17.6Standard and Burden of Proof Required to Establish Statutory Basis for Termination
There must be clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory bases allowing for termination of parental rights have been met. MCL 712A.19b(3); MCR 3.977(E)(3) (termination at initial disposition); MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b) (termination on the basis of different circumstances); MCR 3.977(H)(3)(a) (termination for “other” reason). The clear and convincing evidence standard is the minimum standard necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 768-770 (1982).
The petitioner has the burden of proving the statutory basis for terminating a respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b.1 MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 537 (2006).
A court cannot agree to set aside an order that terminates a respondent-parent’s parental rights if the respondent-parent complies with certain conditions set by the court.2 In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 673-674 (2005), superseded in part on other grounds by In re Hansen, 285 Mich App 158 (2009), vacated 486 Mich 1037 (2010).3 Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded:
“[MCL 712A.19b(5) and MCR 3.977] are clear: once the court finds there are statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, the court must order termination of parental rights and must further order that ‘additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made,’ unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interest. . . . Once the statutory grounds for termination have been proven (unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interests), the court must terminate parental rights immediately. An Adrianson order cannot be entered.” Gazella, supra at 673-674.
1 See Section 17.7 for a detailed discussion of the statutory standards under MCL 712A.19b(3).
2 These types of agreements are commonly referred to as Adrianson Agreements. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 673 (2005), superseded in part on other grounds by In re Hansen, 285 Mich App 158 (2009), vacated 486 Mich 1037 (2010). Specifically, “[i]n an Adrianson proceeding, the trial court would enter an order terminating the [respondent-]parents’ rights following the necessary statutory findings. The court would then enter a further order suspending the order terminating the [respondent-]parents’ rights on condition that the [respondent-]parents comply with certain requirements designed to assist their rehabilitation. If the [respondent-]parents were successful, the order terminating their rights would be set aside and never take effect. However, should the [respondent-]parents not be successful, the order terminating rights would be permitted to go into effect.” Gazella, supra at 673.
3 For more information on the precedential value of an opinion with negative subsequent history, see our note.