Following a jury trial in 2002,
defendant Lorinda Swain was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct for sexually assaulting her adopted son when he was under the
age of 13. This appeal concerns a successive motion for relief from judgment
that Swain filed in 2009. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that
Swain made a successful “claim of new evidence,” as required by MCR
6.502(G)(2), and that she was entitled to a new trial. The trial court also
ruled that a new trial was warranted due to the strength of Swain’s claim of
actual innocence, and in the interests of justice. The Court of Appeals
reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. It relied on the test for “newly
discovered evidence” set forth in People
v Cress, 468 Mich 678 (2003), and found that Swain’s new evidence – a
potentially exculpatory witness – did not satisfy the test. The appeals court
concluded that, because Swain and her attorney knew at the time of trial that
the witness had information concerning the allegations against Swain, the evidence
was not “newly discovered,” and the trial court erred in granting her
successive motion.
On September 30, 2015, the Supreme Court
granted leave to appeal to consider several issues relating to successive
motions for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G), including (1) whether the
test set forth in People v Cress, 468
Mich 678, 692 (2003), for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence, applies in determining whether a
second or subsequent motion for relief from judgment is based on “a claim of
new evidence” under MCR 6.502(G)(2); (2) by what standard(s) Michigan courts
consider a defendant’s assertion that the evidence demonstrates a significant
possibility of actual innocence in the context of a motion brought pursuant to
MCR 6.502(G); (3) whether the Michigan Court Rules provide a basis for relief
where a defendant demonstrates a significant possibility of actual innocence;
and (4) whether, if MCR 6.502(G) does bar relief, there is an independent basis
on which a defendant who demonstrates a significant possibility of actual
innocence may nonetheless seek relief under the United States or Michigan
Constitutions.