A brief discussion on criminal sexual conduct is contained in this section. For a more comprehensive discussion, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Sexual Assault Benchbook.
The types of criminal sexual conduct are:
•First degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), which involves sexual penetration coupled with any of the circumstances described in MCL 750.520b.
•Second degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), which involves sexual contact coupled with any of the circumstances described in MCL 750.520c.
•Third degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), which involves sexual penetration coupled with any of the circumstances described in MCL 750.520d.
•Fourth degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV), which involves sexual contact coupled with any one of the circumstances described in MCL 750.520e.
•Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration under MCL 750.520g(1).
•Assault with intent to commit second degree criminal sexual conduct under MCL 750.520g(2).
MCL 750.520l permits “[a] person [to] be charged and convicted under [MCL 750.520b] to [MCL 750.520g] even though the victim is his or her legal spouse.”
A.Statute of Limitations for Criminal Sexual Conduct Charges
An indictment for CSC-I “may be found and filed at any time[.]” MCL 767.24(1)(a). Except in cases involving a violation of CSC-II and CSC-III against an alleged victim under 18 years of age, an indictment for CSC-II, CSC-III, CSC-IV, or assault with intent to criminal sexual conduct under MCL 750.520g “may be found and filed within 10 years after the offense is committed or by the alleged victim’s twenty-first birthday, whichever is later,” unless “evidence of the offense is obtained and that evidence contains DNA that is determined to be from an unidentified individual.” MCL 767.24(3)(a)-(b). In that situation, “an indictment against that individual for the offense may be found and filed at any time after the offense is committed. However, after the individual is identified, the indictment may be found and filed within 10 years after the individual is identified or by the alleged victim’s twenty-first birthday, whichever is later.” MCL 767.24(3)(b). An indictment for a violation of CSC-II or CSC-III against an alleged victim under 18 years of age “may be found and filed within 15 years after the offense is committed or by the alleged victim’s twenty-eighth birthday, whichever is later,” unless “evidence of the offense is obtained and that evidence contains DNA that is determined to be from an unidentified individual.” MCL 767.24(4)(a)-(b). In that situation, “an indictment against that individual for the offense may be found and filed at any time after the offense is committed. However, after the individual is identified, the indictment may be found and filed within 15 years after the individual is identified or by the alleged victim’s twenty-eighth birthday, whichever is later.” MCL 767.24(4)(b).
“Any period during which the party charged[1] did not usually and publicly reside within this state is not part of the time within which the respective indictments may be found and filed.” MCL 767.24(11). “The extension or tolling, as applicable, of the limitations period provided in [MCL 767.24] applies to any of those violations for which the limitations period has not expired at the time the extension or tolling takes effect.” MCL 767.24(12). “The tolling provision [is] all-encompassing, . . . [and] any period during which a defendant d[oes] not reside in Michigan c[an]not be considered when calculating the time within which charges must be found and filed, i.e., the pertinent limitations period.” People v Kasben, 324 Mich App 1, 10 (2018). “[C]harges not yet time-barred by an existing period of limitations are subject to a new period of limitations set forth in an amended statute.” Id. at 11 (finding that even though the crime was committed under a six-year limitations period, which was later extended to a victim’s 21st birthday, and the defendant left Michigan just before the victim turned 21 and after the limitations period had been extended, defendant’s “CSC I charge was not time-barred under MCL 767.24” because the period of limitations was tolled when defendant left Michigan; “in light of the tolling, the 2001 amendment [to MCL 767.24] became applicable to the case, extending indefinitely the period of limitations on a charge of CSC I”), citing People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 588 (1992). See People v Blackmer, 309 Mich App 199, 202 (2015) (finding that because “the plain and unambiguous language of the . . . nonresident tolling provision [of MCL 767.242] provides that the limitations period [is] tolled for any period in which a defendant [is] not customarily and openly living in Michigan[,]” a “[d]efendant’s subjective intent [to return to Michigan following his or her term of incarceration in another state] is irrelevant[, and] . . . the statute of limitations [is] tolled from the time defendant [leaves] Michigan”).
“[T]he tolling provision in MCL 767.24 [does not] violate [a nonresident] defendant’s constitutional right to interstate travel or . . . equal protection under the law[.]”3 People v James (Joel), 326 Mich App 98, 103 (2018). “[T]he tolling provision [in MCL 767.24] only applies when a party is not usually and publicly residing in Michigan and, therefore, it does not restrict in any way a person’s right to travel within, across, or outside of Michigan’s border”; “residents and nonresidents are not similarly situated for equal-protection purposes,” and there are rational grounds for “[t]he Legislature [to] distinguish[] between Michigan residents and nonresidents for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations for certain crimes, . . . including the investigation, prosecution, and . . . the very discovery of previously unreported crimes.” James (Joel), 326 Mich App at 101, 104, 108, 112 (where the trial court dismissed a CSC-III charge against the defendant on the basis that “had defendant been a resident, the limitations period would have expired before the crime was reported,” the Court of Appeals reversed and held that “it is not a violation of defendant’s right to interstate travel or equal protection to charge him with CSC-III related to alleged criminal conduct not reported until after the untolled limitations periods had expired”).
B.Other Remedies for Victims of Criminal Sexual Conduct
Although criminal prosecution may succeed in holding offenders accountable under the criminal justice system, appropriately penalize them for their unlawful conduct, and result in the award of restitution to the victim of an offender’s criminal conduct, a victim may wish to pursue a civil action against the offender with the possibility of better compensating him or her for the immediate and long-term physical and psychological injuries caused by the offender’s conduct. For the period of limitations on commencement of an action to recover damages sustained because of criminal sexual conduct, see MCL 600.5805(6) (in general) and MCL 600.5851b (minor victim).4 MCL 600.5805(6) and MCL 600.5851b do not require “that a criminal prosecution or other proceeding have been brought as a result of the conduct or, if a criminal prosecution or other proceeding was brought, that the prosecution or proceeding resulted in a conviction or adjudication.” MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5851b(2). For additional discussion on civil actions filed by crime victims, including victims of criminal sexual conduct, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Crime Victim Rights Benchbook, Chapter 10.
Administrative remedies may also be available to victims through the Crime Victim Services Commission (CVSC). For additional discussion on administrative remedies available through the CVSC, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Crime Victim Rights Benchbook, Chapter 9.
1 “The term ‘party charged’ simply refers to the party . . . who [is] charged with a crime to which the limitations and tolling provisions of MCL 767.24 apply.” People v James (Joel), 326 Mich App 98, 109 (2018) (the authority relied on by the trial court “for the proposition that, for the tolling provision to apply, defendant must have been a ‘suspect’ or an ‘accused’ prior to the expiration of the untolled limitations, [was] inapposite”).
2 The Blackmer Court discussed the nonresident tolling provision that was formerly found in MCL 767.24(1). However, it contains substantially similar language as the current provision found in MCL 767.24(11).
3 Although the James Court discussed the nonresident tolling provision that was formerly found in MCL 767.24(8), MCL 767.24(8) contains substantially similar language as the current provision found in MCL 767.24(11).
4 For purposes of MCL 600.5805 and MCL 600.5851b, criminal sexual conduct is “conduct prohibited under . . . MCL 750.520b, [MCL] 750.520c, [MCL] 750.520d, [MCL] 750.520e, and [MCL] 750.520g.” MCL 600.5805(16)(b); MCL 600.5851b(5)(b).