2.15Standing and Real Party In Interest Requirements

“‘[A]lthough the principle of statutory standing overlaps significantly with the real-party-in-interest rule, they are distinct concepts.’” Maki Estate v Coen, 318 Mich App 532, 539 n 1 (2017), quoting In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 (2013) (alteration in original). “The principle of statutory standing is jurisdictional; if a party lacks statutory standing, then the court generally lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or reach the merits.” In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App at 355. “In contrast, the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another.” Id.

Legal actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. MCL 600.2041; MCR 2.201(B). “A real party in interest is one who is vested with the right of action on a given claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another.” BCBSM v Eaton Raps Community Hosp, 221 Mich App 301, 311 (1997). See also MCL 600.2041 and MCR 2.201(B)(1).

“The real-party-in-interest rule recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party having an interest that will [ensure] sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Olin v Mercy Health Hackley Campus, 328 Mich App 337, 345 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The rule also protects the defendant by ‘requiring that the claim be prosecuted by the party who by the substantive law in question owns the claim asserted’ against the defendant.’” Id. at 345, quoting In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App at 356. “[W]hen a minor is negligently injured by another and sues through his or her next friend, the claim still belongs to the minor, and it is the minor who is the real party in interest.” Olin, 328 Mich App at 346.

MCR 2.201(C) governs an individual’s or an entity’s capacity to sue or be sued. “[T]he defense that a plaintiff is not the real party in interest is not the same as the legal-capacity-to-sue defense.” Olin, 328 Mich App at 355 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Where the individual is a minor or incompetent person, MCR 2.201(E) controls. “Nothing in the plain language of MCR 2.201(E) requires the filing of a petition for appointment or the completion of a next friend appointment before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint on behalf of a minor[.]” Olin, 328 Mich App at 349. MCR 2.201(E) “repeatedly refers to what ‘the court’ must do, clearly implying that it is the court assigned to the minor’s lawsuit that handles the next friend appointment process.” Olin, 328 Mich App at 349. As such, “the court rule implicitly assumes the complaint has already been filed, and properly so, even though no next friend has yet been appointed.” Id. at 349. It is not required “that next-friend appointments occur before commencing suit or before the expiration of the statute of limitations period, even after a complaint has been filed.” Id. at 356 (“the formal appointment of a next friend is [not] a meaningful date for statute of limitation purposes,” and the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s medical malpractice action where the next friend was not appointed until after the expiration of the statute of limitations period).¹

“[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605 [(declaratory judgments)], it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Where a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant.” Lansing Schools Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372 (2010), overruling Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726 (2001).

Standard of review. Standing is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Lee, 464 Mich at 734, rev’d on other grounds Lansing Schools Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 349.