Plaintiff filed a
complaint against the City of Detroit pursuant to the Governmental Tort
Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq.,
alleging that he was injured after hitting a pothole while riding his
motorcycle. The city moved for summary disposition, asserting that plaintiff
had failed to meet the GTLA’s notice requirement in MCL 691.1404(2), which
provides that “notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or
by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with
civil process directed against the governmental agency.” Plaintiff had directed
his notice to “City of Detroit Law Department—CLAIMS.” The trial court denied
defendant’s motion, holding that plaintiff substantially complied with the notice
statute and, alternatively, defendant was equitably estopped from raising this
defense. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff’s
notice did not comply with MCL 691.1404(2) or MCR 2.105(G)(2), and that
substantial compliance was insufficient. 322 Mich App 36 (2017). The Supreme Court
has directed oral argument on plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal to
address: (1) whether strict or
substantial compliance is required with the notice provision contained within
MCL 691.1404(2), compare Rowland v
Washtenaw County Road Commission, 477 Mich 197 (2007), with Plunkett v Dep’t of Transportation, 286
Mich App 168 (2009); (2) whether plaintiff’s notice failed to comply with MCL
691.1404(2) under either a strict or substantial compliance standard; (3)
whether an individual described in MCR 2.105(G)(2) can delegate the legal
authority to accept lawful process under MCL 691.1404(2), see 1 Mich Civ Jur
Agency § 1 (2018); and (4) whether the defendant should be estopped from
asserting that the statutory notice requirement was not met. This case will be heard at the same session as
West v City of Detroit (No.
157097).