​Cases Inviting Briefs Amicus Curiae

The cases listed below are those in which the Court has invited the filing of briefs amicus curiae, either by naming persons or groups specifically or by referencing "interested persons or groups" generally, but which have not yet been scheduled for oral argument. The Court's order granting leave to appeal or directing argument on the application can be viewed by clicking on the link in parentheses following the case title.  When available, the statement of the issues to be addressed are quoted verbatim from the Court's order, and indicate whether consideration is limited to the identified issues or whether they are among other issues to be addressed.  If the Court's order does not identify the issues to be addressed, the issues are quoted verbatim from the leave application or the appellant's brief.  The pleadings filed in the cases can be accessed from the Cases Awaiting Argument page. 

The due dates of the amicus briefs are approximate only and may change depending on when the appellee briefs are filed.  Amici curiae are required to file their briefs within the deadline specified in MCR 7.306(D)(1) or as otherwise directed by the Court. Motions to extend time should be filed in advance of the filing deadlines whenever possible and will be granted only upon a showing of good cause. MCR 7.316(B).  A motion to submit a late amicus brief that is filed within two weeks of the scheduled oral arguments in the case will not be decided until after the argument date.  Unless there is a strong showing of good cause, the motion will likely be denied and the amicus brief rejected.​​

(1) whether the requirements of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., amount to “punishment,” see People v Earl, 495 Mich 33 (2014), see also Does # 1-5 v Snyder, 834 F3d 696, 703-706 (CA 6, 2016), cert den sub nom Snyder v John Does # 1-5, 138 S Ct 55 (Oct 2, 2017); and (2) whether the defendant’s conviction pursuant to MCL 28.729 for failure to register under SORA is an ex post facto punishment, where the registry has been made public, and other requirements enacted, only after the defendant committed the listed offense that required him to register, US Const, art I, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10.

(1) the appropriate basis for distinguishing between permissible trial court consideration of acquitted conduct, see People v Ewing (After Remand), 435 Mich 443, 451-452 (1990) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.); id. at 473 (opinion by BOYLE, J.); see also United States v Watts, 519 US 148 (1997), and an impermissible “independent finding of defendant’s guilt” by a trial court on an acquitted charge, see People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590, 608 (1972), overruled on other grounds by People v White, 390 Mich 245, 258 (1973); see also People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 21 (1993); and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by departing from the guidelines range, where the jury acquitted the defendant of murder, but the court departed based on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had perpetrated the killing.

[W]hether genuine issues of material fact preclude summary disposition on the plaintiff’s claim that the driveway at issue was not “fit for the use intended by the parties.” MCL 554.139(1)(a)

(1) whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the trial judge’s comments to the jury in lieu of the standard “deadlocked jury” instruction, M Crim JI 3.12; (2) whether Offense Variable 19 (OV 19), MCL 777.49, was improperly assigned 10 points for interference with the administration of justice, see People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438 (2013), and People v Adams, 430 Mich 679, 689 (1988); and (3) if OV 19 was misscored, whether the defendant is entitled to resentencing before a different judge based on the judge’s verbal exchange with the defendant at sentencing.

(1) whether the plain language of the insurance policy precluded coverage; (2) if so, whether and under what circumstances the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to require an insurer to expand coverage that is contrary to the express terms of an insurance contract; (3) whether an equitable estoppel claim requires that (a) a party against whom the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to be applied has full knowledge of the facts and circumstances involved, and (b) justifiable reliance on the part of the party seeking to invoke it is shown; and (4) whether the defendant-insurer should be equitably estopped from denying coverage in this case.

(1) whether court costs under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) should be classified as a tax, a fee, or some other category of charge; and (2) if court costs are a tax, whether the statute violates the Separation of Powers Clause, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, or the Distinct-Statement Clause, Const 1963, art 4, § 32. 

I. Whether The Court Of Appeals Clearly Erred In Holding That Retiree

Healthcare Benefits Under Macomb County Collective Bargaining

Agreements Are Vested, And Unalterable For The Retirees’ Lifetimes,

Except With The Retirees’ Consent, Where The Agreements Are Silent, And

Unambiguous, As To Vesting, Such That Resort To Extrinsic Evidence To

Find Vesting Is Thus Improper?

II. Whether Alternatively, Even Assuming Arguendo, That The Collective

Bargaining Agreements Were Ambiguous With Respect To Whether Retiree

Healthcare Benefits Were Vested, The Court Of Appeals Clearly Erred In

Holding That, As A Matter Of Law, Extrinsic Evidence Established An

Agreement That The Benefits As Described In The CBAs Were Vested And

Unalterable Without Consent, Such That, At A Minimum A Question Of

Fact Remains For The Trier of Fact?

III. Whether Regardless Of Whether Retiree Healthcare Benefits Vested, The

Court Of Appeals Erred In Ordering That Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary

Disposition Be Granted, Where Plaintiffs Failed To Demonstrate A Genuine

Issue Of Material Fact As To A Breach Of The CBAs By Virtue Of The

Changes To Healthcare Insurance (Except As To Prescription Drug

Coverage For Non-Medicare Eligible Retirees), Implemented By The County

In 2009 And 2010?

(1) whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based on either trial court error or ineffective assistance of counsel, where the defense witness that was not produced at trial also did not appear at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing; and (2) whether the witness’s failure to appear at the hearing is attributable to the defense under the circumstances of this case.

 (1) whether the defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.82 and MCL 750.84 violate double jeopardy; (2) whether MCL 750.82 and MCL 750.84 contain contradictory and mutually exclusive provisions such that the Legislature did not intend a defendant to be convicted of both crimes for the same conduct, compare People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 18-26 (2015) with People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 96-99 (1979); (3) whether the Court of Appeals in People v Davis, 320 Mich App 484 (2017), erred in recognizing a rule against mutually exclusive verdicts in Michigan, see generally United States v Powell, 469 US 57, 69 n 8 (1984); State v Davis, 466 SW3d 49 (Tenn, 2015); and (4) whether that rule is applicable to the facts of this case. 

W]hether, to be eligible to receive personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits, they were required to register, in Michigan, the vehicle involved in the accident, and were thus obligated to maintain security for the payment of PIP benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3101 or be precluded from receiving such benefits by MCL 500.3113(b). 

(1) whether the Court of Appeals special panel correctly held that there is a conflict between MCL 600.2957(2) and MCR 2.112(K); (2) whether, in any event, a party may amend a complaint upon receipt of a notice of nonparty fault without first filing a motion to amend; and (3) if so, whether the amendment relates back to the date the complaint was filed. 

(1) whether the “authorized by law” scope of review under Const 1963, art 6, § 28 applied to the appellants’ judicial review of the Civil Service Commission’s final decision made without a hearing; (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals gave proper meaning to the “authorized by law” constitutional standard; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied that scope of review to the appellants’ challenge.

I. WHETHER A STATUTORY MOLDBUILDER LIEN IS TERMINATED UNDER MCL 445.619(5)(b) WHEN A MOLDER IN POSSESSION OF THE LIENED MOLD SENDS A VERIFIED STATEMENT TO THE MOLDBUILDER’S CUSTOMER STATING THAT THE MOLDER HAS PAID THE MOLDBUILDER’S CUSTOMER, EVEN THOUGH IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT NOBODY HAS PAID THE LIENHOLDING MOLDBUILDER?

of

action” for the deprivation of property without due process occurred when the appellee issued its allegedly wrongful notice of redetermination, or when the appellee actually seized the appellants’ property. MCL 600.6431(3); MCL  600.5827; cf. Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133, 149-153 (2017).​

(1) whether the defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.81a(3) and MCL 750.84 violate double jeopardy; (2) whether MCL 750.81a and MCL 750.84 contain contradictory and mutually exclusive provisions such that the Legislature did not intend a defendant to be convicted of both crimes for the same conduct, compare People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 18-26 (2015) with People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 96-99 (1979); (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in recognizing a rule against mutually exclusive verdicts in Michigan, see generally United States v Powell, 469 US 57, 69 n 8 (1984); State v Davis, 466 SW3d 49 (Tenn, 2015); and (4) whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying this rule to the facts of this case.

(1) what deference should be accorded to the trial court’s factual findings where a recording of events under consideration is available to an appellate court; (2) what evidence may be considered in determining whether there was clear error in the trial court’s factual findings; and (3) what standard of review is to be applied under such circumstances. In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). 

(1) whether a parent/defendant, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor, can be convicted of first-degree child abuse or second-degree murder when a child suffers serious physical harm or death as a result of the parent/defendant leaving the child in the care of the other parent with knowledge that the other parent previously injured the child and that serious physical harm or death would be caused by leaving the child with the other parent; and (2) if so, whether the evidence is sufficient in this case to establish the defendant’s knowledge that serious physical harm or death would be caused by leaving the child with the other parent. ​

(1) whether the plaintiff waived any statute of limitations defense; (2) whether Joughin v Joughin, 320 Mich App 380 (2017), was correctly decided; and (3) when a claim for retirement benefits under a judgment of divorce accrues. 

1 et seq., see In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 (2013), because it was based on the equitable doctrine of implied contract at law. See Restatements of the Law 3d, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011). 

).

nd in Bliss v Caille Bros Co, 149 Mich 601 (1907), or People v Armstrong, 212 Mich App 121 (1995).

(1) this Court’s decision in Covenant Medical Center, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich 191 (2017), should be applied to this case; (2) the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that this Court’s decision in Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 696 (2002), has been “effectively repudiated” in the context of judicial decisions of statutory interpretation, see Spectrum Health Hospitals v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan, 492 Mich 503 (2012); Wayne County v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 484 n 98 (2004); Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 587 n 57 (2005); and (3) if Pohutski has not been effectively repudiated, whether the Pohutskiframework should have been applied in Spectru

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(1) whether the defendants’ home is a “modular home” as defined by Timber Ridge Bay’s “Declaration of Restrictions, Covenants and Conditions”; and (2) if so, whether the violation was a technical violation that did not cause substantial injury, Cooper v Kovan, 349 Mich 520, 530 (1957). 

(1) whether the creation of a fee surplus generated by an enforcing agency under the Construction Code Act (CCA), MCL 125.1501 et seq., and the use of that surplus to pay for shortfalls in previous years by transfer of the surplus into the city’s general fund, violates the constraints of § 22 that fees be reasonable, be intended to bear a reasonable relation to the cost of acts and services provided by the enforcing agency, and be used only for the operation of the enforcing agency or the construction board of appeals, or both; (2) if so, whether appellants have a private cause of action against a governmental subdivision for enforcement of the CCA, MCL 125.1508b(1); (3) whether appellants are “taxpayers” that have standing to file suit pursuant to the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 32; and (4) if so, whether the challenged fees violate the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 31.​ 

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W]hether the defendant federal border patrol agents were “public officers” for purposes of the common-law crime of misconduct in office when they assisted – as members of a law enforcement task force that included Michigan State Police and Michigan motor carrier officers – in the execution of a search warrant.​​ 

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(1) whether strict or substantial compliance is required with the notice provision contained within MCL 691.1404(2), compare Rowland v Washtenaw County Road Commission, 477 Mich 197 (2007), with Plunkett v Dep’t of Transportation, 286 Mich App 168 (2009); (2) whether the plaintiff’s notice failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(2) under either a strict or substantial compliance standard; (3) whether the Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in MCL 691.1404(1) and the word “may” in MCL 691.1404(2) indicates that service on an individual is not the only method of serving proper notice; and (4) whether an individual described in MCR 2.105(G)(2) can delegate the legal authority to accept lawful process under MCL 691.1404(2), see 1 Mich Civ Jur Agency § 1 (2018). 

[W]hether there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an “act” as that term is used in MCL 750.136b(3)

(b)

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