In 2001, the
then-juvenile plaintiff was adjudicated as having committed misdemeanor
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. He was required, under the Sex Offender
Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et
seq., to report and register his address for 25 years. The SORA was amended
in 2011 to establish a tier system, classifying plaintiff’s offense as Tier II
and providing in part that Tier II offenders who had been adjudicated as
juveniles were no longer required or expected to register. The parties agree
that plaintiff’s name should have been removed from the sex offender registry,
but that did not occur and plaintiff continued to register. In 2013, plaintiff
registered his address incorrectly and was charged with violating SORA. He
pleaded no contest to the charge and was assessed a fine. In 2014, plaintiff
was again arrested for failing to comply with SORA. He pleaded guilty to the
felony charge of failure to register and was sentenced to serve a prison term
and ordered to pay a fine. After 17 months of imprisonment, plaintiff was
released from prison, and his convictions and sentences were vacated. Plaintiff
filed suit against the state, alleging that it had violated his constitutional
rights through its policies, customs, and practices, which were a “moving
force” behind the constitutional violations. The Court of Claims denied defendant’s
motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff properly alleged
that, due in part to defendant’s knowledge that law enforcement officers and
prosecutors rely on the sex offender registry when making charging decisions,
there was a direct causal link between defendant’s policies, practices, and
customs that led to the inaccuracy of the registry and plaintiff’s illegal
arrests and prosecutions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff
had not alleged sufficient facts showing a direct causal link between the
alleged failure to train employees and the alleged constitutional violation
such that defendant’s “deliberate indifference” could be shown. The Supreme Court
has granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal to address whether the
Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that he had failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a constitutional-tort claim under the principles
outlined in Canton v Harris, 489 US
378 (1989), and Bryan Co Bd of Co Commr’s
v Brown, 520 US 397, 409 (1997).