was entered after the assignment.” Id. at ___ (rejecting alternative basis for trial court’s ruling that “plaintiff’s claim [was] ‘derivative’ of [the insured’s], and thus, precluded by the judgment in [the insured’s] lawsuit.”)
To satisfy mutuality of estoppel, the party attempting to estop the other party from relitigating an issue must have been a party or in privy to a party in the previous action. Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 684 (2004). “A party is one who was directly interested in the subject matter and had a right to defend or to control the proceedings and to appeal from the judgment, while a privy is one who, after the judgment, has an interest in the matter affected by the judgment through one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase.” Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 498, 529-530 (2014). Estoppel is mutual if the party asserting estoppel would have been bound by the earlier adjudication if it had gone against them. Monat, 469 Mich at 684-685. However, “the lack of mutuality of estoppel should not preclude the use of collateral estoppel when it is asserted defensively to prevent a party from relitigating an issue that such party has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a prior suit.” Id. at 691-692.
In the context of “the defensive use of collateral estoppel, [a plaintiff] is relieved from the mutuality requirement if defendant already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.” Synergy Spine & Orthopedic Surgery Ctr, LLC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024). In Synergy Spine, the Court of Appeals determined that “defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate” whether the insured “suffered a bodily injury from the [subject] accident, from which allowable expenses were incurred,” and thus, “collateral estoppel [bound] defendant to the jury findings.” Id. at ___ (holding that “the trial court erred in not granting plaintiff’s request to narrow the issues” accordingly). The Court reasoned that “(1) the two actions [were] closely related; (2) no factual, law, or procedural changes merit[ed] a new determination; (3) because plaintiff’s suit was filed before [the insured’s] and ongoing at the time of the [insured’s] trial, it was foreseeable these issues would arise in the instant case; and (4) because these fundamental issues establish the potential for defendant’s liability for expenses related to the accident, defendant had an incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication of the issues during the [insured’s] trial.” Id. at ___. However, the Court rejected plaintiff’s contention “this application of collateral estoppel reduces the issues for litigation to what is a reasonable and customary fee for its services” because the insured’s “jury’s finding that [the insured] sustained an accidental bodily injury arising from the accident and that allowable expenses were incurred does not speak to the issue whether the specific benefits sought by plaintiff here were ‘allowable expenses.’” Id. at ___. “More particularly, the jury’s finding did not specifically address the issue whether the benefits sought by plaintiff were for the accidental bodily injury—that the requisite causal connection existed such that PIP benefits were payable for the medical services rendered by plaintiff. That [the insured] incurred allowable expenses does not mean that every medical expense incurred is for the . . . bodily injury caused by the accident.” Id. at ___. Consequently, the Court held that “the proper narrowing of issues under collateral estoppel [did] not include that the requisite causal connection existed between [the insured’s] accidental bodily injury and plaintiff’s fees for use of its facility; rather, that [was] for plaintiff to prove.” Id. at ___.
3.Crossover Estoppel
Crossover estoppel, which precludes a party from raising an issue in a civil proceeding after it has been raised in a criminal proceeding, and vice versa, is permissible. People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 155-157 (1990); Barrow v Pritchard, 235 Mich App 478, 481 (1999). For example, crossover estoppel precludes a complainant from raising a legal malpractice claim in a civil forum after raising and failing to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal forum against the same attorney. Id. at 483-485. However, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that it “must hesitate to apply collateral estoppel in the reverse situation—when the government seeks to apply collateral estoppel to preclude a criminal defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of a prior civil judgment that defense counsel did not commit malpractice.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 48 (2012). In Trakhtenberg, the Court determined that collateral estoppel could not be applied to preclude review of the criminal defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when a prior civil judgment held that defense counsel’s performance did not amount to malpractice, because it did not provide the defendant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 50-51. Indeed, “collateral estoppel ‘must be applied so as to strike a balance between the need to eliminate repetitious and needless litigation and the interest in affording litigants a full and fair adjudication of the issues involved in their claims.’” Id. at 50, quoting Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 372 (1988). See the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Criminal Proceedings Benchbook Vol. 1, Chapter 9, for additional information on civil-to-criminal cross-over estoppel.
“[C]ollateral estoppel may arise within the confines of a single cause of action.” Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC v Fieger & Fieger, PC, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023). “[W]hen a case is remanded for a new trial, the trial court may consider and grant a motion for summary disposition if the requirements for granting such a motion are satisfied.” Id. at ___. Additionally, “when a case is remanded, the lower court is free to consider and decide any matters left open by the appellate court’s mandate.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up).
5.Application of Collateral Estoppel
“A question has not been actually litigated until put into issue by the pleadings, submitted to the trier of fact for determination, and thereafter determined.” VanDeventer v Mich Nat’l Bank, 172 Mich 456, 463 (1988), citing Cogan v Cogan, 149 Mich App 375, 379 (1986).
Older Court of Appeals cases have concluded that collateral estoppel does not apply to consent judgments because “‘[n]othing is adjudicated between two parties to a consent judgment.’” Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 (1985), quoting American Mut Liability Ins Co v Mich Mut Liability Co, 64 Mich App 315, 327 (1975). But a more recent opinion, In re Bibi Guardianship, 315 Mich App 323, 332 (2016), states that “collateral estoppel does not apply to consent judgments where factual issues are neither tried nor conceded.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) Where “the factual issues involved in [a] prior [foreign child protective] proceeding were [not] actually tried or conceded by entry of [a] consent judgment . . . [that] was merely an agreement between the parties regarding a temporary placement for the wards,” and collateral estoppel did not bar a Michigan guardianship proceeding. Id. at 332.
b.Dismissal/Affirmative Defense
Collateral estoppel does not apply to an issue raised as an affirmative defense in a prior action that was dismissed upon stipulation of the parties where the issue “was not one of the essential questions actually litigated in the prior case and . . . was not resolved by the judgment.” King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594, 599 (2019) (the issue “was not mentioned at the hearing to dismiss the case and [was] not mentioned in the order”; additionally, “the dismissal [did] not hinge on the [issue]”).
c.Arbitration Proceeding
“[T]he trial court did not err when it denied [the plaintiff’s] motion to vacate [an] arbitration award on the basis of collateral estoppel.” Radwan v Ameriprise Ins Co, 327 Mich App 159, 173 (2019). Where the issue of the plaintiff’s “injury was actually tried and incorporated into [a] stipulated order of dismissal” during the plaintiff’s third-party action, a question of fact essential to the plaintiff’s claim for first-party benefits had been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment. Id. at 171. “[T]he stipulated order of dismissal, which incorporated the jury’s verdict [that the plaintiff had not suffered an injury, was] sufficient to satisfy the first requirement for collateral estoppel.” Id. at 168 (“even if the stipulated order of dismissal was a consent judgment, collateral estoppel applies in this case”2). Additionally, although the plaintiff “made the tactical decision to relinquish her opportunity to appeal [the jury’s verdict] in consideration for [the defendant’s] agreement to forgo case evaluation sanctions” that decision did not prevent her from receiving “a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of her injuries.” Id. at 173. Lastly, mutuality was not required because “‘collateral estoppel [was] being asserted defensively against [the plaintiff] who [had] already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue[.]’” Id. at 166, quoting Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 680-681, 695 (2004).3
d.Administrative Proceeding
“Collateral estoppel applies to administrative proceedings if the determination was adjudicatory in nature, allowed for an appeal, and the Legislature intended that the decision would be final if no appeal was taken.” Holton v Ward, 303 Mich App 718, 731-732 (2014). “An administrative agency’s decision is conclusive of the rights of the parties, or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first proceeding.” Id. at 732 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
e.Assignments
Because “both res judicata and collateral estoppel apply only when the parties in the subsequent action were parties or privies of parties to the original action,” “a judgment entered after [an] assignment does not bind the assignee [when] the assignee is not in privity with the assignor with respect to that judgment[.]” Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2022). In Mecosta, the insured “was injured in a car crash and received medical treatment from plaintiffs[.]” Id. at ___. “As compensation for this treatment,” the insured assigned plaintiffs “his right to seek no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from the insurer responsible for making those payments.” Id. at ___. “After the assignment,” the insured “filed suit seeking PIP benefits for separate services he received arising from the crash.” Id. at ___. “In that lawsuit, to which [the Mecosta plaintiffs] were not party, the trial court held that [the insured] had not properly insured the vehicle and was therefore not entitled to any benefits.” Id. at ___.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that “the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel [were] inapplicable” “because plaintiffs were neither parties to the earlier suit nor privies with respect to the subsequently entered judgment.” Mecosta Co Med Ctr, ___ Mich at ___. The Mecosta Court noted that “the mere succession of rights to the same property or interest does not, by itself, give rise to privity with regard to subsequent actions by and against the assignor.” Id. at ___. The Court observed that “the assignee succeeds to those rights subject to any earlier adjudication involving the assignor that defined those rights.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, the Court opined that “[w]hen the litigation involving the assignor occurs after the assignment, the rights could not yet have been affected by the litigation at the time they were transferred to the assignee.” Id. at ___.
“The fact that the prior judgment involved rescission does not alter the analysis under Mecosta.” C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023). Accordingly, “[t]he fact that the court in [the injured party’s] case granted the equitable remedy of rescission does not affect [assignee] C-Spine’s rights, because C-Spine was not involved in that case. It had no opportunity to argue against rescission in that litigation. A contrary position would allow an assignor to cut off an assignee’s rights without the latter having any notice or opportunity to be heard.” Id. at ___. “Rescission does not change this.” Id. at ___.
f.Government Employee Advice
“Not everything a government worker tells you binds the government.” Meier v Pub Sch Employees’ Retirement Sys, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2022). The United States Supreme Court has “rejected an estoppel-based argument that erroneous oral and written advice given by a Government employee to a benefits claimant bound the federal government to provide benefits to the claimant.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Michigan Supreme Court “similarly has taken an extraordinarily narrow view of estoppel against the government, ruling that, although it is unfortunate that plaintiff received incorrect guidance, such guidance cannot alter the law of this state.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “There cannot be as many laws as there are public servants who dispense guidance or advice on the meaning of the law. Rather, such guidance or advice must always be understood as subordinate to the law actually enacted by the elected representatives of the people.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, a statute “must be faithfully applied” “even if plaintiff received advice from [a government] employee that contradicted the language of the [act].” Id. at ___.
The application of res judicata or collateral estoppel is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re Bibi Guardianship, 315 Mich App 323, 328 (2016).
1 For more information on the precedential value of an opinion with negative subsequent history, see our note.
2 See Section Section 2.15(B)(4)(a) for additional discussion of collateral estoppel and consent judgments.
3 See Section 2.15(B)(2) for additional discussion of mutuality.