While riding his
bicycle, 15-year-old Ryan Menard was struck and injured by a pickup truck
driven by Terry Imig. Plaintiff, as
Ryan’s conservator, filed this negligence action against defendants Imig, the Macomb
County Department of Roads, and Macomb County.
The Macomb defendants moved for summary disposition on various grounds,
including governmental immunity.
Plaintiff countered with evidence that (1) construction in the area had
resulted in increased traffic on the road; (2) the road was potholed, parts of
it had washed out after rain, and it had a washboard effect; (3) the width of
the roadway had narrowed due to the build-up of sediment and plant life on the
sides of the surface; (4) Ryan had steered his bike to the right side of the
road to avoid being hit, but a driver travelling in the opposite direction turned
on her high-beam headlights, temporarily blinding Imig so that he did not see
Ryan until he struck him from behind and dragged him under his truck; and (5) an
expert witness had opined that the condition of the road, as well as the glare
of the headlights, were contributing factors to the cause of the accident. The trial court denied the motion, holding that
plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support a claim under the
highway defect exception to the Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL
691.1401 et seq. The Court of Appeals reversed in a split
unpublished opinion. The majority held that,
although plaintiff’s theory based on increased glare and blindness was
sufficient to establish a logical sequence of cause and effect, plaintiff
failed to demonstrate proximate cause.
The dissent held that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of
causation to avoid summary disposition. The
Supreme Court has directed oral argument on plaintiff’s application for leave
to appeal to address (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in its
determination of cause-in-fact, and (2) whether the narrowing of the roadway
combined with the oncoming driver’s use of high-beam headlights, or any other
cause-in-fact, was a proximate cause of that accident.