The imposition of excessive fines is prohibited by US Const, Am VIII and Const 1963, art 1, § 16. The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, guarding “against abuses of government’s punitive or criminal-law-enforcement authority,” is a safeguard “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, with deep roots in our history and tradition.” Timbs v Indiana, 586 US ___, ___ (2019) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Excessive Fines Clause is “incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at ___.
At the time of sentencing or a delay in sentencing or entry of a deferred judgment of guilt, a court may impose “[a]ny fine authorized by the statute for a violation of which the defendant entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the court determined that the defendant was guilty.” MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(i).
MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(i) does not allow a court to order a defendant to pay a fine that is not specifically authorized by the penal statute under which he or she was convicted. People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 198-199 (2016); People v Johnson, 314 Mich App 422, 423 (2016).
The language of the applicable penal statute often includes a specific authority to impose a fine, and the maximum amount of that fine. For example, an offender convicted of violating MCL 750.72 (first degree arson), may be punished “by imprisonment for life or any term of years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00 or 3 times the value of the property damaged or destroyed, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine.” MCL 750.72(3).
If a statute authorizes the imposition of a fine but is silent with regard to the amount, the maximum fine permitted for a felony conviction is $5,000, MCL 750.503, and the maximum fine permitted for a misdemeanor conviction is $500, MCL 750.504.
Whenever an offense is punishable by a fine and imprisonment, the court has discretion to impose a sentence comprised of any combination of those penalties: a fine and no imprisonment, imprisonment and no fine, or both a fine and imprisonment. MCL 769.5(1)-(2). However, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of imposing a nonjail or nonprobation sentence when an individual is convicted of a misdemeanor that is not a serious misdemeanor. MCL 769.5(3).
“[U]nder MCL 769.5(4), a court imposing a sentence for an ordinary misdemeanor conviction remains free to depart from the presumption in MCL 769.5(4) ‘if the court finds reasonable grounds for the departure and states on the record the grounds for the departure.’” People of the City of Auburn Hills v Mason, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024), quoting MCL 769.5(4). “When reviewing a sentence that constitutes a departure from the recommended minimum guidelines range, the key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the guidelines’ recommended range.” Mason, ___ Mich App at ___ (cleaned up). “The pertinent question is not whether defendant’s sentence departed from the rebuttable presumption that a non-jail or non-probation sentence is a proportionate sentence for an ordinary misdemeanor.” Id. at ___. “Instead, the question is whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, “the [district] court did not adequately justify the imposed sentence,” because it “did not consider the circumstances of the offense and did not explain how its departure sentence was more proportionate than a different sentence would have been.” Id. at ___.
See Section 1.2 for discussion of this misdemeanor sentencing presumption.