## STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED March 26, 2013

In the Matter of L. LONGMAN, Minor.

No. 312395 Kent Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 11-051984-NA

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent mother appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (l). We affirm.

The principal conditions that led to adjudication were respondent's housing, emotional stability, and dishonesty. During the 14 months of court proceedings, mother never secured housing that was stable. She was referred to counseling services to address her emotional stability, but her attendance was minimal. She failed to address certain issues which had a significant impact on her emotional stability including her own abuse as a child, her physical abuse of her children, and the termination of her parental rights to five other children. Throughout the case, respondent was not forthcoming or honest with case workers about the paternity of her child, or her residence. While her difficulty obtaining employment was due to her lack of identification and the difficult process of getting a copy of her naturalization papers was significant, she was less than aggressive in resolving said difficulty. Respondent's failure to address certain issues and her failure to make significant progress on others reasonably led the trial court to find that it was unlikely she would be able to rectify these conditions or provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. The trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) or (g). In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Further, there was no dispute that respondent's parental rights had been previously terminated to five other children, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding grounds for termination pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(1). Id.

Respondent does not challenge on appeal the trial court's finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence as discussed above. Rather, she argues that the termination was not in the child's best interests. "Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." *In re Olive/Metts*, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); MCL 712A.19b(5). A child's need for stability and permanency may be

considered in determining best interests. *In re VanDalen*, 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). In this case, the child was thriving in foster care, and had lived with the foster family for virtually all of her life. Respondent argues she had a bond with the child. However, other considerations can outweigh the bond between a parent and a child. See *In re LE*, 278 Mich App 1, 29-30; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). Even if there was a bond between respondent and the child, the trial court did not err in finding it was in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights to allow the child permanency and a safe home. *Id*.

Affirmed.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Amy Ronayne Krause