17.6Standard and Burden of Proof Required to Establish Statutory Basis for Termination

There must be clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory bases allowing for termination of parental rights have been met. MCL 712A.19b(3); MCR 3.977(E)(3) (termination at initial disposition); MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b) (termination on the basis of different circumstances); MCR 3.977(H)(3)(a) (termination for “other” reason). The clear and convincing evidence standard is the minimum standard necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 768-770 (1982). “Clear and convincing evidence is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases and requires evidence so clear, direct, and weighty that the fact finder can come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re D P Rozenboom, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (cleaned up).

The petitioner has the burden of proving the statutory basis for terminating a respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b.1 MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 537 (2006). See Rozenboom, ___ Mich App at ___. There, petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f), citing respondent’s failure to visit, contact, or communicate with the child for a period of two years or more before the petition was filed, where “[t]he record supports a finding that respondent spent years persistently attempting to contact and visit [the child],” Rozenboom, ___ Mich App at ___, and “petitioner persistently rebuffed these efforts . . . .” Id. at ___.

A court cannot agree to set aside an order that terminates a respondent-parent’s parental rights if the respondent-parent complies with certain conditions set by the court.2 In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 673-674 (2005), superseded in part on other grounds by In re Hansen, 285 Mich App 158 (2009), vacated 486 Mich 1037 (2010).3 Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded:

“[MCL 712A.19b(5) and MCR 3.977] are clear: once the court finds there are statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, the court must order termination of parental rights and must further order that ‘additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made,’ unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interest . . . .Once the statutory grounds for termination have been proven (unless the court finds that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interests), the court must terminate parental rights immediately. An Adrianson order cannot be entered.” Gazella, supra at 673-674.

A party aggrieved by a trial court’s decision “must overcome the clear error standard of review on appeal.” Rozenboom, ___ Mich App at ___. “This means that prevailing on appeal requires [the aggrieved party] to show that the court made a clear error when it found that petitioner did not meet the highest burden of proof applicable in civil cases.” Id. at ___. In Rozenboom, the trial court did not clearly err in dismissing petitioner’s petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) where “text messages exchanged between petitioner and respondent overwhelmingly support the trial court’s finding that petitioner blocked respondent from visiting, contacting, and communicating with [the child].” Rozenboom, ___ Mich App at ___.

1    See Section 17.7 for a detailed discussion of the statutory standards under MCL 712A.19b(3).

2    These types of agreements are commonly referred to as Adrianson Agreements. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 673 (2005), superseded in part on other grounds by In re Hansen, 285 Mich App 158 (2009), vacated 486 Mich 1037 (2010). Specifically, “[i]n an Adrianson proceeding, the trial court would enter an order terminating the [respondent-]parents’ rights following the necessary statutory findings. The court would then enter a further order suspending the order terminating the [respondent-]parents’ rights on condition that the [respondent-]parents comply with certain requirements designed to assist their rehabilitation. If the [respondent-]parents were successful, the order terminating their rights would be set aside and never take effect. However, should the [respondent-]parents not be successful, the order terminating rights would be permitted to go into effect.” Gazella, supra at 673.

3    For more information on the precedential value of an opinion with negative subsequent history, see our note.