Defendant Thabo Jones was charged with
reckless driving causing death, in violation of MCL 257.626(4), a fifteen-year
felony. Witnesses said that Jones was
driving at an excessive speed, weaving in and out of traffic, and using the
center lane to pass other cars. He
struck another vehicle, causing the driver’s death. MCL 257.626(5) states that, when a defendant
is charged with reckless driving causing death, the jury cannot be instructed
on the lesser misdemeanor offense of committing a moving violation causing
death, MCL 257.601d. Jones argued that
this part of the statute was unconstitutional, and asked the trial court to
instruct the jury on the lesser offense.
The trial court granted the motion, ruling that subsection (5) of the
reckless driving statute violated the doctrine of separation of powers.
The prosecutor filed an application for
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal. In a split, published opinion, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
The majority emphasized that, as a general rule, a criminal jury may
acquit a defendant of a principal charge and find him guilty of a lesser
offense. This concept has been limited,
in Michigan, to necessarily included lesser offenses, see People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112, 118-121 (2007). The statute at issue, MCL 257.626(5), does
not impose any restriction on a judge or jury from finding a defendant guilty
of the lesser offense; it only prohibits instructing the jury as to the lesser
offense. The Court of Appeals panel
emphasized that it is the duty of the courts to properly instruct the jury on
the law, see MCL 768.29 and MCR 6.414(F); an improperly instructed jury cannot
fulfill its duty. The majority noted
that the prosecutor conceded that the offense of committing a moving violation
causing death was a necessarily included lesser offense of reckless driving
causing death. Given this, held the
appeals court, it is a violation of the principle of separation of powers for
the Legislature to forbid the courts to instruct the jury as to that lesser offense. In the alternative, the majority held that
the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon a defendant’s right to a properly
instructed jury.
The dissenting Court of Appeals judge
would have reversed the trial court’s ruling.
The dissenter concluded that, in enacting MCL 257.626(5), and limiting
the jury’s consideration of a lesser included offense, the Legislature
addressed a matter of substantive law and therefore acted within its
policy-making authority. The intent of
the Legislature in enacting the statute was to preclude either a judge or a
jury from convicting a defendant charged with reckless driving causing death of
the lesser misdemeanor offense.
The prosecutor filed an
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which granted the
application in an order dated November 27, 2013. The order stated: “The parties shall include among the issues
to be briefed: (1) whether a legislative
provision barring consideration of a necessarily included lesser offense
violates the separation of powers doctrine, Const 1963, art 3, § 2; (2) whether
MCL 257.626(5) violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial by foreclosing a
jury instruction on a lesser offense; and (3) whether MCL 257.601d is a
necessarily included lesser offense of MCL 257.626(4).”