5.3Types of PPOs

The Legislature has created three types of PPOs, distinguished by the categories of persons who may be restrained:

•Domestic relationship PPOs under MCL 600.2950 are available to restrain behavior (including stalking) that interferes with the petitioner’s personal liberty, or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence, if the respondent is involved in certain domestic relationships with the petitioner as defined by the statute.

•Nondomestic stalking PPOs under MCL 600.2950a(1) are available to enjoin a person, regardless of that person’s relationship with the petitioner, from engaging in stalking (MCL 750.411h), aggravated stalking (MCL 750.411i), or cyberstalking (MCL 750.411s).

•Nondomestic sexual assault PPOs under MCL 600.2950a(2) are available to victims of sexual assault, victims who have received obscene material under MCL 750.142, and petitioners who have been placed in reasonable apprehension of sexual assault by the respondent. The respondent may be enjoined from any of the conduct listed in MCL 600.2950a(3).

A.Domestic Relationship PPOs

For purposes of MCL 600.2950, a PPO is “an injunctive order issued by the family division of circuit court restraining or enjoining activity and individuals listed in [MCL 600.2950(1)].” MCL 600.2950(30)(d).

The domestic relationship PPO, MCL 600.2950(1), permits “an individual [to] petition the family division of circuit court to enter a [PPO] to restrain or enjoin” a person who is:

•the petitioner’s spouse or former spouse.

•a person with whom the petitioner has had a child in common.

•a person who resides or who has resided in the same household as the petitioner.

•a person with whom the petitioner has or has had a dating relationship. For additional information on petitioning the court for a domestic relationship PPO, see Section 5.7.

A domestic relationship PPO may not be issued if the petitioner and the respondent have a parent/child relationship and the child is an unemancipated minor. MCL 600.2950(26)(a)-(b). If there is no such parent/child relationship, a person under age 18 may be a party to a PPO action.¹ MCL 600.2950(27). However, a domestic relationship PPO may not be issued if the respondent is less than ten years old.MCL 600.2950(26)(c).

A child is emancipated from a parent, no matter whether the parent is the child’s natural or adoptive parent, when that parent’s parental rights to the child are terminated. SP v BEK, 339 Mich App 171, 179 (2021). Therefore, MCL 600.2950(26)(b) does not preclude a trial court from issuing on behalf of the child a personal protection order against a natural parent whose parental rights have been terminated. SP, 339 Mich App at 180.

1.Conduct Subject to Restraint

In issuing a domestic relationship PPO under MCL 600.2950, the court may restrain or enjoin the respondent from doing one or more of the following:

“(a) Entering onto premises.

[Note: “A court shall not issue a [PPO] that restrains or enjoins [a respondent from entering onto premises under MCL 600.2950(1)(a)] if all of the following apply:

(a) The individual to be restrained or enjoined is not the spouse of the moving party.

(b) The individual to be restrained or enjoined or the parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor to be restrained or enjoined has a property interest in the premises.

(c) The moving party or the parent, guardian, or custodian of a minor petitioner has no property interest in the premises.” MCL 600.2950(5).]

(b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named individual.

(c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual.

(d) Removing minor children from the individual having legal custody of the children, except as otherwise authorized by a custody or parenting time order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm.^[2]

(f) Interfering with petitioner’s efforts to remove petitioner’s children or personal property from premises that are solely owned or leased by the individual to be restrained or enjoined.

(g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or education or engaging in conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or educational relationship or environment.

(h) If the petitioner is a minor who has been the victim of sexual assault, as that term is defined in [MCL 600.2950a] by the respondent and if the petitioner is enrolled in a public or nonpublic school that operates any of grades K to 12, attending in the same building as the petitioner.

(i) Having access to information in records concerning a minor child of both petitioner and respondent that will inform respondent about the address or telephone number of petitioner and petitioner’s minor child or about petitioner’s employment address.^[3]

(j) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under . . . MCL 750.411h [or] [MCL] 750.411i.

(k) Any of the following with the intent to cause the petitioner mental distress or to exert control over the petitioner with respect to an animal in which the petitioner has an ownership interest:^[4]

(i) Injuring, killing, torturing, neglecting, or threatening to injure, kill, torture, or neglect the animal. A restraining order that enjoins the conduct under this subparagraph does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of the animal as described in [MCL 750.50(11)].

(ii) Removing the animal from the petitioner’s possession.

(iii) Retaining or obtaining possession of the animal.

(l) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.” MCL 600.2950(1). See SCAO form Personal Protection Order / Domestic Relationship).

MCL 600.2950(1)(l)⁵ provides the court with the authority to restrict a respondent’s contact with his or her children. Brandt v Brandt, 250 Mich App 68, 70-71 (2002). Specifically,

“[MCL 600.2950(1)(l)] . . . provided the trial court with authority to issue the PPO prohibiting respondent’s contact with [his] children. This ‘catchall’ provision clearly provides the trial court with authority to restrain respondent from any other action that ‘interferes with personal liberty’ or might cause ‘a reasonable apprehension of violence.’

This statutory provision allows the trial court to restrain respondent from ‘[a]ny other specific act or conduct . . . that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.’ There is no question that it would be reasonable for petitioner[-mother] to fear that respondent might become violent with petitioner if she were forced to permit respondent to visit the children or exchange the children for parenting time. . . .’

* * *

[W]hile it is true that petitioner did not allege that respondent was physically violent toward his children, petitioner did set forth in detail that on several occasions respondent was physically violent toward petitioner in front of the children[, and] . . . it is clear from petitioner’s statement that respondent was becoming increasingly more violent. Therefore, it is entirely possible that respondent’s behavior might have eventually escalated and involved the children. This is particularly true where, as here, petitioner sought the PPO to protect her children so that she could leave respondent and file for divorce. Indeed, a PPO is issued on an emergency basis and when the trial court has only limited information. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s approach of erring on the side of caution when serious allegations of abuse have been made.” Brandt, 250 Mich App at 70-71 (internal citations omitted).

2.Standards for Issuing Domestic Relationship PPO

MCL 600.2950(4) requires the court to “issue a [PPO] under [MCL 600.2950] if the court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in [MCL 600.2950(1)].” The court must consider all of the following when determining whether reasonable cause exists:

“(a)   Testimony, documents, or other evidence offered in support of the request for a [PPO].

(b)   Whether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously committed or threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in [MCL 600.2950(1)].” MCL 600.2950(4).

A court may grant a PPO petition if it finds “‘reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit’ the offense of stalking.” PF v JF, 336 Mich App 118, 127 (2021), quoting MCL 600.2950(4). The offense of stalking requires activity that establishes “a course or pattern of conduct.” PF, 336 Mich App at 130; see also MCL 750.411h(1)(a). To determine whether there is a course or pattern of conduct, the court must contemplate “all relevant present and past incidents arising between the parties.” PF, 336 Mich App at 130. Past incidents to be considered may include allegations that were contained in a previous PPO petition found insufficient to merit granting a PPO, if the subsequent PPO petition contains an additional allegation that is different from the previous allegations and that could not have been included in the PPO petition that had been earlier denied. Id. at 128-129. In PF, the petitioner sought the first PPO based on five incidents, and the trial court denied the request. Id. at 126. After the court denied the request, a sixth incident occurred, and it “drove petitioner again to seek the assistance of a [different] court in an effort to obtain a PPO against respondent.” Id. at 129. If the subsequent PPO petition contained only the allegations already considered and decided by a court, subsequent review of another PPO petition containing only those same allegations would be prohibited under res judicata. Id. at 128-129. However, res judicata does not prohibit a court from considering the allegations first found insufficient to issue a PPO, when those first allegations, repeated in the subsequent petition, are used to establish a course or pattern of conduct when considered with conduct not included in the initial petition. Id. at 130-131 (finding that the petitioner’s second request for a PPO was not barred by res judicata). “[M]ultiple acts or a series of acts are necessarily required to issue a PPO based on stalking conduct, and any one of the acts can shed light on the other acts. One incident can change the dynamics and meaning of surrounding incidents.” Id. at 129.

A court cannot refuse to issue a domestic relationship PPO based solely on the absence of certain reports or other indications of abuse:

“A court shall not refuse to issue a [domestic relationship PPO] solely because of the absence of any of the following:

(a) A police report.^[6]

(b) A medical report.

(c) A report or finding of an administrative agency.

(d) Physical signs of abuse or violence.” MCL 600.2950(6).

“When the court holds a hearing before issuing a PPO, the petitioner bears the burden of providing evidence that shows that there is ‘reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the’ violent or harassing acts identified in [MCL 600.2950(1)].” Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 385 (1999). “Although [MCL 600.2950(4) does not] . . . specifically state that the burden of proof is on the petitioner, the burden of proof naturally falls on the petitioner under [MCL 600.2950(4)] . . . because the court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before issuing a PPO.” Kampf, 237 Mich App at 385-386.

3.Standard for Issuing Domestic Relationship Ex Parte PPO

If the petitioner specifically requests that the PPO be issued without written or oral notice to the respondent or his or her attorney,⁷ the court must issue the PPO ex parte if both of the following are met:

•“the court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in [MCL 600.2950(1).]” MCL 600.2950(4).⁸

•“it clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will itself precipitate adverse action before a [PPO] can be issued.” MCL 600.2950(12). See also MCR 3.703(G); MCR 3.705(A)(2).

Note: “The court must rule on a request for an ex parte order within one business day of the filing date of the petition.” MCR 3.705(A)(1). If the court refuses to enter the PPO ex parte, it must advise the petitioner of the right to request a hearing.⁹ MCR 3.705(A)(5). For additional information on the procedures required for issuing PPOs, see Section 5.7.

A respondent need not have actually committed one of the acts prohibited in MCL 600.2950(1) before a trial court may issue an ex parte order; an ex parte order issued under MCL 600.2950(4) requires “only that there was reasonable cause to believe that [the respondent] may commit one of the acts.” SP v BEK, 339 Mich App 171, 187 (2021).

“In cases in which an ex parte order is sought, the petitioner must show that the danger is imminent and that the delay to notify the respondent is intolerable or in itself dangerous.” Kampf, 237 Mich App at 385. “Although [MCL 600.2950(12) does not] . . . specifically state that the burden of proof is on the petitioner, the burden of proof naturally falls on the petitioner under . . . [MCL 600.2950(12)] because the court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before issuing a PPO.” Kampf, 237 Mich App at 385-386.

“There is no procedural due process defect in obtaining an emergency order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for the emergency protection order is supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying entry of an emergency order without prior notice, . . . and where there are appropriate provisions for notice and an opportunity to be heard after the order is issued.” Kampf, 237 Mich App at 383-384. The procedural safeguards set out in MCL 600.2950(12) (issuing ex parte order), MCL 600.2950(13) (filing motion to modify or rescind ex parte order), and MCL 600.2950(14) (hearing on motion to modify or rescind ex parte order) satisfy due process. See Kampf, 237 Mich App at 384.

“A [PPO] issued under [MCL 600.2950(12)] is valid for not less than 182 days.” MCL 600.2950(13). See also MCR 3.705(A)(3). It must state its expiration date. Id.

B.Nondomestic Stalking PPOs

For purposes of MCL 600.2950a, a PPO is “an injunctive order issued by the family division of circuit court restraining or enjoining conduct prohibited under [MCL 600.2950a(1)] or [MCL 600.2950a(3)].”MCL 600.2950a(31)(d).

The nondomestic stalking PPO, MCL 600.2950a(1), permits “an individual [to] petition the family division of circuit court to enter a [PPO] to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under . . . MCL 750.411h [(stalking)], [MCL] 750.411i [(aggravated stalking)], [or] [MCL] 750.411s [(cyberstalking)].”¹⁰ For additional information on petitioning the court for a nondomestic stalking PPO, see Section 5.7.

A nondomestic stalking PPO must not be issued if the petitioner and the respondent have a parent/child relationship and the child is an unemancipated minor. MCL 600.2950a(27)(a)-(b). If there is no such parent/child relationship, a person under age 18 may be a party to a PPO action.¹¹ MCL 600.2950a(28). However, a nondomestic stalking PPO must not be issued if the respondent is less than ten years old. MCL 600.2950a(27)(c).

The court must not enter a nondomestic stalking PPO if the petitioner is a prisoner. MCL 600.2950a(30). If the court issues a PPO in violation of MCL 600.2950a(30), the court “shall rescind the [PPO] upon notification and verification that the petitioner is a prisoner.” Id. 

“[F]or the reasons stated in Kampf, [237 Mich App at 377,] [the Court of Appeals] conclude[d] that MCL 600.2950a provides sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy due process.” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 437 (2014). The Kampf Court stated that “[t]here is no procedural due process defect [under MCL 600.2950] in obtaining an emergency order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for the emergency protection order is supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying entry of an emergency order without prior notice, . . . and where there are appropriate provisions for notice and an opportunity to be heard after the order is issued.” Kampf, 237 Mich App at 383-384. Accordingly, the procedural safeguards set out in MCL 600.2950a(1)-(2) (issuing ex parte order), MCL 600.2950a(13)-(14) (filing motion to modify or rescind ex parte order; hearing on motion), MCL 600.2950a(14) (hearing on motion to modify or rescind ex parte order), MCL 600.2950a(18) (notice), and MCL 600.2950a(22) (requiring actual notice and opportunity to comply before being arrested) satisfy due process. See IME, 306 Mich App at 436-438.

1.Conduct Subject to Restraint

In issuing a nondomestic stalking PPO under MCL 600.2950a(1), the court may restrain or enjoin the respondent from stalking under MCL 750.411h(1)(e). MCL 600.2950a(1). Stalking is “a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” MCL 750.411h(1)(e). The prohibited conduct must be a pattern involving a series of two or more “separate  noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.” MCL 750.411h(1)(a).

Harassment, as used in MCL 600.2950a(1)(d), is “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.” MCL 750.411h(1)(d).

A PPO entered under MCL 600.2950a may prohibit a person from engaging in the following unconsented courses of conduct:¹²

•stalking, which includes, but is not limited to:

•following or appearing within the petitioner’s sight.

•appearing at the petitioner’s workplace or residence.

•approaching or confronting the petitioner in a public place or on private property.

•entering onto or remaining on property the petitioner owns, leases, or occupies.

•sending the petitioner mail or electronic communications.

•contacting the petitioner by telephone.

•placing an object on or delivering an object to property the petitioner owns, leases, or occupies.

•purchasing or possessing a firearm.¹³ MCL 600.2950a(1), MCL 600.2950a(3),¹⁴ MCL 600.2950a(26); MCL 750.411h(1)(f); SCAO form CC 380, Personal Protection Order (Nondomestic).¹⁵

•aggravated stalking, which includes, but is not limited to conduct that constitutes stalking (see above), when any of the following conditions are present:

•at least one of the actions constituting stalking violates a restraining order, and the respondent received actual notice of the order, or at least one of the actions constituting stalking violates an injunction or preliminary injunction.

•at least one of the actions constituting stalking violates a condition of probation, parole, pretrial release, or release on bond pending appeal.

•the respondent’s course of conduct includes making at least one credible threat (i.e. threat to kill or physically injure another individual that causes the person hearing the threat to reasonably fear for his or her or another person’s safety) against the petitioner, a member of the petitioner’s family, or an individual living with the petitioner.

•the respondent has been previously convicted of stalking or aggravated stalking. MCL 600.2950a(1); MCL 600.2950a(26); MCL 750.411(1)(b); MCL 750.411i(1)(f); MCL 750.411i(2); SCAO form CC 380, Personal Protection Order (Nondomestic).

•cyberstalking, which includes posting a message through the use of any medium of communication, including the Internet or a computer computer program, computer system, or computer network, or any other electronic medium of communication without the consent of the victim if all of the following apply:

•“[t]he person knows or has reason to know that posting the message could cause 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts of unconsented contact with the victim.”

•the person posts the message with the intent “to cause conduct that would make the victim feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.”

•any conduct that arises from the posting “would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.”

•“[c]onduct arising from posting the message causes the victim to suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” MCL 600.2950a(1); MCL 750.411s(1); SCAO form CC 380, Personal Protection Order (Nondomestic).

2.Standard for Issuing Nondomestic Stalking PPO

In order for the court to grant a nondomestic stalking petition under MCL 600.2950a(1), the petitioner must “allege[] facts that constitute stalking as defined in . . . [MCL 750.411h] or [MCL 750.411i], or conduct that is prohibited under [MCL 750.411s].”¹⁶ MCL 600.2950a(1).

A respondent may argue that a PPO enjoining conduct described in MCL 750.411s violates his or her First Amendment rights. See TT v KL, 334 Mich App 413, 445-446 (2020). It is only then that the issue of defamation (an exception to the First Amendment) may serve as a possible argument by a PPO petitioner. Id. at 446. When this issue arises, “the trier of fact must determine [whether] the statements or posts were definitively false.” Id. at 450. However, the language to be prohibited by the PPO must “be specifically limited to the [false and defamatory] speech.” Id. In TT, 334 Mich App at 418, “the . . . PPO prohibited respondent ‘from posting defamatory statements about [p]etitioner on social media and/or from publishing such statements elsewhere.’” The trial court should have amended the PPO because the scope of language prohibited by it was “much too broad and unconfined to the boundaries set in MCL 750.411s.” TT, 334 Mich App at 450. “The trial court should have amended the PPO to provide that, absent petitioner’s consent, respondent is prohibited from posting online messages that assert that petitioner is allowing [a two-time sex offender] to have access to, or contact, with [the parties’ daughter] and that otherwise violate MCL 750.411s.” TT, 334 Mich App at 450.

Although a respondent’s comment was clearly offensive and in poor taste, the comment was constitutionally protected and could not support the issuance of a PPO. CNN v SEB, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023). In CNN, the respondent’s comment “‘did not reach the level of intending the commission of an unlawful act of violence,’” and the petitioner “did not describe being threatened by the statement.” Id. at ___. “True threats” include those statements made by a speaker who intends that the statement “communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Id. at ___, quoting Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003). The respondent’s statement to CNN, “‘[H]ere come your masser (sic),’” was not a threat and nothing indicates that SEB meant to create violence. CNN, ___ Mich App at ___. “Rather, SEB boorishly expressed anger about a white neighbor interfering in her disagreement with CNN. Her words were racially charged, puerile, and ugly, but also were protected.” Id. at ___.

MCL 600.2950a(1) does not require the respondent to have been charged or convicted of violating MCL 750.411h, MCL 750.411i, or MCL 750.411s for relief to be sought or granted under MCL 600.2950a(1).

3.Standard for Issuing Nondomestic Stalking Ex Parte PPO

If the petitioner specifically requests that the PPO be issued without written or oral notice to the respondent or his or her attorney,¹⁷ the court must issue the PPO ex parte if both of the following are met:

•“the petition alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in . . . [MCL 750.411h] or [MCL 750.411i], or conduct that is prohibited under [MCL 750.411s][.]”¹⁸ MCL 600.2950a(1).¹⁹

•“it clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will precipitate adverse action before a [PPO] can be issued.” MCL 600.2950a(12). See also MCR 3.703(G); MCR 3.705(A)(2).

Note: “The court must rule on a request for an ex parte order within one business day of the filing date of the petition.” MCR 3.705(A)(1). If the court refuses to enter the PPO ex parte, it must advise the petitioner of the right to request a hearing.²⁰ MCR 3.705(A)(5). For additional information on the procedures required for issuing PPOs, see Section 5.7.

“A [PPO] issued under [MCL 600.2950a(12)] is valid for not less than 182 days.” MCL 600.2950a(13). See also MCR 3.705(A)(3). It must state its expiration date. Id.

C.Nondomestic Sexual Assault PPO

For purposes of MCL 600.2950a, a PPO is “an injunctive order issued by the family division of circuit court restraining or enjoining conduct prohibited under [MCL 600.2950a(1)] or [MCL 600.2950a(3)].” MCL 600.2950a(31)(d).

The nondomestic sexual assault PPO provision, MCL 600.2950a(2), permits, “an individual [to] petition the family division of circuit court to enter a [PPO] to restrain or enjoin an individual” from conduct listed in MCL 600.2950a(3) when the respondent (1) has been convicted of sexually assaulting the petitioner, (2) “has been convicted of furnishing obscene material to the petitioner under . . . MCL 750.142, or a substantially similar law of the United States, another state, or a foreign country or tribal or military law[,]” or (3) has subjected, threatened, or placed the petitioner in reasonable apprehension of sexual assault.²¹ For additional information on petitioning the court for a nondomestic sexual assault PPO, see Section 5.7.

A nondomestic stalking PPO must not be issued if the petitioner and the respondent have a parent/child relationship and the child is an unemancipated minor. MCL 600.2950a(27)(a)-(b). If there is no such parent/child relationship, a person under age 18 may be a party to a PPO action.²² MCL 600.2950a(28). However, a nondomestic stalking PPO must not be issued if the respondent is less than ten years old. MCL 600.2950a(27)(c).

The court must not enter a nondomestic stalking PPO if the petitioner is a prisoner. MCL 600.2950a(30). If the court issues a PPO in violation of MCL 600.2950a(30), the court “shall rescind the [PPO] upon notification and verification that the petitioner is a prisoner.” Id. 

“[F]or the reasons stated in Kampf, [237 Mich App at 377,] [the Court of Appeals] conclude[d] that MCL 600.2950a provides sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy due process.” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 437 (2014). The Kampf Court stated that “[t]here is no procedural due process defect [under MCL 600.2950] in obtaining an emergency order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for the emergency protection order is supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying entry of an emergency order without prior notice, . . . and where there are appropriate provisions for notice and an opportunity to be heard after the order is issued.” Kampf, 237 Mich App at 383-384. Accordingly, the procedural safeguards set out in MCL 600.2950a(1)-(2) (issuing ex parte order), MCL 600.2950a(13)-(14) (filing motion to modify or rescind ex parte order; hearing on motion), MCL 600.2950a(14) (hearing on motion to modify or rescind ex parte order), MCL 600.2950a(18) (notice), and MCL 600.2950a(22) (requiring actual notice and opportunity to comply before being arrested) satisfy due process. See IME, 306 Mich App at 436-438.

Moreover, MCL 600.2950a(2)(a) is not facially invalid “[b]ecause the statute does not on its face impair a fundamental right, . . . [and because t]he Legislature’s decision to allow the victims of sexual assault to seek personal protection orders against the persons convicted of assaulting them is reasonably related to the legitimate government purpose of protecting the victims of sexual assault from further victimization.” IME, 306 Mich App at 441, 443. In addition, “trial courts have substantial discretion to fashion a PPO that balances the petitioner’s need for appropriate protection and the respondent’s liberty interests[,]” and “[t]his flexibility advances the Legislature’s interest in protecting the victims of sexual assault while ensuring that the perpetrators’ liberty interests are not arbitrarily or unreasonably restrained.” Id. at 443-444.

1.Conduct Subject to Restraint

In issuing a nondomestic sexual assault PPO under MCL 600.2950a, the court may restrain or enjoin the respondent from doing one or more of the following:

“(a) Entering onto premises.

(b) Threatening to sexually assault, kill, or physically injure petitioner or a named individual.

(c) Purchasing or possessing a firearm.^[23]

(d) Interfering with the petitioner’s efforts to remove the petitioner’s children or personal property from premises that are solely owned or leased by the individual to be restrained or enjoined.

(e) Interfering with the petitioner at the petitioner’s place of employment or education or engaging in conduct that impairs the petitioner’s employment or educational relationship or environment.

(f) Following or appearing within the sight of the petitioner.

(g) Approaching or confronting the petitioner in a public place or on private property.

(h) Appearing at the petitioner’s workplace or residence.

(i) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the petitioner.

(j) Contacting the petitioner by telephone.

(k) If the petitioner is a minor who is enrolled in a public or nonpublic school that operates any of grades K to 12, attending school in the same building as the petitioner.

(l) Sending mail or electronic communications to the petitioner.

(m) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the petitioner.

(n) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under . . . MCL 750.411s.

(o) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence or sexual assault.” MCL 600.2950a(3). See also the SCAO form Personal Protection Order (Nondomestic Sexual Assault).

2.Standard for Issuing Nondomestic Sexual Assault PPO

The court must grant a petition under MCL 600.2950a(2)(a) “if [it] determines that the respondent has been convicted of a sexual assault of the petitioner or that the respondent was convicted of furnishing obscene material to the petitioner under . . . MCL 750.142, or a substantially similar law of the United States, another state, or a foreign country or tribal or military law.”

The court must not grant a petition under MCL 600.2950a(2)(b), “unless the petition alleges facts that demonstrate that the respondent has perpetrated or threatened sexual assault against the petitioner.^[24] Evidence that a respondent has furnished obscene material to a minor petitioner is evidence that the respondent has threatened sexual assault against the petitioner.” MCL 600.2950a(2)(b). However, MCL 600.2950a(2)(b) does not require the respondent to have beencharged with or convicted of “sexual assault or an offense under . . . MCL 750.142, or a substantially similar law of the United States, another state, or a foreign country or tribal or military law.”

3.Standard for Issuing Nondomestic Sexual Assault Ex Parte PPO

If the petitioner specifically requests that the PPO be issued without written or oral notice to the respondent or his or her attorney,²⁵ the court must issue the PPO ex parte if both of the following are met:

•“the court determines that the respondent has been convicted of a sexual assault of the petitioner or that the respondent was convicted of furnishing obscene material to the petitioner under . . . MCL 750.142, or a substantially similar law of the United States, another state, or a foreign country or tribal or military law,” MCL 600.2950a(2)(a); or “the petition alleges facts that demonstrate that the respondent has perpetrated or threatened sexual assault against the petitioner,” MCL 600.2950a(2)(b).²⁶

•“it clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will precipitate adverse action before a [PPO] can be issued.” MCL 600.2950a(12). See also MCR 3.703(G); MCR 3.705(A)(2).

Note: “The court must rule on a request for an ex parte order within one business day of the filing date of the petition.” MCR 3.705(A)(1). If the court refuses to enter the PPO ex parte, it must advise the petitioner of the right to request a hearing.²⁷ MCR 3.705(A)(5). For additional information on the procedures required for issuing PPOs, see Section 5.7.

“A [PPO] issued under [MCL 600.2950a(12)] is valid for not less than 182 days.” MCL 600.2950a(13). See also MCR 3.705(A)(3). It must state its expiration date. Id.